




FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

A TOOLBOX

JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC MORIN &
JONATHAN PAQUIN



Foreign Policy Analysis

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What Is Foreign Policy Analysis?

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is very appealing to students, irrespective of age or caliber. Some people expect to find a field of study that is more concrete and practical than international relations theories. Others are fascinated by great historical figures, from Otto von Bismarck to Winston Churchill, or are drawn, without always wanting to admit it, by the apparent romanticism of diplomacy.

These are, of course, only lures. The novice soon realizes that the theoretical models in FPA are just as complex as those in other fields of international relations. They also realize that most foreign policy decisions, far from being clinched in padded embassy drawing rooms, between a cigar and a martini, are the result of bureaucratic processes similar to those in other areas of public policy.

As the complexity unfolds and diplomacy loses its aura, other attractions come into play. First and foremost, FPA provides a unique opportunity to integrate analysis at different levels. At the crossroads between the theories of international relations and public policy analysis, FPA is not limited to the study of the international system that fails to take account of its component parts, or to the study of one-off decision-making processes in the international context.

Instead, FPA focuses on the continuous interaction between actors and their environment. To understand and explain foreign policy, the international context must be taken into account. The distribution of power

between countries and the influence of transnational stakeholders and intergovernmental organizations partially determine foreign policy. Governments that adopt foreign policies perceive the international system through their own filters, which may be cultural, organizational or cognitive. Therefore, to understand and explain a foreign policy, it is also essential to study the state's domestic dynamics and decision-making processes (Sprout and Sprout 1965).

Although FPA does not have its own specific level of analysis, it can be defined by its dependent variable, namely, foreign policy itself. Most research in FPA seeks to explain how one or more public authorities adopt a given policy in certain conditions. Why do great powers actively try to forge alliances with small countries despite their limited military resources (Fordham 2011)? Why did Jordan drop its territorial claims on Palestine (Legrand 2009)? Why did members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sign the Kyoto agreement, even though it aims to reduce the consumption of their main export (Depledge 2008)? Why does France concentrate more of its official development assistance in its former colonies than does the United Kingdom (Alesina and Dollar 2000)? Why did Norway join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but refuse to join the European Union (EU), whereas Sweden chose to do the opposite (Reiter 1996)? The questions are endless, but the starting point is always the same: identify a foreign policy, which is often puzzling or counter-intuitive, and then try to explain it.

WHAT IS A POLICY?

Despite the fact that foreign policy is the focal point of FPA, or perhaps for that very reason, there is no consensual definition of what a foreign policy actually is. The truth is that the question is hardly ever discussed in the literature. Most analysts quite simply avoid tackling the concept directly, even though it is central to their work. Other fields of international relations are organized around definitions, which act as reference points for theoretical debates, as well as for operationalizing variables. But FPA has no equivalent.

After all, the concept of foreign policy adopted by analysts is in constant mutation, as a function of the changes in practices and theories. It would be illusory to freeze foreign policy within a specific empirical reality that is timeless and universal. Indeed, what is considered to be a foreign policy

today may not have been so yesterday and may not be tomorrow. As a result, every definition remains more or less dependent on its context.

This book, which seeks to reflect the field of study overall and its evolution over the past few decades, adopts a broad definition of foreign policy: *a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority deployed in the international environment.*

Our definition emphasizes that foreign policy is the “actions of an *independent* political authority” because it is reserved to sovereign states. The Canadian, the German or the Spanish governments, for example, are the legal custodian of their states’ sovereignty and the representatives of the international personality of their respective states. Hence, sub-national states such as Quebec, Bavaria or Catalonia are not conducting foreign policy. They can conduct international relations according to their constitutional jurisdictions, but they cannot deploy a foreign policy on the international scene because they are not sovereign and independent entities (Vengroff and Jason Rich 2006). Of course, there are exceptions—in Belgium, for instance, federalism is quite decentralized and gives several exclusive constitutional jurisdictions to Wallonia and Flanders as well as the right to sign international legal agreements (treaties) in their jurisdictions (Criekemans 2010).

Our definition of foreign policy also refers to “actions or rules governing the actions” because the notion of policy is polysemic. Some scholars consider that a foreign policy comprises actions, reactions or inaction, which may be *ad hoc* or repeated (Frankel 1963). From this perspective, France’s decision to withdraw from the negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998, or the repeated practice of providing emergency assistance to a neighboring country in the event of a major natural disaster, would be considered examples of foreign policy.

Other scholars view foreign policy not as the action itself but as the underlying vision—in other words, the specific conception that a state has regarding its place in the world, its national interests and the key principles that allow it to defend them. According to this view, the American policy to contain communism during the Cold War or Beijing’s “one China” policy concerning Taiwan would be examples of foreign policy.

A third option places foreign policy between these two extremes. This is the middle path, favored, notably, by James Rosenau, who considers that doctrines are too country-specific, which rules out the study of their variation, and that the decisions are too irregular and idiosyncratic to allow for generalizations (1980: 53).

The definition of foreign policy proposed in this book does not settle this debate. Some research, which clearly comes within the FPA framework, focuses on well-defined decisions, while other research focuses on practices that are repeated so often that they are taken for granted. Some researchers concentrate on what states do materially, while others consider what states declare verbally. Given this diversity, there is *a priori* no need to limit the field of FPA to a narrow definition of policy, whatever it may be (Snyder et al. 2002 [1962]: 74).

WHEN A POLICY BECOMES FOREIGN

Are foreign policy and public policy different? Research shows that there is a substantial amount of overlap between these two fields of research. However, scholars differentiate foreign policy because it is located at the junction between international politics and domestic public policy (Rosenau 1971). On the one hand, as Lentner explains, “(t)here are foreign policy writers who concentrate on exactly the type of analysis that most public policy analysts do” (2006: 172). Authors like Richard Neustadt (1960), Graham Allison (1969) and Alexander George (1980) are good examples. On the other hand, several FPA experts belong to the discipline of international relations and are directly influenced by research paradigms such as realism or liberalism, which try to explain states’ behavior in the international system. What differentiates these two traditions of FPA from the study of domestic public policy, however, is that they must somehow take into account the international system as they deal with problems arising outside state borders. This is the reason why this book defines foreign policy as being “deployed in the international environment”.

Nonetheless, we cannot hide the fact that the boundary between foreign and domestic policies is increasingly porous in today’s world. Several issues that were previously considered strictly international now include domestic policy. Homegrown terrorism in Western democracies where citizens perpetrate terrorist acts on behalf of international terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al-Qaeda is a case in point. It led governments to adopt public policies to prevent and to tackle citizens’ radicalization. Conversely, other issues traditionally perceived as domestic public policy now have obvious international ramifications, Chinese environmental policies on greenhouse gas emission being an obvious example.

During the Cold War, some observers assimilated the distinction between external and internal policies to that between high politics and low politics. From this perspective, foreign policy was perceived as an instrument to serve vital state interests, geared specifically to guaranteeing security or maximizing power (Morgenthau 1948). The prospect of a nuclear war heightened the impression that all public policy objectives, from public health to transport, including education, should be subordinated to the security priorities of foreign policy. As John F. Kennedy expressed in 1951, when he was a House representative in the US Congress:

Foreign policy today, irrespective of what we might wish, in its impact on our daily lives, overshadows everything else. Expenditures, taxation, domestic prosperity, the extent of social services – all hinge on the basic issue of war or peace. (Dallek 2003: 158)

In reality, despite Kennedy's comments, economic and social policies have never been systematically subjected to foreign policy security concerns. Likewise, state security has never been viewed exclusively through the prism of foreign policy. The artificial distinction between high politics and low politics, combined with that of domestic and external policy, is an idea that has been encouraged by introductory textbooks on foreign policy for years. However, it has never really corresponded to the realities of exercising power (Fordham 1998).

The interconnection between domestic and foreign policy is well illustrated by the crosscutting operations of the armed forces and the police forces. Traditional discourse suggests that the armed forces deal with external or interstate threats and the police forces deal with internal and civil threats. Yet, the armed forces have always played a specific role in domestic order, particularly in colonies or peacekeeping operations, while police forces have been involved in international relations for years, for example, in their fight against organized crime or terrorist organizations (Sheptycki 2000; Balzacq 2008; Friesendorf 2016).

The fictitious assimilation of high politics to foreign policy and low politics to domestic policy remained relatively intact in political discourses until the first oil crisis in 1973. When the repercussions of the Middle East conflict were felt directly at fuel stations around the world, the strict and rigid distinction between security and the economy, like that between internal and external policies, became obsolete (Keohane and Nye 1977).

The binary distinction between high and low politics disappeared definitively from FPA lexicon at the end of the Cold War. In the contemporary world, nuclear conflict no longer appears to pose as great a threat as financial crises, new epidemics, migratory movements, biotechnology or climate change. In order to affirm that the single objective of foreign policy is still to guarantee state security, the notion has to be extended to cover economic, health, energy, human, nutritional, societal and environmental securities, until all areas of state action are included and the notion loses all meaning (Buzan et al. 1998). It is undoubtedly simpler to acknowledge that foreign policy is multisectoral. Indeed, it focuses equally on promoting cultural diversity, respecting human rights, prohibiting chemical weapons, restricting agricultural subsidies, conserving fish stocks in the oceans and so forth.

The field of foreign policy, unlike other areas of public policy, cannot be defined by a single question, objective, target or function. Rather, it can be defined by a geographic criterion: every action (or inaction) undertaken by a sovereign political authority in a context beyond the state's borders can be considered as a component of foreign policy, regardless of whether it is the responsibility of the ministry of foreign affairs or any other public authority.

It is actually this transition from internal to external that gives foreign policy its specificity: the political authority that adopts and implements a foreign policy has very limited control over its outcome because the outcome depends on variables that elude its sovereignty. The Brazilian government cannot reform the UN Security Council in the way it reforms its own institutions; the French government cannot govern Greenpeace boats navigating in international waters the way it regulates NGO activities in France; and the Chinese government cannot protect its investments in Africa as it does in its own territory.

Of course, the notion that the modes of governance of the international system are fundamentally different from those of national systems can be challenged. After all, the categories of actors, their capacity for action and the factors that determine their influence are relatively similar. As a result, the traditional distinction is fading between the national context, where the state alone has the monopoly over legitimate violence, and the anarchic international context, which has no hierarchical authority. However, the fact remains that, from a government's perspective, there are two distinct contexts, which always present radically different constraints and opportunities (Walker 1993).

AN ARRAY OF EXPLANATIONS

A vast array of independent and intermediate variables can explain a given foreign policy. These explanations range from social structure to leader's personality. They include interest groups, institutional architecture, the influence of the media and bureaucratic politics.

To identify the most suitable variables, FPA draws on multiple disciplines. In fact, few fields of study have embraced disciplines as varied as sociology, economics, public administration, psychology and history with the same enthusiasm. Although there are now calls for interdisciplinarity in all the social sciences, FPA can, undeniably, claim to be a leader when it comes to integrating different disciplines.

This interdisciplinarity has generated a remarkable diversity in theoretical models and methodological approaches. A single issue of a journal devoted to FPA can quite easily include the psychological profile of a head of state, a study on national identity based on iconography, a cybernetic model of the rationale of a ministry of foreign affairs and a statistical analysis of the relationships between inflation rates and declarations of war over the last two centuries. A 2010 issue of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, for example, purposely published a collection of articles that relied on very different theoretical approaches, methodologies and substantive issues to show the extent to which FPA could contribute to knowledge production in international relations. As the editors of the issue pointed out:

The theoretical and methodological approaches used in foreign policy analysis are as varied as the substantive questions asked. Thus, the strength of foreign policy analysis is its integrative approach that emphasizes individuals, groups, and institutions at or within the level of the state as driving forces in foreign policy behaviour and outcomes. (Drury et al. 2010)

At first glance, this theoretical and methodological eclecticism is vertiginous. The sheer diversity can seem discordant, particularly for a reader who is used to the structured theoretical debates of international relations, which have generally recognizable dividing lines. The internationalist who opens the state's black box will find a jumble of different approaches that are neither catalogued nor ordered. This may seem confusing and incoherent.

This impression is exacerbated if one considers, wrongly, that the different approaches are competing to dominate this field of study. In reality, FPA has long since given up on developing a highly generalizable theory

that would explain the most important foreign policies. Instead, middle-range theories are being developed to explain only a limited number of decisions or even just one aspect of the decision-making process in well-defined circumstances. This lies halfway between general theories, which cannot explain specific features, on the one hand, and the complexity of the real world, which cannot be reported intelligibly, on the other hand (Sil and Katzenstein 2010; Lake 2011).

This epistemological modesty, referred to as a leitmotif in the literature on FPA, is a way of avoiding sectarian and sterile clashes. In FPA, there is no trench warfare between different paradigms. No one pledges allegiance to a specific school of thought. On the contrary, the availability of a huge spectrum of medium-range theories invites the researcher to combine these theories in order to build new constructions. FPA is not only multi-level and multidisciplinary; it is resolutely multicausal. By freeing ourselves from the pursuit of a single explanatory variable, a confusing first impression can be transformed into a creative impulse (Schafer 2003).

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND THE EVOLUTION IN FPA

The behavioral revolution that marked the discipline of political science in the United States in the mid-twentieth century led to a split between the field of FPA and international relations. One of the main dividing lines between the different theories is the level of analysis (Singer 1961). In his book *Man, the State and War* published in 1959, Kenneth Waltz distinguishes three levels of analysis: the individual level (first image), the national level (second image) and the international system (third image).

FPA mainly relies on Waltz' first and second images as it is an agent-centered field of research. It focuses on actor-specific decisions and places the decision-making process at the center of its attention. FPA, therefore, concentrates on subnational factors, such as the personality of government leaders, social groups or the bureaucracy.

The field of international relations, by contrast, mainly focuses on Waltz' third image as it is structure-oriented. It is through the macroscopic scale of analysis that this field of research tries to explain interstate or transnational phenomena, and this without looking inside the state. This field of research is outcome-oriented as oppose to process-oriented. Considerations such as the distribution of power in the international system or the impact of international norms on states' interactions are key.

This said, even if the individual, the state and the international levels of analysis focus on different actors, processes and outcomes, they can all be relevant, depending on the research puzzle that is driving the research (Singer 1961: 90).

Focusing on the individual and national levels of analysis, James Rosenau and Harold and Margaret Sprout called for a scientific analysis of foreign policy, which led to the behaviorist turn in FPA in the 1960s (Rosenau 1966; Sprout and Sprout 1965). Rosenau argued that FPA should strive for a greater degree of generalization by going beyond simple case studies and the descriptive and interpretative approaches traditionally used in diplomatic history (1968).

Responding to this call, databases were put together by a generation of scholars in order to systematically study foreign policy, and experts produced a burgeoning literature that defined the modern field of FPA. The research agenda on comparative foreign policy analysis (CFPA) contributed to this development (Rosenau 1968). Vast databases, such as the World Event Interaction Survey or the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, were created to systematically observe the behavior of states with respect to international events. The main objective of CFPA was to identify empirical patterns from which it would be possible to isolate independent variables and develop generalizable theoretical models to explain states' behavior.

But after years of intensive research supported by governments and private foundations, FPA experts had to face reality: attempts to identify the main behavioral patterns in foreign policy had proved unsuccessful. Experts failed to achieve a degree of abstraction and parsimony sufficiently high to develop large-range theories of FPA. This is because states' behavior is conditioned by peculiar characteristics, such as cultural and political values, economic development and leaders' perceptions. This makes impossible the production of theories with universal and timeless significance.

This reality begot a certain lack of interest for the analysis of foreign policy to the point where FPA appeared to be a neglected field of study in the 1980s. To add to this disappointment, the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of new theories of international relations favoring an exclusively macroscopic scale of analysis. Neorealism, world-system theory and regime theory, for instance, caught the attention of researchers studying international structures and institutions, but failed to take

account of the domestic processes involved in formulating foreign policy. These theories sought to explain the outcome of international interactions rather than the specific action of particular actors.

The field of FPA was then virtually left to think tanks such as the *Council on Foreign Relations*, the *Royal Institute of International Affairs* or to journals geared more to practitioners than to academics, such as *Foreign Policy* and *Foreign Affairs*. To James Rosenau's great dismay (1980), FPA turned to solving policy problems rather than constructing theories.

Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War, macroscopic approaches that fail to take account of domestic dynamics have shown their limitations. The collapse of the Soviet Union has shown that international structures are unstable and that national politics and specific individuals can have a profound impact on international relations. Neorealists, for instance, were compelled to recognize that foreign policy agents are the engines of change in international politics. For instance, Mikhail Gorbachev, Lech Walesa and Pope John Paul II all played a role in the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result, it became obvious at the turn of the 1990s that the structure of the system helps to explain continuity in international relations, but that the agents are more suitable for the study of its change.

Fortunately, FPA has come back since the years 2000s and its theoretical and disciplinary openness has no doubt contributed to its recent resurgence. Internationalists are increasingly striving to integrate several levels of analysis, cut across different disciplines and develop medium-range theories. FPA, whose spearhead is multicausality, multidisciplinary and analysis at multiple levels, seems to be a promising field once more (Smith 1986; Gerner 1991 and 1995; Light 1994; Hudson and Vore 1995; Neack et al. 1995; White 1999; Hagan 2001; Kaarbo 2003; Stern 2004; Hudson 2005; Houghton 2007).

There are numerous indicators of the resurgence of FPA. In terms of teaching, a survey conducted among professors of international relations in ten countries revealed that there are now more courses in foreign policy than in international security, international political economy or international development (Jordan et al. 2009). In terms of research, a journal exclusively devoted to FPA, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, was created in 2005, and its distribution shows that it is well received by internationalists. Therefore, in this context of a revival, this book proposes an introduction to FPA, with a forward-looking approach and a classic base.

A TOOLBOX FOR STUDYING FPA

This book is designed like a toolbox from which students and researchers can draw ideas, concepts and references in order to conduct their own research. It does not set out to retrace the evolution of diplomatic practices, present classic decision-making processes or describe the main foreign policy trends of any particular country. Instead, it proposes a panorama of different approaches, which represent just as many keys for analysis.

As these different keys are more complementary than contrasting, we are reluctant to draw conclusions, in absolute terms, as to which is the most equitable or relevant. In any case, such arbitration would be counter to FPA's epistemological modesty and to its commitment to multicausality, multidisciplinary and multisectorality. The subject of specific analysis and its context, as well as the researcher's objectives, should obviously guide the choice of theoretical and methodological approaches.

We as researchers also navigate continuously between constructivism, institutionalism and realism. We rely on discourse and content analysis, process tracing and regression tables for our own research projects. We would definitely feel deprived if we had to limit our research projects to a single theoretical or methodological approach.

With this toolbox, we invite readers to adopt different theoretical and methodological approaches, not in order to reproduce them blindly, but to develop, adapt or, better still, combine them. Conducting FPA research often means putting together an *ad hoc* construction, by borrowing ideas from different approaches. The main interest that FPA holds for us, and others, lies in the intellectual creativity that it encourages.

In this context, this book focuses particularly on works that have become classics, namely, those by Graham Allison, Ole Holsti, Jack Levy, Margaret Hermann, Irving Janis, Robert Jervis, Alexander George, Helen Milner, Jack Snyder, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Robert Putnam. Going back to these classics is essential because they continue to be a source of inspiration and provide the basis for debate decades after their publication.

In addition, this book is influenced by recent research published in North America, Europe and elsewhere. It refers extensively to recent foreign policy articles published in peer-reviewed journals such as—but not exclusively—*Foreign Policy Analysis*, *International Studies Quarterly*,

International Organization, Review of International Studies, Security Studies, International Security, the European Journal of International Relations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research and Political Psychology. On the basis of this research, the book illustrates the implementation and the strengths, but also the weaknesses of the different theoretical models presented. The numerous bibliographic references also help guide the reader to more specialized reading.

The book starts with a presentation of FPA's dependent variable, that is, foreign policy itself (Chap. 1). The subsequent chapters look at different explanatory models. It presents the multiple levels of analysis going from the microscopic scale of analysis, inspired by psychology, to the macroscopic scale of analysis of structural theories of international relations. The book also deals with more abstract material and ideational considerations by focusing on the impact of rationality and culture on foreign policy. Hence, the book focuses successively on the definition of a foreign policy (Chap. 2), the decision-maker (Chap. 3), bureaucratic mechanisms (Chap. 4), political institutions (Chap. 5), social actors (Chap. 6), rationality (Chap. 7), culture (Chap. 8) and the international structure (Chap. 9). Finally, it identifies the main challenges that are facing FPA today (Chap. 10).

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How to Identify and Assess a Foreign Policy?

This chapter focuses on an essential prerequisite for every FPA, namely, identifying a foreign policy so that it can be grasped and explained. This stage is often neglected and constitutes the Achilles' heel of several studies, which are so preoccupied with the decision-making process that they overlook the foreign policy itself. Yet, it is crucial for analysts to carefully define the policy that they aim to explain. To define is to interpret. In other words, by defining, the researcher attributes a meaning that will, in turn, influence the type of explanation sought.

For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Switzerland refused to allow members of the coalition to fly over its airspace to transport troops and weapons to Kuwait. Some researchers may see this decision as a manifestation of the Swiss doctrine of neutrality. They would then try to explain why this neutrality persists: does Swiss national identity use this historical heritage as a federating principle? Or do the institutional characteristics of the Swiss political system dissuade the Federal Council from reviewing its constitutional obligations? Other researchers, however, might observe that the Swiss government imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, as outlined in the Security Council resolution 661, and, therefore, conclude that the policy of neutrality was being relaxed. Explaining the change rather than the continuity may then encourage them to study the geopolitical upheavals that occurred in the wake of the Cold War or the shifting balance

of power between members of the Swiss government. This example clearly illustrates that the foreign policy related to the same question during the same period can be interpreted in different ways. From the outset, the interpretation chosen will steer the research in a particular direction.

In order to interpret a foreign policy correctly, researchers must carefully compare it with previous policies, other states' policies or domestic policies. A comparative exercise is essential to provide an overview, even in the framework of a study focusing on a single case. That is why James Rosenau has argued passionately for a resolutely comparative approach to FPA:

Comprehension of the external activities undertaken by one national system is not sufficient to answer the questions of systemic adaptation and political process that are inherent in foreign policy phenomena. The repeated experiences of two or more systems must be carefully contrasted for an answer to such questions to begin to emerge. Only in this way can the theoretically oriented analyst begin to satisfy his curiosity and the policy-oriented analyst begins to accumulate the reliable knowledge on which sound recommendations and choices are made. Only in this way will it be possible to move beyond historical circumstances and comprehend the continuities of national life in a world of other nations (1968: 329).

For reasons similar to those mentioned by James Rosenau 50 years ago, comparison remains a central component of FPA. Regardless of whether the method is quantitative or qualitative, the enterprise positivist or post-positivist, the comparison between different states, different periods or different fields remains essential when it comes to identifying specific characteristics and generalizations, as well as continuity and change (Kaarbo 2003).

Comparison requires points of reference, which can help to determine what is real and identify variations. Every foreign policy analyst has their own favorite benchmarks. Charles Hermann, for example, uses four: the orientation, the problem, the program and the level of commitment of the foreign policy (1990). Peter Katzenstein, on the other hand, compares policies by contrasting their instruments and goals (1976, 1977).

This chapter focuses on five benchmarks that provide the basis for a comparative approach, including the goals, mobilized resources, instruments, process and outcomes. As this chapter makes clear, identifying benchmarks is not generally difficult; it is access to comparable data for research that poses problems.

THE GOALS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Some analysts of international relations ascribe a general predefined goal to foreign policy. This goal is then considered as timeless, universal and valid for every country under all circumstances. Depending on their theoretical preferences, analysts consider that foreign policy aims at the stability of the international system, the accumulation of wealth, the increase in relative power, the maintenance of leaders in power or the reproduction of national identity. Stephen Krasner, for example, suggests that foreign policy aims to protect national sovereignty and presumes that “all groups in the society would support the preservation of territorial and political integrity” (1978: 329).

The assumption that states pursue a single predefined goal in this way has an undeniable methodological advantage. The researcher is then exempt from explaining the goal and can freely interpret or model behavior. As Hans Morgenthau observed, attributing a goal to foreign policy “imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (1948 [2005]: 5).

However, this is an unrealistic methodological fiction. Political leaders pursue different, sometimes contradictory goals. The concept of national interest, more generally, depends on periods of time, countries and individuals. As a result, there is no general theory of FPA that is valid for all issue-areas and in all circumstances.

Several foreign policy analysts refuse to define a foreign policy goal arbitrarily. Instead, they endeavor to chart and compare the specific goals of the actors they are studying. There are two possible methods to achieve this: to consider that the goals announced by the leaders are actually the ones that they pursue or to deduce the goals that are pursued as a function of the leaders’ behavior.

The Goals Communicated

In some cases, foreign policy analysts can identify the foreign policy goals in the government’s public declarations. Policy statements, official speeches, government reports to parliament and white papers can be used as sources of information (Paquin and Beauregard 2015).

A foreign policy goal stated clearly in a public declaration should indicate four elements: the target, the direction, the expected outcome and a

timescale. For example, a specific foreign policy objective could be to improve (the direction) the conditions of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa (the target) to combat the spread of HIV (the outcome) in the next decade (the timescale) (Snyder et al. 2002 [1962]: 72).

If every state expressed their goals as clearly and precisely as this last example, it would be easy for the analyst to identify variations in any of the elements included in the foreign policy goals. It would be easy to research the dependent variable, and the analyst could, thus, focus on the independent variables. Why do some states, for example, have a more limited timescale than others for controlling the spread of HIV? However, foreign policy goals are rarely stated clearly and explicitly.

Furthermore, when a specific goal is communicated, it is legitimate for the analyst to question whether there is a discrepancy between the stated goal and the goal actually pursued (Onuf 2001). There are at least three reasons for this kind of discrepancy. First, in order to preserve their international reputation and legitimacy, it may be in states' interest to mask their pursuit of relative gains by mentioning the pursuit of absolute gain or, to use Arnold Wolfers' terms, to conceal their possession goals behind milieu goals (1962: 73–77). Trade restrictions that aim to protect a national industry may be applied in the name of environmental protection; a military intervention that seeks to guarantee access to natural resources may be launched in the name of international stability; and inaction in the face of an ally's reprehensible acts may be justified in the name of international law.

Second, it is tempting for political leaders to reduce the scope of a stated foreign policy goal in order to increase the likelihood of success and, thus, boost their status on the national political stage. For example, the Clinton administration claimed that the aim of the 1998 bombings in Iraq was merely to weaken the capacity of Saddam Hussein's regime to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Many observers, however, suspected that the United States' real goals were more ambitious, ranging from the total elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction manufacturing capability to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. As these objectives were harder to achieve, the Clinton administration opted for a communication strategy that guaranteed success in the eyes of the American public (Zelikow 1994; Baldwin 1999; Baum 2004b).

Third, decision-makers tend to evade the question of communication goals rather than acknowledge them openly. Military intervention abroad, for example, can be officially justified by the need to overthrow a hostile government or preempt an imminent attack. However, these instrumental

goals can conceal equally important communication goals. Military intervention can also serve to demonstrate strength to third-party states or to fuel patriotism on the national political stage. Nonetheless, openly acknowledging communication goals is counterproductive and can undermine a government's national and international credibility. Paradoxically, declaring communication goals undermines their achievement (Lindsay 1986; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988).

Consequently, discourse analysis does not usually suffice when it comes to identifying the specific goals actually pursued by foreign policy. More generally, all sources that explicitly state the objectives should be treated with caution. Political statements and press releases are often geared to the electorate and are sometimes at odds with the foreign policy they refer to. Decision-makers' autobiographies are mere narratives compiled *a posteriori* in the light of the events resulting from foreign policies. Minutes and recordings of meetings, when available, are partial and incomplete. Even apparent leaks of secret documents should be carefully examined for their authenticity and representativeness.

Doctrine

Another way foreign policy analysts can identify a government's foreign policy objectives is by searching for a doctrine. A doctrine is a set of beliefs, rules and principles guiding foreign policy. It is a self-imposed coherent framework that helps a government carry out its mission and objectives in the world. A doctrine is often but not always summed up in a statement or in an official document to communicate a government's priorities and goals to its domestic audience as well as to foreign actors.

Doctrines are often assimilated to the notion of grand strategy, yet they are not limited to great power politics. Canada, for example, had its "Axworthy doctrine" in the 1990s, named after its Minister of Foreign Affairs, which emphasized the need to protect human security through several initiatives such as the campaign to ban anti-personal landmines (Hampson and Oliver 1998). Finland had its Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine during the Cold War named after two of its presidents. This doctrine was established to preserve Finnish independence and foreign policy neutrality in the context where it evolved next to the Soviet empire.

As doctrines are not always explicitly presented as such, the search for doctrines is like a national sport for some foreign policy experts. For analysts, doctrines usefully provide macro-political frameworks through

which we can understand states' interests and try to predict their behavior. Doctrines also provide a benchmark for assessing the success and failure of a government's foreign policy strategy over time.

Throughout his tenure as the president of the United States, Barack Obama has confused observers on whether or not his administration had a foreign policy doctrine. A quick search online under "Obama doctrine" shows that this issue has been and still is a major source of debate among experts. Some claim that there was no Obama doctrine (Danforth 2016; Hirsh 2011), whereas others argue there was a doctrine, but they could not agree on its components (Goldberg 2016; Drezner 2011). At times, mere declarations acquire the status of doctrines *ex post* and subsequently serve as a guide for action for the bureaucratic apparatus and the successors of those who initially made the declarations.

Doctrines, however, have the tendency to create distortion between the belief system of a government (the macro-political trend) and the actual foreign policy decisions made by that government. By relying too heavily on the rules and principles contained in a doctrine, FPA experts can miss certain explanatory factors that account for a particular outcome because they don't fit the official doctrine. Take, for example, President Trump's 'America First' doctrine as formulated during his inaugural address on January 20, 2017. Emma Ashford from the Cato Institute writes that "while the implications for trade and immigration are relatively clear, his speech brought us little closer to understanding what this will mean for foreign policy" (Ashford 2017). Indeed, if Trump wants to protect American jobs from the forces of globalization and to increase homeland security through restrictive executive orders on immigration, his doctrine does not shed light on the core principles that will guide his actions toward the Middle East or Russia.

Moreover, a doctrine is like a picture taken at a particular moment that shows the interests, beliefs and principles of a government. It often has a hard time to adapt to domestic and international changes. For instance, Canada's late 1990s' Axworthy doctrine on human security failed to explain Canada's foreign policy behavior in the post-9/11 era, which essentially brings back national security issues to the forefront. Hence, doctrines may be more useful to foreign policy historians as they help to identify different eras and trends in the evolution of a state's foreign policy than to political scientists trying to make sense of current issues.

National Interest

Political leaders often hide behind the notion of national interest the moment they are asked to specify their foreign policy goals. This behavior allows them to depoliticize foreign policy and generate some legitimacy. In fact, it is often the political objectives that define the concept of national interest and not the other way around. As Henry Kissinger commented, “When you’re asking Americans to die, you have to be able to explain it in terms of the national interest” (quoted in Weldes 1999: 1).

The concept of national interest is omnipresent in leaders’ rhetoric around the world and transcends political parties and political regimes. Rwandan President Paul Kagame once declared, “The history and national interest of Rwanda and the Rwandan people dictate our national orientation” (IGIHE 2012). Thousands of kilometers from there, English Prime Minister David Cameron stated, “I believe something very deeply. That Britain’s national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it” (BBC News 2013). Clearly, the majority of British citizens who voted for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in June 2016 did not share Prime Minister Cameron’s view of the national interest.

The first question we should ask ourselves when reading such statements is what do leaders mean by the “national interest” and what kind of foreign policy objectives are they trying to communicate? Did Kagame and Cameron’s definition of the national interest refer to the same irreducible needs? It is not easy to give a clear meaning to such a fussy concept. The national interest is a catch-all concept that is often used without definition and which has no pre-social significance. It is a social construct that evolves with its context (Rosenau 1968, 1980; Frankel 1970; Finnemore 1996; Weldes 1996).

National interest draws from intuitive thinking rather than from sound theoretical justification and explanation (Paquin 2010). Alexander George and Robert Keohane argue that the national interest is “so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial” (George and Keohane 1980: 217). The problem with using this concept without defining precisely what one means by it is that it remains vague, underspecified and non-operational. The challenge to foreign policy experts is therefore to “unpack” this fussy concept in order to make it intelligible and meaningful.

David Callahan (1998) offers an interesting framework to understand the different national interests that democratic states pursue. His framework considers the “needs” and the “wants” of governments. The “needs” are connected to the so-called states’ vital interests that ensure their protection and survival in the international system such as the protection of their citizens and national territory, access to energy resources, the health of the economy and the security of its allies. As for the “wants”, they refer to states’ desires that do not have a direct impact on their security, such as the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad as well as conflict and crime prevention.

This typology is interesting but does not inform the researcher on the kinds of interests that are pursued by decision-makers at a particular time and in a particular place. We can all agree that the Rwandan and the British governments have “needs” and “wants”, but this is not specific enough to attribute a foreign policy behavior to a particular type of national interest.

This is where FPA theories come into play. Theoretical models are built on assumptions about what constitutes states’ interests. These models provide theoretical mechanisms that establish a connection between the national interest (i.e. policy imperatives) and the foreign behavior of a government. FPA models can operationalize the concept of the national interest, without always directly referring to it, and shed lights on the kinds of interests that were at play in a particular decision-making process. Hence, theories can clarify the fustiness of this concept by testing empirically the theoretical assumptions they make about the national interest.

In sum, unlike political leaders who hide behind the fussy concept of the national interest to bolster the legitimacy of their communicated political goals, foreign policy analysts cannot allow themselves to be as intuitive and vague as political leaders when they refer to this concept because it is meaningless when not properly defined and operationalized in research.

Deducing the Goals Pursued

Several techniques can be used to deduce foreign policy goals from the state’s behavior instead of relying on its publicly stated goals. One technique is to analyze the outcomes. If a policy is maintained for a long period and decision-makers have had numerous occasions to assess and modify it, we can deduce that the outcomes correspond to the goals pursued. For example, many studies on public development aid have observed that bilateral aid has little impact on the economic development in

beneficiary countries. Since this practice has been repeated over several decades, it is legitimate to call into question the primary goal, namely, to promote economic development of stated beneficiaries (Easterly 2006; Jensen and Paldam 2006; Rajan and Subramanian 2008).

In fact, several studies have revealed that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between development aid and the concordance of votes within international bodies. In general, the more aid a country receives, the more likely its stance will resemble that of its donors at the UN General Assembly. On the basis of this observation, analysts may be tempted to draw the conclusion that public development aid's primary goal is to increase the donor's political influence (Rai 1980; Lundborg 1998; Wang 1999; Lai and Morey 2006; Dreher et al. 2008).

However, such a conclusion is premature. First, some surprising studies have observed the opposite statistical relationship. These studies claim that aid reduces rather than increases the beneficiary country's cooperation with the donor country (Sullivan et al. 2011). Second, even if the apparent correlation between aid and the concordance of UN votes proved to be causal, the effects do not always correspond to the intentions. The reaction of beneficiary countries could result from processes of socialization that go hand in hand with aid, without necessarily being the primary goal.

Another, more convincing, approach involves deducing the foreign policy goals from the variables that influence it. Take the example of development aid. Several studies have shown that political considerations seem to have more influence than economic requirements when deciding on the choice of beneficiary countries and the amounts allocated. In other words, the countries in most need of humanitarian aid do not necessarily receive the most aid. The geographic location, the threat of a hostile opposition overthrowing the government, the government's ideological alignment, regional influence and a clique of leaders small enough to be corrupted, all have a positive impact on development aid. When a developing country is elected onto the UN Security Council, for example, American aid leaps by 59% on average before returning to a normal level once the country loses its strategic position. This phenomenon is apparently not unique to the United States. Japan, for instance, provides more development assistance to member states of the International Whaling Commission that vote with Tokyo (Strand and Tuman 2012).

Although contested by some (Kevlihan et al. 2014), we could draw from these findings that donor countries are motivated by the pursuit of political gains rather than humanitarian considerations (Maizels and

Nissanke 1984; Trumball and Wall 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik et al. 1998; Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Palmer et al. 2002; Lai 2003; Kuziemko and Weker 2006; Roper and Barria 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).

Nonetheless, it is important to remember that identifying one objective does not automatically rule out other possibilities. The same foreign policy can have several simultaneous objectives, for example: possession and milieu goals, instrumental and communication goals, intermediary and end goals, short-term and long-term goals or domestic and external goals. If development aid is actually designed to strengthen political alliances, there is no reason why it cannot also be driven by moral, trade or electoral considerations (Lindsay 1986; Morgan and Palmer 1997; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 2000).

In fact, combining a long series of goals seems to be the rule rather than the exception in pluralist societies. Foreign policies are often the result of a trade-off between the different actors involved in the domestic decision-making process. The actors are encouraged to find a way to combine their respective goals so that a common policy can be reached. Elected politicians prefer to announce a foreign policy that encompasses a wide range of goals simultaneously. Conversely, they avoid situations in which they are forced to choose between different goals to avoid disappointing some sections of the electorate. The issue of trade sanctions against the People's Republic of China, for example, put several Western leaders in a difficult position by setting the pursuit of trade interests against the defense of human rights (Drury and Li 2006).

Furthermore, there is controversy over the very concept of preset goals, identified prior to the implementation of a foreign policy. In some cases, foreign policy goals actually seem to depend on the instruments previously used. Do investments in weapons serve military purposes or do military objectives justify investments in weapons? Does the political stabilization of the Balkans aim to facilitate the expansion of the European Union or does the expansion aim at political stabilization? It is sometimes hard to differentiate the goals from the mobilization, the instruments and the outcome. For this reason, some analysts choose to ignore foreign policy goals in their comparative exercises, focusing instead on the resources mobilized, which can be quantified and observed.

MOBILIZED RESOURCES

As Joseph Nye puts it, “Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it” (Nye 1990: 177). Indeed, power is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental concepts of international relations, but also one of the most difficult to define and implement (Guzzini 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Nye 2011; Lieber 2012).

Raymond Aron is one of the few analysts to propose a clear and subtle vision of power. In his view, power is the implementation of any resources in specific circumstances. It is not a question of possessing a resource or controlling a specific structure, but of mobilizing resources, taking a particular structure into account. For example, in a game of poker, power is not the possession of a royal flush or the capacity to grasp the rules of the game, but playing the royal flush at a strategic moment in the game. Resources and context are essential aspects of power, but do not suffice on their own to constitute it (Aron 1962).

From this perspective, power is not simply a determinant of foreign policy or a fact that governments have to contend with. It is an aspect of foreign policy that can be assessed, compared and explained: there are power politics just as there are inward-looking politics.

Resources

Aron’s definition of power breaks with the traditional reflex of assessing power exclusively on the basis of potential force—in other words, the available resources. Here, resources are taken to mean the capital that states can mobilize but rarely increase on their own, such as territory, population and raw materials. This indicator of power has the twofold advantage of being relatively stable and quantifiable. It can be measured in square kilometers, thousands of inhabitants or tonnes, respectively. Although state-controlled resources are only an indirect indicator of power, they do significantly facilitate comparisons.

The comparative exercise can, nonetheless, be made more complex by taking into account the whole range of resources relevant to foreign policy. In the 1940s, several analysts were still focusing solely on material or demographic resources. However, since the studies conducted by Morgenthau (1948), most analysts also take into account ideational resources. Prestige and patriotism can be just as significant for foreign

policy as the number of cubic meters of oil, the number of citizens in the diaspora or the area of arable land (Posen 1993; Hall 1997; Nye 2004; Fordham and Asal 2007).

The Pontifical Swiss Guard, for example, is certainly not the most imposing army corps. Nevertheless, the Vatican exerts considerable influence in several regions of the world because of its moral authority. Likewise, some observers wonder whether the European Union's true source of power lies more in its capacity to define what is "ethical" or "moral" on the international stage than in its economic or military resources (Duchêne 1972; Hill 1990; White 1999; Manners 2002; Nicolaidis and Howse 2003; Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006; Telo 2007).

On the other hand, some actors seem to be truly handicapped by their lack of symbolic capital. During apartheid, South Africa was unable to exert political influence across the African continent despite its considerable economic weight. To a lesser extent, China's interest in Africa's natural resources is limited by the cultural divide that separates these two regions. Despite their colonial past, several European countries have maintained privileged relationships with African societies: migratory flows, NGO network, sharing a common language and religious communities are all assets that indirectly encourage Western investments in Africa (Alden and Hughes 2009).

In addition to considering multiple resources and revealing their social dimension, most analysts now recognize that resources are necessarily specific to a given field. No single resource is relevant to all theaters of action. During the Cold War, some analysts were still striving to develop an index of absolute power that would be valid under any circumstances. However, this idea is illusory. Power is always specific to a particular context (Ferris 1973; Taber 1989).

Geopolitics and strategic studies were the first to highlight this feature of power: the type of resources required for military victory inevitably depends on the battlefield. The borders of Australia, Switzerland and Russia are so different in number, scale and nature that the resources mobilized to defend them must be adapted to their respective context. Several recent studies continue to underline the fundamental role played by geography in the statistical probabilities of conflict and military victory (Bremer 1993; Vasquez 1995; Senese 1996, 2005; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Reiter 1999; Braithwaite 2005).

The specificity of power is equally valid in diplomatic arenas and different political fields. The number of NGOs working in Africa, for example, cannot be used to establish power balances at the World Trade Organization,

any more than the distribution of oil reserves can explain the failure of UN Security Council reforms. Foreign policy always lies within a particular context, which determines the pertinence of the resources that can be mobilized in power politics (Baldwin 1989).

It is true that some resources, particularly financial resources, appear relatively fungible and can easily be transferred from one domain to another (Art 1996). The Eisenhower administration used its pound sterling reserves to its advantage during the 1956 Suez crisis in order to threaten the United Kingdom with a financial crisis if the British army did not withdraw from Egypt. However, transferring resources in this way, between two very distinct domains in cognitive and institutional terms, is exceptional. Resources cannot be aggregated for mobilization indifferently in all areas of foreign policy.

The Power Paradox

Exerting influence does not depend solely on possessing more resources than other countries in a particular domain. Resources must be mobilized effectively in a context of power politics. States do not always succeed in converting their resources into influence. Several foreign policy analysts call this the “power paradox” (Ray and Vural 1986; Maoz 1989; Baldwin 1989).

For example, just after the First World War, the United States already had all the economic resources it needed to impose an international economic order to suit its interests. Despite this opportunity, it withdrew and opted for an isolationist foreign policy. When the stock market crashed in 1929, the US Congress reacted in a defensive and protectionist way, drastically increasing import tariffs instead of trying to maintain a stable and open international regime. It was only when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was in office that the United States converted its formidable economic resources into influence (Kindleberger 1981; Frieden 1988; Zakaria 1998).

In a way, like the United States in the 1920s, contemporary China is also showing restraint. Given its capabilities, Beijing remains relatively discreet in financial and trade negotiations. There is an undeniable gap between China’s available resources and the influence it exercises. It is because of examples like this that Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye insist on defining economic *hegemony* in terms of an actor that not only has sufficient resources to maintain an economic order but also the will to mobilize them for that purpose (Keohane and Nye 1977: 44).

Conversely, some actors with relatively few resources manage to assert themselves. In Asia, some small economies exert a significant influence on regional economic integration in the face of major economic powers, such as Japan and the People's Republic of China. In Europe, small states like Denmark or Belgium sometimes succeed in exerting a significant influence on the European Union's policies and function (König and Slapin 2004; Slapin 2006; Nasra 2011; Schneider 2011).

The only countries whose behavior appears, at first glance, to systematically correspond to their resources are those that are sometimes qualified as "middle powers". However, this is just an illusion, or rather a tautology. The notion of middle power actually refers less to the moderate amount of resources that are available to a state than to the type of behavior it exerts in foreign policy. A middle power is one that seeks compromise, encourages multilateralism, calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes and complies with international laws and standards. It is a socially constructed role rather than a resource-dependent status. Hence, countries as different as France and Ireland can sometimes be qualified as "middle powers" (DeWitt 2000; Chapnick 2000; Ungerer 2007; Gecelovsky 2009; Cooper 2011).

Mobilization and Exploitation

If a foreign policy cannot be explained in terms of resource distribution, it is because there are numerous intermediary variables between resources and influence. Natural resources alone cannot increase external trade and the latter cannot impose economic sanctions any more than a large population can enlist in the army and the army decide to engage in international conflicts. It is the stakeholders operating within a specific social and institutional framework that convert resources into capabilities and capabilities into foreign policy instruments.

The capacity and will to exercise power politics vary from one state to another. A growing number of supporters of the realist school of international relations recognize this. While they consider that states, above all, seek to guarantee their security and maximize power, they are now more willing to acknowledge that the domestic dynamics specific to each country shape that country's ambitions (Krasner 1977, 1978; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Lamborn 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Christensen 1996; Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Schweller 2006; Lobell et al. 2009; Cladi and Webber 2011; Fordham 2011; Kirshner 2012; Ripsman et al. 2016).

The differences between states are particularly linked to the relative primacy of mobilization strategies over exploitation strategies. Mobilization can be defined as the transformation of available resources to generate additional capabilities. Exploitation is the transformation of capabilities into instruments of foreign policy. All states pursue mobilization and exploitation strategies simultaneously, but the balance between the two poles varies as a function of the preferences and constraints specific to each state (Mastanduno et al. 1989).

In some cases, mobilization and exploitation strategies can be contradictory. For example, liberalizing an economy through trade agreements can encourage the mobilization of resources, but restrict the capacity to impose trade sanctions. Conversely, increasing taxes to finance a military intervention abroad can reduce, rather than stimulate, economic growth.

The theory of imperial power cycles developed by Paul Kennedy is based precisely on the contradiction between mobilization and exploitation. Several countries that have successfully managed to dominate the international order have concentrated most of their efforts on exploitation strategies. In so doing, they have failed to mobilize new resources and have, paradoxically, undermined their very position, leading to their decline (Kennedy 1987; Snyder 1991).

Another variable that affects the use of resources involves the choices between control, autonomy and legitimacy. Depending on the social structure and the existing political system, leaders may give priority to any one of these three components of power. A policy that promotes one component may discriminate against the other two. For example, invading a neighboring state can increase the resources that the invading state controls, but harm its legitimacy in the eyes of its allies. Complying with the recommendations of intergovernmental organizations can increase legitimacy, but limit political autonomy. Refusing foreign aid can increase political autonomy, but reduce control over resources (Mastanduno et al. 1989; Blanchard and Ripsman 2008).

To sum up, while approaches based on the comparison of potential resources have the significant advantage of being based on observable and generally quantifiable data, they are of limited use when it comes to explaining foreign policy. Foreign policy does not depend on an aggregated portfolio of resources. In other words, power is not just a stock that determines foreign policy; it is the flow that constitutes foreign policy.

INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Instruments are often used as references for reporting variations in foreign policy over time, domains or space. To some extent, the emphasis on instruments reflects the actual decision-making process. Decision-makers are often under pressure to react swiftly to international crises. They rarely have the political opportunity to reassess their goals or consider the balance between resource exploitation and mobilization. When leaders are called on to make a decision, they generally have to choose from a list of possible interventions prepared by their administration.

Several analysts and practitioners perceive the options for intervention as a series of instruments similar to those shown in Fig. 2.1. They range from diplomacy to military force or, in the words of Joseph Nye (2004), from soft power to hard power. Between the two extremes, the instruments can be grouped into three categories: socialization, which targets the maintenance or modification of ideas; coercion, which targets the maintenance or modification of interests; and intervention, which targets the maintenance or modification of the domestic political structures of a foreign state. Each of these categories can, in turn, be broken down into sub-categories.

Socialization

The first category of instruments, socialization, can be defined as the transfer of beliefs, values and ideas from one actor to another (Schimmelfennig 2000; Alderson 2001). As Thomas Risse stated “ideas do not float freely” (1994: 185). They are actively promoted by specific actors, at least in the preliminary stages of their dissemination.




Fig. 2.1 Foreign policy instruments

Ideas are spread in different ways. In the framework of a rational communication process, actors can sometimes be so convinced by the validity of another actor's arguments that they modify their own ideas. Nonetheless, most analysts consider that sincere communication, where all participants are open to being persuaded by the best arguments, is extremely rare in international relations (Gehring and Ruffing 2008).

Most actors communicate strategically. Rhetorical action consists of expressing a set of arguments in order to achieve specific goals. An actor who uses rhetoric dramatizes events, establishes new associations between previously disconnected ideas and thinks up evocative expressions or resorts to using metaphors to influence discussions in a specific direction (Kuusisto 1998; Risse 2000; Payne 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001; Müller 2004; Mitzen 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007).

A rhetorical exchange is not the same as a dialogue of the deaf, which inevitably leads to a stalemate. It can lead some actors to modify their behavior. For example, African countries managed to convince members of the World Trade Organization to encourage the export of generic medicines, by strategically making the link between patent laws and the spread of HIV (Morin and Gold 2010). Similarly, United Nations representatives succeeded in convincing the American government to significantly increase its emergency aid to victims of the devastating tsunami in 2004, through their rhetorical action on the subject of greed (Steele 2007).

Rhetorical action is not just used by weak actors. Great powers use it constantly. The discourse surrounding the "war on terror" developed by the administration of George W. Bush in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, illustrates this. Presenting the attacks as an act of war against American freedom and the American way of life, rather than as a criminal act, was a rhetorical strategy. It legitimized recourse to military force overseas, silenced the opposition, authorized emergency measures curtailing freedom and strengthened national unity (Kuusisto 1998; Heng 2002; Jackson 2005).

Some discourses are not expressed in words, but are translated into actions. For instance, prestige can be consciously fueled by military parades, space exploration or Olympic performances. The study of military purchases, for example, indicates that weapons can have functions that are more symbolic than strategic (Eyre and Suchman 1996). Some countries acquire a new fleet of fighter jets or submarines that are not adapted to the threats they face. The impression of power generated by

this type of weapon, however, can have a real impact. A state that resorts to such demonstrations of power may actually hope to disseminate its ideas abroad more easily (Fordham and Asal 2007).

Public diplomacy, which aims to “conquer the hearts and minds” of foreign populations, is another socialization strategy used on a large scale. During the Cold War, it was the primary motivating factor behind American public funding for Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Even today, several governments invest massively in public diplomacy. The French government uses several instruments to disseminate French opinion overseas, including the Alliance Française, TV5 Monde, France 24, Radio France International and the Eiffel excellence scholarships for students (Goldsmith et al. 2005; Cull 2008; Nye 2008; Snow and Taylor 2009).

The diffusion of democratic practices through socialization has been largely studied over the years. Some argue that authoritarian exposure to democratic standards and practices shapes their attitude and contributes to their democratization (Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Simmons et al. 2006; Atkinson 2010). However, it appears that not all types of socialization have a real effect on democratic diffusion. Freyburg (2015), for instance, shows that international education programs and foreign democratic media broadcasting in non-democratic countries do not have a significant impact on democratization. Democratic socialization works only when it involves practical experience. “Officials who have participated in the activities of policy reform programs undertaken by established democracies show a higher agreement with democratic administrative governance than their non-participating colleagues” (Freyburg 2015: 69). Hence, interpersonal exchange has more socialization power than indirect types of democratic socialization.

In other cases, states define the goals of their socialization initiatives more clearly. They can, for example, encourage informal and repeated interactions between their own civil servants and those from another country (Schimmelfennig 1998; Checkel 2001, 2003; Pevehouse 2002; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Cao 2009; Greenhill 2010; Morin and Gold 2014). Intergovernmental conferences organized by capital exporting countries could convince developing countries of the potential benefits of agreements on the liberalization of the investment (Morin and Gagné 2007). Similarly, training foreign officers in American military schools could encourage the spread of American standards and values (Atkinson 2010).

Coercion

While the diverse mechanisms of socialization are still relatively unknown, the literature on coercion abounds (Baldwin 1985; Hirschman 1980; Carter 2015; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2016). Coercive measures are designed to influence how a target state behaves by modifying the way its interests are calculated, without directly intervening in foreign territory. The term conceals a vast array of instruments that are derived from different processes and have distinct impacts. These instruments can be organized into at least five axes that overlap to form a multidimensional matrix.

The first axis refers to the “carrot and stick” idiom as it differentiates between the coercive instruments that use positive sanctions (or reward-based strategy) and those that resort to negative sanctions to induce certain behaviors (punishment-based strategy) (Crumm 1995; Newnham 2000). The conditions for the expansion of the European Union are a form of coercion based on a positive sanction (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Likewise, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been able to compel Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania to adopt legislation that reduced their social and ethnic tensions as a condition to their accession to these organizations (Kelley 2004). Despite their conflicting history, Romania and Hungary have maintained peaceful relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to increase their chances of becoming members of NATO and the European Union (Linden 2000, 2002). Conversely, the American trade restrictions imposed on countries that fail to take the necessary action to prevent trafficking of endangered species are an example of a negative sanction (Reeve 2002). There is no consensus in the literature on which type of coercion works best (Crawford 2011; Izumikawa 2013). But carrot and stick are not always separate options in the sense that they often work in tandem. Jakobsen (2012) shows, for instance, that it is the combination of positive and negative coercion, as well as British confidence-building measures, that led Libya to give up its weapon of mass destruction program in 2003.

Another axis that differentiates between coercive instruments contrasts the threat of sanctions with the actual imposition of them (Bapat and Kwon 2015). According to some historians, military mobilization on the eve of the First World War was a demonstration of power designed to intimidate and target one final abdication before the outbreak of hostilities (Tuchman 1962). In contrast, the Swiss government’s decisions to freeze

the assets that certain heads of state held in Swiss banks, including Robert Mugabe, Ben Ali and Jean-Claude Duvalier, were issued without prior warning (Dulin and Merckaert 2009).

Coercive instruments can also be distinguished according to their goals. Dissuasion is a form of coercion that aims to maintain the *status quo*, whereas compellence is a form of coercion that aims to change it. Nuclear weapons are generally seen as an instrument of dissuasion—in other words, an implicit threat to any shift in the balance of power (Kahn 1966; Freedman 1989). On the contrary, the American *Super 301* system, named after the section number of the US Trade Act of 1974, which identifies the countries with apparently unfair trade policies, is an example of a compellence because the targeted countries are requested to modify their practices or risk sanctions (Sell 2003).

A fourth dimension differentiates targeted coercive instruments from those with a general scope (Morgan 1977). The former is usually adopted in times of crisis and have a different logic from the latter, which are institutionalized. Thus, the Eisenhower administration's refusal to support the United Kingdom's request for IMF funding, as long as it did not end the Suez Crisis, cannot be explained by the same mechanisms that led Congress to adopt a law stipulating that no country supporting terrorism would benefit from the US support at the IMF (Kirshner 1995).

The last axis contrasts sanctions that specifically target the elite from those that target the entire population. In January 2011, the United States' decision to ban American citizens from establishing business dealings with the Belarusian petroleum company Belneftekhim primarily targeted President Alexander Lukashenko's inner circle. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the European Union, the United States and other nations issued similar bans against Russian companies including Rosneft, a Russian state oil company, in order to hurt Vladimir Putin's regime (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). In 1973, in protest against American military support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, the Arab countries' reduction of oil exports targeted Western public opinion as a whole (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Pape 1997).

Another type of coercive instrument, which is slightly different in nature from the previous developed axes, is coercive diplomacy (Phillips 2012; Christensen 2011, Art and Cronin 2003). This instrument differs from economic sanctions and the conditionality argument because, although its objective is to influence the behavior of another state, its logic rests on the threat to use force or the actual use of limited violence. In a

sense, coercive diplomacy lies at the intersection between traditional coercive measures and full-scale military intervention abroad (Art and Jervis 2005; Levy 2008). As Alexander George explains, in coercive diplomacy, “one gives the opponent an opportunity to stop or back off before employing force against it” (1991: 6). Hence, military intervention is often the result of failed coercive diplomacy. Turkey relied on coercive diplomacy toward Syria and Northern Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s to force them to stop their support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ankara’s strategy achieved mixed results: Syria decided to comply with Turkey’s request since it was not willing to bear the cost of war to preserve its ties with the PKK, while Northern Iraq remained defiant toward Ankara because it shared similar aspirations with the PKK and ultimately suffered Turkey’s retaliation (Aras 2011).

Interventions

The third category of instruments covers interventions and can be broken down into a typology that is equally complex. All interventions are incursions in the domestic affairs of a foreign state to bring about internal structural change. However, it is important to distinguish political interventions from military interventions.

A political intervention targets subversion by supporting dissident groups, or stabilization by supporting a weak ruling power. In this way, the United States provides finance, material and training to diverse foreign political powers that are sympathetic to liberal democracy, including the media, political parties and NGOs. Sometimes political interventions are declared overtly, such as in the 1999 Iraq Liberation Act, which detailed the budgets allocated to Iraqi subversion. More often, interventions are clandestine, as in the case of the American support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party immediately after the Second World War (Miller 1983; Collins 2009).

Research has shown that from 1946 to 2000, the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States deployed overt and covert partisan electoral interventions in no fewer than 117 competitive elections abroad (that is one election out of nine) in order to influence the political outcome of these elections (Levin 2016). As Levin explains, “in a world in which military interventions are increasingly costly and democracies are more common, partisan electoral interventions are likely to become an ever more central tool of the great powers’ foreign policy” (Levin 2016: 20).

The scope of military interventions should also be broken down. Contrary to common wisdom, most military interventions abroad do not lead to war. Border skirmishes and maneuvers on foreign territory can just be a strategy to test a state's determination to defend a disputed border. Maritime blockades can simply be used to force negotiations by avoiding direct confrontations. Gunboat diplomacy is merely a show of strength designed to intimidate. Some military interventions have specific targets that can be reached in a matter of hours, for example, assassinating a political leader or bombing a chemical factory. Resorting to war is an extreme decision, which remains relatively rare compared to all other foreign policy instruments (Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Of course, this has not prevented experts from conducting research on military interventions. Some have focus, for instance, on regime change and democratization as factors making military interventions more likely (Meernik 1996; Downes and Monten 2013; Durward and Marsden 2016; Downes and O'Rourke 2016). Others have looked at intervention in ethnic and intrastate conflicts (Regan 2000; Carment et al. 2006; Schultz 2010). But this does not change the fact that political leaders have an aversion to overt war.

By moving away from the pole of soft power toward the pole of hard power, the instruments gradually become more intensive and, consequently, more dangerous. Each step heightens the degree of commitment, making it harder to back off. A government that beats a retreat after taking draconian measures implicitly acknowledges its mistake and leaves itself open to criticism on the national and international stages. President Obama's decision not to enforce his "red line" in Syria in August 2013, that is, to back down from intervening militarily against Bashar al-Assad's regime following its use of chemical weapons, was highly criticized by the foreign policy establishment for seriously damaging the administration's credibility in foreign policy (Chollet 2016).

In this context, instead of backing off when an instrument proves ineffective, leaders may be forced to sink deeper into a difficult situation. Military interventions are often reactions to failed coercive efforts, which can, in turn, be reactions to the failures of socialization. Yet, a headlong rush can lead to decision-makers demise (Staw 1981; Brockner and Rubin 1985; Bowen 1987; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994; Billings and Hermann 1998; Taliaferro 2004; Baum 2004a, b, c; Tomz 2007). This is what President Johnson did in Vietnam. Faced with immense difficulties on the ground, the president chose to increase the number of troops even though some of his advisers, including Defense

Secretary Robert McNamara, sought to dissuade him. Johnson preferred to stay the course rather than carry the odium of a military defeat (Janis 1982). This led the president to retire from politics by declining to run in the 1968 presidential elections.

Political leaders generally prefer persuasion to intervention. As the American Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed, “it is better, whenever possible, to let the reputation of power rather than the use of power achieve policy goals” (2004: 62). Although the outcome of socialization may be uncertain and massive intervention at the start of a conflict may maximize the chances of success, when a new situation arises, leaders often prefer resorting to socialization, followed by coercion, before considering military intervention.

Many foreign policy analysts prefer studying military interventions rather than socialization. This preference is not due to a fascination with violence, nor due to the conviction that military conflicts have a greater impact than the exchange of ideas. It is simply a question of methodological constraints. Socialization is particularly difficult to research, whether through interviews or discourse analysis. Military interventions, on the other hand, can be observed directly and their intensity can be assessed quantitatively.

Thus, there are several databases on military interventions that are freely available to researchers. Four of them are frequently used in research on FPA: Militarized Interstate Disputes (www.correlatesofwar.org), International Crisis Behavior (sites.duke.edu/icbdata/), Armed Conflict Dataset (www.prio.no/cscw) and International Military Intervention (www.icpsr.umich.edu).

These databases differ in terms of their coding manual and their spatial and temporal scope. Some researchers define war as a military intervention in foreign territory, while others define it as a conflict that causes the death of at least 1000 combatants; some go back to the Napoleonic Wars, while others limit themselves to the Cold War; some focus on interstate conflicts, while others include civil wars as well. However, there is no equivalent database that focuses exclusively on states’ socialization endeavors.

Event-Based Databases

Obviously, socialization, coercion and intervention are not mutually exclusive. Negotiation, for example, is generally based on a combination of socialization and coercion. The European Union has convinced its East European neighbors to abolish the death penalty by resorting to a discourse on human rights and via policies of economic conditionality

(Manners 2002). In some cases, negotiation can even include some form of military intervention (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000). Foreign policy tends to combine different instruments rather than choose between them. When several instruments are used simultaneously, it is not always easy to determine the level of commitment and the degree of cooperation between two protagonists.

Event-based databases are methodological tools capable of integrating different types of foreign policy instruments, which are implemented simultaneously. They aggregate a vast quantity of information and record it on a common numeric scale. In this way, they facilitate comparisons between countries, domains or periods (Rosenau and Ramsey 1975).

Technically, event-based databases are generated from several thousand one-off events reported in the newspapers. Each event is recorded on a scale of cooperation according to a detailed coding manual. Thus, a bilateral meeting between two heads of state can have a value of +1, a joint military intervention +5 and imposing trade sanction -3. Coding can be carried out manually, by a team of researchers, or automatically, using predefined key words (Schrodt 1995).

The best-known event-based databases are the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO), the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), the Penn State Event Data Project (KEDS), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) based at the University of Maryland and the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON). Most of these databases are accessible via the website for the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research (www.icpsr.umich.edu). Databases dedicated to a specific issue are also available, such as the International Water Event Database on water cooperation (www.trans-boundarywaters.orst.edu).

These event-based databases provide a common numeric base, which is extremely helpful for comparing policies. They can be used, for example, to determine whether small and large powers tend to be aggressive in the same circumstances (East 1973; Clark et al. 2008) or to assess whether the arrival of a new head of state alters the degree of cooperation (Hermann 1980).

Nonetheless, these databases are not a panacea. In the midst of the Cold War, the American government generously financed the development of event-based databases in the hope that they would serve as a barometer for international tension and even as an early warning system for imminent conflict. However, it was too much to expect of this

methodological tool: even with the use of powerful computer systems that make it possible to diversify sources, increase the volume of data and remove the influence of coders, inaccuracies inevitably still occur (Smith 1986; Laurance 1990; Kaarbo 2003). In fact, the data used are biased even before they are filtered through the analytical grid. As raw information is drawn from newspapers, the databases reflect the media interest generated by a bilateral relationship more than the actual cooperation between two states. Furthermore, they ignore non-events, which are as significant in diplomatic language as the events that have actually occurred. For this reason, several analysts pay greater attention to how decisions are made rather than what actions are undertaken.

THE PROCESS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Analysts interested in the decision-making cycle often assume that a state's domestic context is more important than the external context, when it comes to explaining foreign policy decisions. However, the range of levels of analysis is still broad at the sub-national level. Some analysts focus on the government leader's cognitive mechanisms, while others take into account the structures that allow interaction between the social actors. In order to identify the relevant level of analysis, the analyst can divide the decision-making process into several stages, which range from identifying the problem to assessing the results.

Years ago, public policy experts understood that by segmenting the decision-making process, different levels of analysis could be identified. However, this segmentation must be slightly adapted for the study of foreign policy. In foreign policy, the highest executive authorities are often challenged, the legislative power is generally less directly involved, interest groups are less active and debates are often less transparent than in other public policy areas. This section proposes a segmentation of the decision-making process inspired by different studies of foreign policy. It then considers the theoretical implications and the limits of this kind of segmentation (Zelikow 1994; Hermann 1990; Billings and Hermann 1998; Hermann 2001; Knecht and Weatherford 2006; Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

Segmentation in Six Phases

Figure 2.2 shows a classic segmentation of the decision-making process in six phases (Jones 1984). Obviously, it is a simple diagram, which does not reflect the complexity of the decision-making process. However, its simplicity




Fig. 2.2 The cycle of formulating foreign policies

gives it heuristic value. Each stage corresponds to a level of analysis. By going through all the stages of the cycle, the analysis completes a circuit. The diagram goes from the social to the governmental level, then to the individual level and back to the governmental level, before returning to the social level.

According to this schematic cycle, framing is the first stage in formulating a foreign policy. It is important to keep in mind that most foreign policy problems remain in a state of limbo because they are not framed as problems. Environmental protection, for example, could have challenged foreign ministers as early as the nineteenth century because transnational pollution was already affecting citizens' quality of life. Yet, it was not actually considered as a foreign policy problem until the 1970s (Maoz 1990; Snow and Benford 1998; Mintz and Redd 2003).

For a problem to be framed as a political issue and shift from a world of objectivity to one of intersubjectivity, it must first be shaped by one or more "policy entrepreneurs". The latter make the problem intelligible by giving it a framework—in other words they name, interpret and simplify it. The problem of access to medicines in developing countries can be framed as a social justice, an economic development or a prevention of global epidemics issue. The way a problem is defined will orient the terms of the debate and determine which actors are called on. Consequently, the

actors that set the framework for the debate have a considerable influence, even when they have no direct access to public decision-makers (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Busby 2007).

The second stage in the cycle is agenda-setting. Political leaders are challenged on a series of questions and cannot reasonably examine each one of them. Here, the capacity of non-state actors to mobilize and convince key people, such as civil servants and political advisors, who control access to the leaders, plays a major role. Convincing them of the importance of an emerging issue is essential if it is to be included on the list of political priorities.

In several cases, an extraordinary event or a crisis is needed to create the political opportunity necessary to enable a new issue to be included on the agenda. The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing gave policy entrepreneurs the chance to force Western leaders to publicly express their views on Tibet's political status and the freedom of the press (Tarrow 1989; Joachim 2003; Carpenter 2007).

The framework and the political opportunity largely determine the political authority called on to examine the different policy options, which is the third stage of the cycle. International negotiations on climate change can be presented as an issue relating to investment, international distributive justice or the protection of territorial integrity, which concerns the ministries of finance, international cooperation or defense, respectively. In all cases, when an administration takes on an issue, discussions become more technical and the positions more moderate. The experts, including civil servants, advisors, and scientists, gradually replace the activists, reporters or lobbyists who initially framed the issue (Morin 2011).

At the fourth stage, decision-makers are called on to give an opinion on a limited number of options. As a result, their decision is broadly structured by the previous stages. The decision-making unit varies considerably in different countries and for different issues. A dictator, a minister, a politburo and a parliament have very different procedures, which invariably affect decisions and how they are communicated. A significant part of FPA research specifically involves determining the decision-making unit and identifying its particular characteristics (Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann et al. 2001a, b; Hermann 2001).

The process of formulating a foreign policy does not stop at the decision-making stage. Public administration is largely responsible for how it is interpreted, implemented and continually adjusted to external circumstances. Yet, at this fifth stage of the cycle, the administration does

not always have the material capacity, the information, the legitimacy or even the will to ensure that the authorities' decision is perfectly translated into concrete results. These constraints are very real in domestic politics and seem to be exacerbated when a policy is implemented beyond state boundaries. Very little FPA research has been conducted on the implementation stage, and our knowledge is still fairly limited.

Policy evaluation is the sixth and last stage. In foreign policy, evaluation is open to interpretation because results are generally diffuse and multicausal. For example, the arms race during the Cold War can be interpreted simultaneously as a factor of stability between the two superpowers or as a factor of instability, generating local conflicts throughout the world. In this context, the same categories of actors, which initially framed the problem, will seize the opportunity to campaign in favor of maintaining, adjusting or entirely reformulating the policy. The problem can then go through the entire cycle again (Morin and Gold 2010; Morin 2011).

A Linear, Cyclical or Chaotic Process

Figure 2.2 presents the decision-making process in a cyclical form because most issues central to foreign policy are never permanently settled. George Shultz, secretary of state under Ronald Reagan, commented that “policy-making does not involve confronting one damn thing after another, as most people imagine. It involves confronting the same damn thing over and over” (cited in Hoagland 1994: C1). The same issues come up periodically, whether it is the Israel–Palestine conflict, the price of raw materials, Africa’s development, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the apparent decline of American power, the reform of the UN Security Council, the devaluation of the Chinese yuan or Turkey joining the European Union.

Nonetheless, an issue is modified slightly each time it goes through the cycle. New arguments are put forward, new institutions are created and lessons are drawn. For this reason, it is more appropriate to consider the cycle of formulating policies as an evolving spiral rather than as a closed circle (Billings and Hermann 1998; Dreyer 2010).

Even when the cycle for formulating policies is seen as a spiral, it is still no more than a simplified diagram. In reality, the different stages overlap more than they follow a linear sequence. Examining the options, for

example, is often anticipated at the framing stage, and, sometimes, going back to agenda-setting may be planned at the implementation stage.

Some theoretical models are clearly opposed to a sequential vision of the decision-making process. The garbage can theory, notably, rejects the idea that solutions are imagined as a function of the problems. According to this theory, decision-making is the result of the more or less random assembly of diverse elements, which are divided into four different garbage cans. The first can includes the problems seeking solutions. The second contains solutions seeking problems to solve. The third includes political opportunities seeking a decision, and the fourth includes public decision-makers searching for solutions to problems. The flows in and out of these cans are independent of each other. A minister of international trade may take advantage of the upcoming elections to present a law on intellectual property as a solution to the problem of access to medicines in developing countries. There are no links between the four elements, *a priori*. The only common denominator is the random content of the respective cans (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1984; Bendor et al. 2001).

Nonetheless, a schematic diagram in the form of a spiral is helpful for understanding that formulating a foreign policy is not about a single moment and a single actor. If a researcher conducts interviews to find out about the origin of a well-perceived policy, it would not be surprising if all those questioned identified themselves, in good faith, as being the true initiator: non-state actors whispered about it to civil servants, who recommended it to the minister, who defended it at the council of ministers where it was approved by the government leader. Inversely, in the case of a foreign policy judged unfavorably, everyone will blame a third party. In general, it is futile to conduct interviews with the objective of identifying the single author of a foreign policy.

A precise definition of the purpose of the study may be sufficient to direct the researcher toward a specific phase in the public policy cycle. A project that seeks to understand why a state intervened on a particular issue may focus on the first two stages in the cycle. A project that aims to explain why the state chose a specific option over another may limit its research to the next two stages. A third project that calls into question the maintenance of an apparently ineffective policy may only consider the last two stages. The stage chosen will then guide the researcher toward a societal, governmental or individual level of analysis.

THE OUTCOME OF FOREIGN POLICY

Studying the outcome of a country's foreign policy raises fundamental practical and theoretical questions. Assessing the relative effectiveness of a series of foreign policy measures can raise questions concerning the conditions that determine their success or failure. Can an apparently faultless decision-making process lead to a flawed policy? Conversely, can a foreign policy that successfully achieves its target emerge from chaos (Herek et al. 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 2002) ?

Measuring Effectiveness

Evaluating the impact of a foreign policy presents considerable methodological challenges. The difficulty of identifying the real goals pursued, the multicausality of the outcomes, the tensions between the short and long term and the problem of counter-factuality are just some of the methodological issues raised by foreign policy evaluation (Harvey 2012; Hansel and Oppermann 2016).

Public development aid and public diplomacy, for example, target such diffuse and long-term goals that it is virtually impossible to evaluate the full extent of their impacts (Goldsmith et al. 2005). Policies of dissuasion have the special feature of leaving no trace of their success. The number of surprise attacks and terrorist attacks that have been discouraged, thanks to politics of dissuasion, remains unknown (Lebow and Gross Stein 1989; Fearon 2002). Even when a war leads to unconditional surrender, it does not necessarily mean that the winner has achieved their goals (Mandel 2006). More fundamentally, if foreign policy only has domestic goals, like reproducing collective identity, it would be pointless to look for indicators of its effectiveness beyond state borders (Bickerton 2010).

These methodological constraints no doubt explain why the literature on the outcomes of foreign policy focuses on economic sanctions. Sanctions actually have three undeniable methodological advantages. First, they are used often enough to enable precise statistical analyses. Second, they are generally imposed for specific reasons, which can serve as benchmarks for assessing their outcomes. Lastly, their use is relatively transparent, which means the outside observer can locate them precisely in time and space and quantify their scale in dollars or euros.

The numerous studies on the effectiveness of economic sanctions conclude almost unanimously that sanctions rarely achieve their goals (Peksen and Drury 2010; Pape 1997). This observation was first established by

qualitative studies on specific cases. Multilateral sanctions against the regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, for example, did not lead them to review their racist policies. The Rhodesian government was overthrown in 1979 and apartheid was abolished in South Africa in 1991, but these revolutions are not directly linked to the sanctions imposed several years previously (Doxey 1972; Klotz 1995).

The American embargo imposed against Cuba is an even more striking failure. After over half a century of sanctions, the Cuban government has not yet paid compensation to the United States for nationalizing American investments during the Cuban revolution. The Castro regime even blamed American sanctions for the failings of its communist economy and used them to generate patriotic reactions and rally support (Kaplowitz 1998).

With the multiplication of economic sanctions since the 1970s, it is now possible to study their effectiveness from a quantitative point of view. One of the first quantitative studies, and one of the most frequently quoted, is that by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Elliott. Their study was first published in 1985. It presents a systematic analysis of over 100 sanctions imposed since 1914 and concludes that their success rate was approximately 35%. Later editions of the study conclude that the success rate, already relatively low, is decreasing markedly (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Elliott and Hufbauer 1999).

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's quantitative argument triggered an intense methodological debate. The first wave of criticisms concerns their choice of case studies. According to several analysts, their study is biased in favor of sanctions with the greatest probability of success. For example, it does not take into account cases where sanctions were envisaged by decision-makers before being dismissed because of the risk of failure. This bias induces an overrepresentation of favorable cases and rules out the possibility of establishing probabilities of success for a hypothetical sanction. The second wave of criticism focuses on the control of certain influential variables. Many examples of success could, in reality, be attributed to other variables, like resorting to military force in parallel, rather than to economic coercion. Reviews and reassessments have concluded that only 5% as opposed to 35% of sanctions achieve their goals (Lam 1990; Von Furstenberg 1991; Kirshner 1995; Drury 1998; Nooruddin 2002).

Nonetheless, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's quantitative approach made it possible to reorient research on the scope of economic sanctions and, more generally, on the effectiveness of foreign policy. It is no longer a question of knowing whether sanctions are effective, but of identifying the factors that influence their effectiveness.

Feedback Effects

Feedback is another way to measure foreign policy effectiveness. It can be defined as a message about an actor's action, which a system sends back to that actor; or a message about the state of a system, which an actor sends back to the system. The emphasis is not placed on a single foreign policy decision, but on constant flows of actions and reactions spread over time. The causes of foreign policy become its effects and vice versa (Snyder et al. 2002 [1962] p.110; Pierson 1993).

For clarification, it is important to differentiate between two types of feedback: negative and positive. In the case of negative feedback, the effects of a foreign policy undermine its very existence. During the war between the USSR and Afghanistan, the United States supported mujahidin resistance by imposing an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union. Although the Carter administration's initial goal was to limit the capacities of Soviet action, the embargo caused a slump in the price of cereal products, which primarily hit American farmers. As a result of this unexpected feedback, the American administration lifted its ban (Lindsay 1986).

Another example of negative feedback is how a fragile government's foreign enemies react. Some studies show that governments, which are tackling popular discontent or have recently established their power, are statistically at greater risk of being attacked by a foreign power (Prins 2001; Bak and Palmer 2010). Iraq's attempted invasion of Iran in 1980 took advantage of the weakness of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, which had not yet fully established its power after the Islamist revolution. However, foreign attacks generally provoke a rallying effect on the population. The Iraqi attack did not so much undermine as strengthen Khomeini's control on the Iranian people.

Positive feedback helps explain the gradual strengthening of some foreign policies. For example, Franco-German cooperation required strong political impetus in the post-war period. Relationships of trust have gradually been established at all levels of the administration, which consolidates cooperation on a continual basis (Krotz 2010). This positive feedback mechanism is central to the neofunctional theory developed by Ernst Haas (1958) to explain the process of European integration.

The same phenomenon of positive feedback can also fuel relations of mistrust. A conflict between two countries can alter their mutual perception and lead them to interpret all subsequent actions with suspicion. The economic sanctions imposed on South Africa because of apartheid

left Pretoria feeling politically isolated. Consequently, it developed a nuclear weapons program, which further justified the maintenance of sanctions. This vicious circle, fueled by positive feedback loops, explains why a rise in military spending in one country generally leads to a similar rise in expenditure in rival countries (Lepgold and McKeown 1995). It also explains why an initial conflict increases the statistical probabilities of subsequent conflicts (Bremer 1993; Hensel 1994, 1999, 2002; Drezner 1999; Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Dreyer 2010).

A research project that aims to assess the relative value of a causal relationship could benefit from taking into account the continuous feedback between an actor and his environment. Ignoring feedback can distort the analysis. If feedback is positive, the direct relationship between cause and effect is likely to be overestimated because of the amplification effect. Inversely, if the feedback is negative, causality can be underestimated because the reaction partly offsets the effect of the action (Rosenau 1980).

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is one of many theories that uses the concept of feedback to explain foreign policy. Historical institutionalism focuses particularly on the phenomenon of path dependence—in other words on the constraints that past decisions impose on the present. If an actor takes a given path, backtracking or changing course can be difficult, even if he realizes that he has not chosen the best path. This difficulty is heightened over time, as he continues along the path, because the positive feedback loops constantly endorse the initial sub-optimal decision (Fioretos 2011).

A classic example of path dependence is the use of computer keyboards. Both QWERTY and AZERTY keyboards are sub-optimal—in other words the key layout is not ideal for speed typing. On the other hand, the more familiar a user becomes with a given arrangement, the faster they can type and the harder it is for them to change to a different kind of keyboard, even if, objectively speaking, it is optimal.

Similarly, political leaders can unwittingly commit their country to taking a sub-optimal path. This occurs because they take account of the considerations that relate to the specific initial context, without necessarily anticipating the feedback loops and their long-term consequences. These critical moments generally occur in times of crisis and they are crucial for the future. The economic crisis of the 1930s, the two world wars and the

collapse of the Soviet Union all constitute critical moments when foreign policy decisions were made concerning the attitude to adopt in a given domain or toward a particular country. These attitudes persisted for decades (Mabee 2011).

Positive feedback loops that maintain policies in path dependence are particularly evident in the field of economics. In fact, any trade policy that is adopted will benefit some economic actors and penalize others. Yet, the longer a policy is maintained, the stronger the beneficiaries become and the more they pressurize the government to preserve the policy. Thus, in the United States, granting trade preferences to China in the 1980s encouraged the emergence of large American importers of Chinese products and the development of American investments in China. This limited President Clinton's capacity to impose sanctions on China for its human rights violations, despite his commitment to do so. Instead, the trade concessions paved the way for China's admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Goldstein 1988).

Similar feedback loops can also help explain why a military alliance or security tensions continue. From this point of view, the case of Israel is striking. By authorizing the establishment of colonies on Palestinian territory after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government created an interest group that has since campaigned to conserve and expand the colonies. Gradually, the interest group gained considerable political influence within conservative and nationalist parties. In parallel, the United States first demonstrated its unfailing support for Israel during the Cold War. This policy shaped the expectations of the American people and the Israeli government. The slightest variation would be interpreted as an unacceptable historic change, even though the United States has every interest in working more closely with Arab governments (Dannreuther 2011).

Historical institutionalism does not necessarily present a deterministic view of history. Changing trajectory is always possible. It just becomes harder over time. Radical changes generally occur in exceptional circumstances, such as the overthrow of the ruling elite or a military defeat. These occasions of rupture are critical moments for adopting new policies, which, over time, are also likely to become entrenched by positive feedback loops.

Explaining Effectiveness

Asking the question of what determines the effectiveness of a foreign policy raises the issue of the level of analysis. In the case of economic sanctions, most analysts consider that the main explanatory variables,

which determine the sanctions' effectiveness, are at the national level and are inherent to the characteristics of the sanctioned state.

One of the main determinants of the success of sanctions is their economic impact on the targeted state, which is calculated as a percentage of its gross domestic product. A policy change is likely if these costs are greater than the interest represented by maintaining the incriminating policies. From this point of view, the most dependent economies are also the most vulnerable to sanctions (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Hufbauer 2007).

Nonetheless, high economic cost is not a sufficient prerequisite to guarantee the success of a sanction. The ruling power's internal structure should also be taken into account. Several statistical analyses have concluded that autocracies and democracies react differently to sanctions. Democracies are more sensitive to sanctions that have a diffuse impact on society as a whole, whereas autocracies manage to resist them more easily. Trade sanctions imposed on Haiti and Iraq in the 1990s, for example, seriously affected civilian populations, but did not seriously affect regimes in power. In reality, they were more controversial in the countries that adopted them than in the target countries. In order to threaten autocracies, sanctions should directly target the resources of the ruling elite (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Brooks 2002; Nooruddin 2002; McGillivray and Stam 2004; Allen 2005; Lai and Morey 2006; Allen 2008; Blanchard and Ripsman 2008; Sechser 2010).

Some analysts consider the national context in the state that instigated the sanction, as well as the national context in the targeted state. Indeed, a sanction that represents a high cost for the state that adopts it may be unsuccessful. This explains why sanctions that target complementary economies are generally less effective than those that target competing economies (Morgan and Schwebach 1995; Zeng 2002). The most striking example is when the American Congress threatened the People's Republic of China in the early 1990s because of its human rights violations. The threats, which were raised periodically, were so counterproductive that an intensification as opposed to a reduction in Chinese repression ensued. China was in a position to behave so defiantly because the primary victims of the potential trade sanctions would have been the American investors based in China and the American importers of Chinese products. In the case of sanctions, these two heavyweights of the American economy would not have hesitated to put pressure on Congress and plead their case. The American and Chinese economies are so closely intertwined that the

threats from Congress were not taken seriously. The Chinese government no doubt concluded that Congress was merely making threats to please a few activist groups and a few unions with no real intention of taking action (Drury and Li 2006).

However, the effectiveness of sanctions is not entirely determined by rational calculations. Games of perception, filtered through cognitive mechanisms, can also help explain the outcomes of economic sanctions. A long-standing relationship of cooperation between the state sanctioned and the sanctioning state makes it possible to establish a relationship of trust and encourages the former to think that the latter will actually lift the sanctions when their demands have been met. Conversely, the memory of past antagonisms can maintain relationships of suspicion and make the sanctioned state fear that a concession will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and lead to the multiplication of new sanctions (Drezner 1999; Drury and Li 2006; Giumelli 2011).

The international context is another pertinent level of analysis for explaining the effectiveness of sanctions. Third countries can actually neutralize the effects of sanctions by suggesting that they become alternative economic partners. Several United States' traditional allies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan, benefit from unilateral American sanctions to develop their own markets. Therefore, the success of sanctions varies as a function of the capacity to guarantee interstate cooperation and prevent the targeted state from turning to new partners (Martin 1992; Early 2011, 2012).

Guaranteeing this type of cooperation with third states can be difficult. Firm and targeted unilateral sanctions can be more effective than vague and porous multilateral sanctions. That is probably one of the reasons why unilateral sanctions are generally more effective than multilateral sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999). On the other hand, taking the unilateral path when a multilateral option is available can be perceived as illegitimate and may generate opposition instead of concessions. According to a study, the perception of illegitimacy associated with unilateralism could reduce the efficacy of sanctions by 34% (Pelc 2010).

FROM THE PUZZLE TO THE THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

Debates on economic sanctions have focused less on their degree of effectiveness than on identifying the factors that explain their effectiveness. Thus, the problems are no longer purely methodological, but also theoretical.

Of course, identifying a dependent variable always raises methodological problems: the available information is fragmented and does not always allow to draw comparisons. However, an examination of the most relevant explanatory variables also requires delicate theoretical choices: which level of analysis is the most relevant for explaining a given foreign policy? If the answer is all of them, then how can these variables be included in a coherent theoretical explanation?

Theoretical Models

Now that the identification of the dependent variable, that is, the foreign policy itself, is clarified, the remaining of the book focuses on the independent variables, that is, on the theoretical explanations of foreign policy, which are generated from the multiple levels of analysis.

Theories are abstract simplifications of complex empirical realities. It is because they simplify reality that they are useful to researchers. More specifically, a theory is a coherent and logical statement (or speculation) generated by a researcher. This statement is then operationalized using independent variables and tested to an empirical domain in order to validate or refute its explanatory power (Van Evera 1997; King et al. 1994). Theories guide researchers toward the fundamental explanatory factors and allow them to ignore secondary elements that are not essential for understanding or explaining a phenomenon.

If this definition is generally accepted to be the primary function of a theory, analysts disagree, however, on what the fundamental explanatory factors of FPA actually are. The following chapter focuses on the decision-maker and introduces a number of theories explaining foreign policies at the individual level of analysis.

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Do Decision-Makers Matter?

How useful is the individual level of analysis in understanding foreign policy? This is a legitimate question since there is still controversy surrounding the use of this unit of analysis. Until the 1950s, several internationalists focused their analyses on the “great men” of history, such as Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Bolivar, Otto von Bismarck, Winston Churchill or Mao Zedong. These leaders were depicted as exceptional and independent figures. Their political actions were defining history more than they were forged by the historical context. Their strength of character, strategic genius and charisma have even been considered as fundamental attributes, on an equal footing with military capacities and natural resources, which constituted the foundations of power in their respective states (Morgenthau 2005 [1948]).

With the behavioral revolution in the 1960s, internationalists abandoned the study of “great men”. Kenneth Waltz was the first to acknowledge that heads of state do sometimes play a defining role, but considered that they are too complex and idiosyncratic for a systematic analysis (1959). The literature in International Relations focused instead on international and domestic factors as the principal constraints shaping leaders’ decisions. When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was asked why he had changed his policies, he famously answered back, “Events, dear boy, events” (cited in Jervis 2013: 154).

According to Waltz and his followers, structural variables make it easier to identify laws that can be applied universally. This theoretical approach

was actually encouraged throughout the Cold War: the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were analyzed more through the impersonal prism of bipolarity than in terms of the personality of the American and Soviet leaders.

However, many leaders continue to believe that they are the driving force of international relations. Some are under the impression that they are in full control of their foreign policy. The Reagan–Thatcher and Mitterrand–Kohl couples marked the media as much as the individual protagonists themselves. Henry Kissinger recognized this when he became President Nixon’s national security advisor: “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make” (Quoted in Byman and Pollack 2001: 108).

For Robert Jervis, “[t]he question of the extent to which leaders matter in international politics is as familiar as it is impossible to fully answer” (Jervis 2013: 154). According to him, one way to test the impact of “great men” on the course of history would be “to write the history of the Cold War without mentioning the name of either side’s leaders and see if a naïve reader could determine when personnel changes occurred” (Jervis 2013: 154).

In recent years, the individual level of analysis has gradually regained its proper place in the analysis of foreign policy (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012; Krebs and Rapport 2012; Jervis 2013; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Foster and Keller 2014; McDermott 2014; Dolan 2016a, b). Many internationalists now recognize that completely ignoring the role of individuals is as reductive as considering foreign policy to be the projection of a single figure (Byman and Pollack 2001; Post et al. 2003). Moreover, research is increasingly focusing on decision-makers, other than heads of state and government leaders. Generals, parliamentarians, commissioners, advisors and ministers are now increasingly subject to analysis (Smith 2003).

Obviously, individuals do not always play a determining role. Their influence varies as a function of specific circumstances (Hermann 1974). At least three main factors can accentuate or diminish their role. The first is their institutional and political capacity to influence foreign policy. The centralization of authority varies significantly from state to state. In some ways, French President Charles de Gaulle had greater flexibility than Chinese President Hu Jintao. Thus, we can assume that de Gaulle had a greater impact on French foreign policy than Hu Jintao had on Chinese foreign policy (Hermann and Hermann 1989; McGillivray and Smith 2004).

The second factor is the individuals' willingness to exert a major influence on foreign policy. They all have their own specific interests, motivations and leadership styles. For example, General Francisco Franco preferred delegating the crucial issues of Spanish foreign policy to his subordinates on condition that they avoid disruptive action. On the contrary, General Murtala Mohammed was very interested in international relations and tried to shift Nigeria's foreign policy (Beasley et al. 2001).

The third factor is the political opportunity available to decision-makers with regard to influencing foreign policy. Heads of state have greater decision-making power in times of crisis, in particular, as their personalities can permeate foreign policy. These uncertain and ambiguous situations give them the chance to directly impact the outcome of a crisis. Terrorist attacks, natural disasters or recessions, for instance, provide decision-makers with the opportunity to exert a greater influence on foreign policy (Holsti 1979; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1982; Stern 2003).

The circumstances that increase the influence of decision-makers are reasonably well known. However, analysts do not always agree on the theoretical and methodological tools that help to explain how decision-makers actually influence foreign policy when they have the capacity, the desire and the opportunity to do so. As this chapter shows, some researchers are focusing on the cognitive and affective characteristics specific to a given individual, while others are trying to identify major trends in the way decision-makers generally perceive and interpret their environment.

EMOTIONS

Political leaders' affective and emotional life are the most personal variables of FPA. Some researchers consider that this aspect is so private that it only has a marginal impact on foreign policy. However, the most recent studies rooted in social psychology and neuroscience suggest the opposite (Mercer 2013). Dolan (2016a) shows that emotions generated by leaders' perceptions have "distinct effects on cognition, perception, and memory" (2016a: 571). Hence, they will either favor or suppress belief change when facing a tough situation during a war. For instance, anxiety makes strategic change very likely, while frustration is likely to produce resistance to change. In other words, emotions would offer a predictable explanation for leaders' decision to stay the course or to alter their strategies in wartime. Elsewhere, Dolan (2016b) demonstrates that leaders' positive emotions do not have the same effects on

their approach to war. An unexpected good news will produce joy and will likely lead the leader to operate change in his or her strategy by making it riskier or less costly, while an expected good news will provide contentment and will surprisingly lead a decision-maker to resist change of strategy or to oppose increase in aims.

Western culture traditionally sets reason against emotions, as if they were two completely independent thought processes. In reality, they are closely interwoven. Several studies in the field of neurology conducted using magnetic resonance imaging confirm that during the decision-making process, the zones of the brain governing the emotions are activated before cognitive reasoning has been consciously formulated. Furthermore, people who have suffered damage to the part of the brain that controls emotions, but whose cognitive capacities remain intact, experience difficulties when making trivial decisions. Therefore, emotions appear to be an essential component of all forms of decision-making.

On the basis of these neurological studies, specialists argue that FPA should integrate emotional dimensions to a greater extent (Crawford 2000; Greenstein 2001; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Stein 2008; Mercer 2010; Sasley 2010, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011).

Yet, including emotions is no easy task for FPA. The main obstacle is methodological. Presidents and prime ministers refuse to be scrutinized with magnetic resonance imaging apparatus, to lie down on a psychoanalyst's couch or answer a questionnaire on their affective life. Although analysts can directly observe some of their actions and speeches, leaders may attempt to hide their emotions (Greenstein 1982).

From Psychobiography to Statistics

The difficulty of measuring the emotional fluctuations of leaders led researchers to adopt a psychobiographic approach. This method involves compiling as comprehensive and detailed a profile as possible of a particular leader's experience, including their childhood. Different sources of information are generally combined, such as interviews with family members, friends and colleagues, as well as the analysis of archival documents, including schoolwork, personal correspondence and private diaries.

Jerrold Post is undoubtedly one of the analysts who has made the greatest contribution to the development of the psychobiography. He graduated as a psychiatrist and worked for 20 years at the CIA's Centre for the Analysis of Personality, where he was responsible for compiling the

psychological profile of foreign leaders. When he became a professor, his research established links between major events in leaders' lives, their personality and their behavior in terms of foreign policy. Post studied the personalities of Slobodan Milosevic, Bill Clinton, Fidel Castro, Kim Jong-il and Woodrow Wilson (1983, 1991, 1993, 2004, 2006).

The best-known psychobiography of Woodrow Wilson, however, is not the one by Jerrold Post. Nor is it the one by Sigmund Freud himself (1939), which is often considered to be partial. It is the one co-written by Alexander and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, which became a classic in the field of psychobiography (1964). Woodrow Wilson is depicted as being a man with low self-esteem. His demanding and moralizing father may have instilled fear in him, which could only be mitigated by extraordinary performances. This personality trait may have been the driving force of Wilson's career. He began as a political scientist and went on to become the president of Princeton University. Then, as a politician, he made it to the White House. However, once at the top, his high moral standards paralyzed his political action during the First World War, as he was unable to find an unselfish justification to get the United States involved in that war. As George and George explain, "Wilson was capable of using force and violence as an instrument of foreign policy if he were convinced of the purity of the cause. He could fight an 'unselfish' war" (George and George 1964: 174). Later on, Wilson lacked the necessary self-confidence to accept concessions and negotiate the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles with Congress. It was his own intransigence, nurtured unconsciously to meet his father's expectations, which might explain why the United States remained outside the League of Nations.

Wilson is no exception. As in the case of other leaders, the affective traits that contributed to his political rise also constituted a handicap once he was in power. We can safely state that the great ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein equally led to their own downfall. This pattern is relatively common among leaders who suffer from varying degrees of narcissism and paranoia. In fact, when diagnosing political leaders, some researchers do not hesitate to turn to the famous and controversial *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* published by the American Psychiatric Association (Birt 1993; Glad 2002; Post 2004; Byman and Pollack 2001).

However, compiling the psychobiographies of leaders who do not have a flamboyant personality and do not suffer from an obvious pathology is more difficult. Apart from the problem of data access, data interpretation

is sometimes based on weak presumptions. Some psychobiographies cannot be falsified and some cannot be replicated. Most of them adopt a strictly idiosyncratic approach as they do not provide any basis for comparison and make no attempt to generalize.

Some studies on the influence of affective dimensions go to the other extreme: they ignore the specific characteristics of each decision-maker and limit themselves to the study of objective variables that are directly accessible and easy to compare. For example, they study the impact of the decision-makers' age, their gender or birth order. In the general population, it is a well-established fact that these demographic characteristics are closely correlated with specific affective tendencies due to psychological or physiological factors. Nevertheless, the studies that attempt to identify the same correlations among political leaders generally obtain ambiguous results. The statistical significance of the impact of age, gender or birth order on the affective life of leaders has not yet been proven, and therefore, it is not traceable in their foreign policy (Holsti and Rosenau 1980; Walker and Falkowski 1984; Hudson 1990; McDermott and Cowden 2001; Horowitz et al. 2005).

Middle Way: Affective Dimensions

A more promising middle way consists of focusing the analysis on a specific affective dimension. It does not involve compiling the full psychological profile of an individual, nor is it limited to measuring an indirect indicator. Instead, it involves isolating and operationalizing a single affective dimension so that it can be directly documented. Subsequently, comparisons can be established and the findings can be generalized.

Some studies that promote this middle way focus on the affective attachment that leaders have to their nation (Herrmann 2017). Jacques Hymans (2006) demonstrates that a particular form of nationalism provokes a cocktail of fear and pride that incites leaders to acquire nuclear weapons for their country. He identified this particular form of nationalism among Indian and French decision-makers who initiated a nuclear weapons program, but not among their Australian and Argentinian counterparts who rejected nuclear arms. Brent Sasley (2010) argues that the different forms of nationalism shown by the Israeli prime ministers influenced their position in peace negotiations. While Yitzhak Shamir was particularly attached to Israeli land, Yitzhak Rabin seemed more attached to the Israeli people. This variation could explain their political differences during the Oslo Peace Process.

Another affective dimension that is often studied is the relationship that political leaders have with social norms (Gaskarth 2011). Some individuals feel tied by social norms, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, while others do not feel personally constrained by them. In foreign policy, decision-makers who appear to be less sensitive to social norms are more likely to resort to armed conflict, even if military intervention is unpopular or contrary to international law. Jonathan Keller (2005) drew this conclusion from his comparison between President John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. Stephen Dyson (2006, 2007) reached the same conclusion after comparing British Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and Tony Blair.

A third affective dimension that can be studied in a comparative and qualitative approach is that of leaders' motivation. David Winter, who devoted his career to this question, distinguishes three principal political motivations: the desire to win and stay in power, the desire to realize an ambitious political project and the desire to develop relationships of social affiliation. In a study on African leaders, Winter observes that those driven by a thirst for power resort to armed force more often in their foreign policy and are less inclined to accept new international standards on arms control (Winter 1980, 2007; Winter and Carlson 1988; Winter et al. 1991).

Typologies Combining the Affective Dimensions

Affective dimensions can be combined to form ideal types. For example, James David Barber (1972) developed a typology of the character of American presidents by juxtaposing two affective dimensions: the need to invest in work and the pleasure derived from work. Barber obtained four ideal types, ranging from the presidents who do not become very emotionally involved in their work, but nonetheless derive a certain pleasure from it, such as Ronald Reagan, to those who are totally dedicated, but only derive a feeling of frustration, as in the case of Richard Nixon. Barber considers that active and positive presidents, like Bill Clinton, are generally the best at deploying an effective foreign policy, despite the fact that they may be inclined to dissipate their efforts in several theaters of action at the same time.

The simplicity of Barber's typology contributed to its success. It includes two variables, each one documented in a dichotomous way. On the other hand, it may be difficult to categorize a specific leader owing to

this simplicity. For example, it is hard to determine whether Dwight Eisenhower was genuinely absorbed in his work or whether he derived real satisfaction from it (Greenstein 1982).

Margaret Hermann (1980) developed a more complex typology and a method that facilitates categorization. Her typology combines seven classic personality traits, including cognitive and affective, which have been addressed separately in this chapter: (1) the level of cognitive complexity, (2) thirst for power, (3) mistrust of others, (4) self-confidence, (5) nationalism, (6) sources of motivation and (7) belief in one's capacity to control events.

According to Hermann's method, these personality traits can be documented by a statistical discourse analysis. Each trait is associated with a series of terms whose relative frequency in a corpus of allocution indicates how pronounced that trait is. The results are then compared to the average for political leaders: a standard deviation above or below the average signifies that the trait is, respectively, particularly strong or weak.

The results obtained for the seven personality traits are subsequently combined and associated to one of the numerous personality types generated by Hermann. The so-called aggressive personality, for example, corresponds to a low cognitive complexity, a thirst for power, a deep mistrust of others, pronounced nationalism and a belief in one's capacity to control events. Hermann's research shows that leaders with an aggressive personality are statistically more likely to engage in armed conflicts.

Margaret Hermann's approach has appealed to numerous researchers. As with the psychobiographies, the approach makes it possible to conduct a subtle analysis, reconciling cognition and affection. However, unlike the psychobiographies, Hermann's quantitative method can be used to establish statistical ratios with diverse dependent variables and to make generalizations.

As Hermann's approach has been used to determine the personality of several leaders, there is now a reliable comparative basis. The averages for each of the personality traits are fairly stable. They are calculated from an increasing number of political leaders and, thus, constitute a benchmark. The approach is encouraging a return to case studies, which can be considered in the light of this comparative basis. Although Hermann compiled her typology using variables defined by previous research, her work is now revitalizing studies that focus on the analysis of a single individual in all their complexity (Preston 2001; Crichlow 2005; Dyson 2006, 2009a; Gallagher and Allen 2014).

COGNITION

The human mind is limited and cannot analyze all the information that it perceives. As a result, leaders try to integrate all this information into theories or within the mental images of the world they have constructed. Leaders analyze information through their cognitive filters, which make it possible to identify and give meaning to the elements that seem important to them. “Cognition” usually refers to the mental processes that allow individuals to interpret their environment. There is no consensus of opinion, however, with regard to the theoretical model that best reflects cognitive processes.

Cognitive Consistency

Several cognitive scientists believe that the human mind is governed by the need to maintain internal consistency. To avoid a feeling of doubt, which is psychologically uncomfortable, any information that is incompatible with the established belief system is ignored. Inversely, any information that is compatible with this belief system can be integrated easily. Similarly, individuals’ aspirations are generally consistent with their expectations and their beliefs match their behavior. When an internal inconsistency is identified, the human mind makes swift adjustments to re-establish an impression of coherence by imagining a detailed explanation or an exception to the preset rules of thought without altering the actual essence of the rules (Festinger 1957; Jervis 1976; Janis and Mann 1976; Kahneman 2011).

According to the theory of cognitive coherence, an individual’s belief system is shaped by their earliest experiences. It then expands, though the central core remains relatively stable throughout their life. As Henry Kissinger commented, “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office” (quoted in Andrianopoulos 1991: 13). The more experience individuals acquire, the stronger their belief system, the more established their insights and the more their reactions will be automatic and intuitive. Thus, the religious beliefs that leaders have grown up with can have a lasting influence on the way they interpret the world and, by extension, on their foreign policy (Hermann 1980).

As a result of this tendency to maintain a coherent belief system, leaders sometimes experience difficulty when it comes to adapting to changing situations. They have difficulty in integrating new information that cannot

be explained by preexisting ideas and mental images. This can lead to a lack of flexibility (cognitive rigidity) and difficulty in reacting promptly to crises. Even when leaders claim to be open to new ideas and are presented with convincing proof that their perception of the world is outmoded, they are not always able to shed their old cognitive reflexes. For example, Ole Hosti observed that the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had such a fixed idea of the Soviet Union that he failed to fully grasp the information contradicting the Soviet Union's alleged hostility to the United States (1962). Similarly, in the 1980s, several leaders denied that the profound changes that shook the USSR would resolutely change international relations. During the 1990s, some leaders were still unable to shake off the prism of the Cold War (Chollet and Goldgeier 2003; Malici and Malici 2005).

Operational Codes

One of the methods most frequently used by foreign policy analysts to grasp the political leaders' belief system involves defining their operational code (Walker 1990; Winter et al. 1991). Alexander George (1969) developed this method after being inspired by Nathan Leites' work on the beliefs of Soviet leaders (1951). The operational code method involves identifying the beliefs specific to each leader in relation to ten fundamental questions. These questions are organized in a hierarchy, ranging from the most fundamental and inflexible to the most marginal and transient. The first five questions are of a philosophical nature and the following five are instrumental:

- (1) What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
- (2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and ideological goals? Can one be optimistic or pessimistic?
- (3) In what sense and to what extent is the political future predictable?
- (4) How much control or mastery can one have over historical developments? What is the political leader's (or elite's) role in moving and shaping history?
- (5) What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?
- (6) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
- (7) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
- (8) How are the risks of political action best calculated, controlled, and accepted?
- (9) What is the best timing of action to

advance one's interest? (10) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? (Quoted in George and Bennett 2005: 87–88).

Although the operational code approach was initially developed in the United States to further our understanding of Soviet leaders, researchers were quick to turn the spotlights on Washington. The ten questions that constitute the operational code have actually guided research on several American presidents, secretaries of state and national security advisors, such as Woodrow Wilson (Walker and Schafer 2007), Dean Acheson (McLellan 1971), John Kennedy (Stuart and Starr 1981), Lyndon Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), Henry Kissinger (Starr 1984; Walker 1977), Jimmy Carter (Walker et al. 1998), George H. W. Bush (Walker et al. 1999), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000) and George W. Bush (Renshon 2008). Recent studies have also used the ten questions devised by Alexander George to study leaders in different countries, including German chancellors (Malici 2006) and Russian presidents (Dyson 2001). Overall, the operational code approach made it possible to examine the belief system of over 100 political leaders (Schafer and Walker 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008).

The comparative analysis of the most recent case studies was greatly facilitated by the widespread use of a common encoding technique proposed by Walker et al. (1998). Instead of using a qualitative approach, combining archive research, interviews with key people and content analysis, to find the answers to the ten operational code questions, Walker, Shafer and Young developed a quantitative technique for speech analysis. This technique, called “verbs in context”, involves the systematic analysis of verbs in a vast corpus of speeches using specialized software (Schafer and Walker 2006). For example, the proportion of verbs used in the active voice followed by a direct object, which refers to a political opponent, reflects a degree of confidence in the capacity to control events and influence the course of history. This corresponds to question five in the operational code. This common statistical basis provides the framework to compare the belief systems of different political leaders.

The Achilles' heel of cognitive analysis using the operational code is the difficulty of establishing the links between the responses obtained and foreign policy behavior (Karawan 1994). Several studies compile detailed profiles of a specific decision-maker's operational code. Yet, they satisfy themselves with vague allusions to the impact that the operational code may have had on the decision-maker's actions. In other words, research on

the dependent variable rarely attracts as much attention as research on the independent variable. Harvey Starr (1984) even reached the conclusion that he was unable to identify any significant relationships between Henry Kissinger's operational code and the American foreign policies adopted when he was secretary of state.

Heuristic Shortcuts

One method that can be used for a more direct examination of how leaders' cognition influences foreign policy is to study the stereotypes that they hold with regard to foreign countries. Stereotypes, sometimes referred to as "images" in FPA, are heuristic shortcuts that are conveyed culturally or shaped by the initial contact with foreign countries. Once they are deep-rooted, stereotypes tend to persist even against the will of those who wish to be free of them (Holsti 1962).

The stereotypes that are relevant to FPA vary according to a series of perceptions with regard to foreign states, including those concerning their power, their cultural status and their political objectives. For example, the stereotype of the immature state corresponds to the weak culturally inferior state that has friendly goals. It reflexes a paternalistic stereotype and suggests certain types of foreign policy behavior, such as France's behavior toward Africa and the United States' behavior toward the Philippines (Doty 1993; Herrmann et al. 1999; Morgan 2001; Alexander et al. 2005).

An alternative approach to studying political leaders' cognitive processes is the study of the analogies they use in their speeches (Oppermann and Spencer 2013). Analogies are used to interpret the present in the light of lessons learned from past events, regardless of whether they were experienced personally or are part of the collective memory. They are intellectual shortcuts, much like stereotypes: it is easier to recall similar experiences than to consider all the relevant elements and think logically about the present case. By transposing lessons from the past to the present, decision-makers find it easier to define the situation they are facing, anticipate events to come and identify the best course of action (Vertzberger 1986; Neustadt and May 1986; Vertzberger 1990; Shimko 1994; Sylvan et al. 1994; Peterson 1997; Hehir 2006, Dyson and Preston 2006; Layne 2008; Brunk 2008; Flanik 2011).

Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein sought to understand the situation he was facing by relying on the Gaddafi analogy. Hussein came to believe that the Bush administration might punish his

regime as the Reagan administration had punished Colonel Gaddafi's Libyan regime in the 1980s, but that Washington would not militarily intervene to depose him. This analogy increased Hussein's misperception of the Bush administration's real intentions since, as we know, the United States invaded Iraq (Duelfer and Dyson 2011).

One of the most classic studies on the use of analogies in foreign policy was conducted by Yuen Foong Khong (1992). He shows that during the Vietnam War, American decision-makers allowed themselves to be guided by lessons drawn from previous wars. In particular, by drawing from the Munich Crisis, when France and the United Kingdom agreed to negotiate with Hitler, they deduced that it is important to act firmly and swiftly against aggressive enemies. In addition, by drawing from the Korean War, they deduced that massive intervention is an effective way to limit the enemy's ambitions. However, as the example of the Vietnam War illustrates, analogies do not always provide sound advice. By obscuring specific details and strengthening certitudes, analogies often lead to inaccurate interpretations and poorly conceived foreign policy (Dallek 2010). This is why analogies are often referred to as "history's traps".

Cognitive studies that focus on heuristic shortcuts sometimes underestimate the complexity of cognitive processes. Decision-makers could simply mention analogies *ex post* in order to justify their actions and convince the public that their policies are well founded. From this perspective, analogies may tell us more about the decision-makers' rhetorical strategies than about their cognitive processes. Decision-makers may draw analogies from history that correspond to their preferences, rather than identifying their preferences as a function of analogies (Breuning 2003).

This possibility could explain why there is no apparent generational effect in terms of the analogies mentioned by political leaders (Holsti and Rosenau 1980). Although George W. Bush described himself as being a product of the Vietnam generation, it was the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the war against Nazism that were raised after the September 11 attacks. Perhaps the use of vague and distant analogies, which have a considerable impact on public opinion nonetheless, was merely a rhetorical strategy to justify the war against Iraq (Western 2005).

Cognitive Mapping

Some researchers keen to reconstitute the complexity of decision-makers' cognitive processes use cognitive mapping. Robert Axelrod (1973), Michael Shapiro and Matthew Bonham (1973) developed this technique

to create a graphic representation of the structure of decision-makers' causal beliefs. Essentially, it involves the use of speech analysis to identify reference points for thoughts that are linked by positive or negative causal relationships. For example, if a prime minister maintains that signing a free-trade agreement will help reduce poverty, a link can be drawn between the concept of free trade and poverty that is marked with a minus sign. By analyzing an entire corpus of speeches and by identifying multiple causal beliefs, the researcher obtains a cognitive map that can include dozens of concepts that have hundreds of links.

Compiling cognitive maps can target three different goals. Axelrod's primary goal was to use them in a reflexive exercise involving the political leaders themselves in order to help the latter consider their own belief system and identify possible inconsistencies. With the development of information technology in the 1980s, some researchers hoped that cognitive maps would be applied to modelling cognitive processes and predicting the reactions of foreign leaders. Today, cognitive maps are used more often to compare the degree of complexity of different individuals' belief systems. A decision-maker with a high level of cognitive complexity will have a cognitive map comprising more concepts and causal relationships.

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive complexity varies from one political leader to another. In addition to cognitive maps, comparisons can be made on the basis of the statistical analysis of the terms used in speeches. This approach was first developed by Margaret Hermann (1980) and has been used by an increasing number of researchers ever since.

According to Hermann, several terms indicate a high level of complexity, including "sometimes", "probably" and "some". In a speech, they suggest an equivocal and subtle understanding of the world. Terms like "always", "certainly" and "all" indicate a lower degree of complexity and more general, absolute and coarse mental categories. By establishing the ratio of these two groups of key words in a corpus of speeches, a researcher can obtain an assessment of the level of cognitive complexity on a quantitative scale and, thus, compare different individuals.

This method made it possible to establish the fact that leaders with a low level of cognitive complexity, like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, generally see the world dichotomously. They are quick to associate foreign powers to enemies and to evil, and internal powers to friends

and to good. This Manichaeism reduces their capacity for empathy, their tolerance to protests, their inclinations to bow to international constraints and their will to negotiate compromises. When faced with a threatening situation, they are quick to resort to armed force, without considering all the other possibilities of intervention.

Conversely, leaders with a higher level of cognitive complexity are generally more comfortable with ambiguous situations, surround themselves with advisors who are not afraid to express their differences, adapt more easily to changing situations, consider a broader repertoire of action, find more suitable analogies for a given situation, show greater respect for international standards, are more willing to negotiate agreements with their adversaries and, lastly, are less likely to resort to military force (Adorno et al. 1950; Hermann 1980, 1983; Glad 1983; Vertzberger 1990; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Preston 1997; Dyson and Preston 2006; Dyson 2009a, b; Foster and Keller 2014). Looking at the diversionary use of force, Foster and Keller (2014) show that a leader's low level of cognitive complexity is likely to rely on military diversion when faced with domestic political problems, while those with more complex cognitive minds will perform a thorough cost-benefit analysis before rejecting the use of force as a diversion tool in favor of a less risky approach.

The weakness of some of these studies is to suggest that cognitive complexity is an invariable fact that remains stable throughout a leader's political career. Yet, several studies analyze the different speeches of a specific leader separately. They indicate that cognitive complexity fluctuates, depending on the context. International crises, in particular, generate a high level of stress, which can reduce the leaders' cognitive complexity. Robert Kennedy describes just that in relation to the stress felt during the Cuban Missile Crisis: "That kind of crisis-induced pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men" (1969: 22).

Several studies actually suggest that intense and prolonged stress momentarily atrophies the complexity of the decision-makers' belief system. In addition, it reduces their tolerance to ambiguity and encourages the use of stereotypes and analogies. All these symptoms can be detected by speech analysis. Consequently, some researchers suggest that fluctuations in the degree of cognitive complexity could be used to detect bluffs during a tense negotiation or even to anticipate the probabilities of an enemy surprise attack (Holsti and George 1975; Suedfeld and Tetlock

1977; Holsti 1979; Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Guttieri et al. 1995; Wallace et al. 1996; Astorino-Courtois 2000; Suedfeld and Leighton 2002; Conway et al. 2003; Mintz 2004; Post 2004).

In addition, the level of cognitive complexity appears to fluctuate as a function of the political leaders' goals. In general, their speeches reveal a simpler belief system when they are striving to gain power than when they are actually in power. They also tend to express more basic causal relationships when they are calling for war and use more subtle language when calling for peace. For example, that is what emerges when Yasser Arafat's speeches at the time of the 1967 Six-Day War are compared with those given during the Oslo process 30 years later; or again the comparison of Richard Nixon's speeches when he was senator during McCarthyism with those given 20 years later at the time of his rapprochement with communist China (Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Maoz and Shayer 1987; Crichlow 1998; DiCicco 2011).

Schema Theory

The evolution in leaders' belief systems is difficult to reconcile with the theory of cognitive coherence. According to the theory's initial wording, the belief system is relatively rigid and stable. Life's diverse experiences enhance it continually, making it increasingly hermetic to information that could be contradictory. The theory of cognitive coherence clearly recognizes that it is possible to make gradual peripheral adjustments to the knowledge system, specifically in order to maintain the system's coherence. However, core changes are rare, and when they do occur they occur brutally, in the wake of a major event. A decision-maker has to be confronted head-on with the inadequacy of his belief system before he possibly agrees to revise it fundamentally. The Soviet attack on Afghanistan may have provoked a brutal shift in Jimmy Carter's belief system, much like the September 11 terrorist attacks for George W. Bush in 2001 (Walker et al. 1998; Renshon 2008).

DiCicco (2011) shows that dramatic events involving NATO in the winter of 1983–1984 transformed President Reagan's mental construct of the Soviet Union. The US intelligence found that Moscow greatly feared that a NATO military exercise (the Able Archer 83) was the first step of a US surprise attack against the USSR. As a result, Soviet leaders were anticipating nuclear war. This led Reagan to "reevaluate his understanding of Soviet perceptions" of the United States' intentions (2011: 253) and to

initiate a change in his approach by focusing on an open and peaceful dialogue. This incident was the tipping point that moved Reagan's strategy from confrontation to cooperation.

The more recent schema theory recognizes that there is greater flexibility in the political leaders' cognitive processes. Schemas are constructions of the mind, which aggregate knowledge and beliefs in relation to a specific domain. Contrary to the concentric and hierarchical vision of the belief system proposed by the theory of cognitive coherence, schema theory maintains that beliefs are fragmented and relatively independent of each other. Different beliefs that belong to different domains may appear incoherent to an outside observer, but they are upheld, nonetheless, because they are dissociated cognitively. Therefore, schema theory is more compatible with the idea that cognition adapts continually to environmental changes (Larson 1994; Renshon and Larson 2003; Sohn 2012).

Schema theory maintains that individuals learn continuously from their interactions with the environment (Levy 1994; Reiter 1996). They are not presented as passive filters that absorb or reject certain information depending on their belief system. They are actors who are continually testing hypotheses and adjusting to the feedback they receive from the environment. Soviet leaders, for example, have learned by trial and error from the various policies they deployed in the 1970s and 1980s. According to several Sovietologists, if Mikhail Gorbachev radically changed Soviet foreign policy, it is not so much because of the shift in the international system or his exceptional personality, but because he drew lessons from previous Soviet failures. His predecessors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were faced with the same structural difficulties as Gorbachev, but maintained a confrontational stance toward the United States (Nye 1987; Blum 1993; Checkel 1993; Mendelson 1993; Stein 1994; Evangelista 1995; Wallace et al. 1996; Bennett 1999; Laucella 2004).

Having said that, the cognitive capacities of adaptation vary from one leader to another. Some leaders prove themselves to be relatively inflexible, while others demonstrate a remarkable capacity for learning. For example, for decades, Yitzhak Rabin's operational code was far more stable than that of Shimon Peres, which fluctuated frequently as a function of the context (Crichlow 1998).

Therefore, the theory of cognitive coherence is not necessarily incompatible with schema theory (Larson 1985). The first is more suitable for analyzing dogmatic leaders, who use deductive reasoning based on a

broad general theory. The second is more suitable for pragmatic leaders, who prefer induction using their empirical observations. Paradoxically, dogmatic leaders tend to be more confident in the soundness of their own logic, whereas pragmatic leaders are better at grasping the complexities of their environment and anticipating the evolution in international relations (Hermann et al. 2001a, b; Tetlock 2005).

PERCEPTIONS

In the 1960s, Richard Snyder (1961) and the couple Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) were already interested in the importance of perceptions in foreign policy. They clearly pointed out that if analysts want to fully understand foreign policy decisions, they should reconstruct the world as political decision-makers perceive it and not as it actually is or as the analysts imagine it to be (Gold 1978).

There is always a gap between the real world and the perceived world. A human being can only assimilate the environment by omitting certain elements, by simplifying reality, by making assumptions to compensate for unknown data, by relying on personal and historical analogies and by restructuring scattered information to give it meaning (Tetlock and McGuire 1985; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). Political leaders react to this biased vision of reality and not to reality itself. If analysts ignore this bias, their analyses are likely to be distorted.

Despite this note of caution from the pioneers of FPA, most foreign policy analysts disregard the perceptions of the actors that they are studying. Reconstructing the decision-makers' perceptions is risky in methodological terms because it is impossible to slip into their minds to see the world through their eyes. A number of analysts prefer using objective rather than subjective indicators. Thus, they accept the fiction, which is methodologically convenient, that decision-makers directly assimilate the real world.

Robert Jervis, in his key book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976), has helped overcome these methodological difficulties. In this book, Jervis suggests that perception bias in foreign policy is not totally idiosyncratic and unpredictable. Some bias recurs in most individuals' mind, which can actually be observed systematically in a laboratory. Jervis' central premise is that political leaders perceive the world with the same bias.

Misperception

Duelfer and Dyson define misperception as “the gap between the world as it actually exists and the world as it exists in the mind of the perceiver” (2011). One of the most common forms of perception bias that has drastic consequences is to overestimate the hostility of one’s rivals (Jervis 1976). Actions that are strictly defensive are frequently perceived as being offensive actions. For example, China and Japan have been eyeing each other like China dogs for decades. Although they are economically interdependent, they continue to interpret each other’s actions with mistrust (Yahuda 2006; He 2007).

At the same time, individuals tend to underestimate how much others mistrust them. Few individuals define themselves as threatening or aggressive, and it is hard for them to imagine that they can be perceived as such. They mistakenly consider that their intentions are clear and that others can interpret their behavior correctly (Jervis 1976). Nehru seriously underestimated the threat that India represented in the eyes of Mao Zedong’s China. Yet, Chinese authorities genuinely feared an attack from India. Therefore, Nehru failed to anticipate that China would carry out a preemptive attack on India (Vertzberger 1984; Garver 2006). More recently, the Bush administration seriously underestimated the mistrust of the Afghan and Iraqi populations. While the United States was expecting to be welcomed as a liberator in Kabul and Baghdad, a substantial part of the Afghan and Iraqi populations came to perceive the American army as a hostile occupying force (Mandel 2009). According to a *Pew Research Center* opinion poll, the majority of the Jordanian population considered, as early as 2004, that the United States’ war on terror was motivated by the desire to control oil in the Middle East (71%), to protect Israel (70%) or for world domination (61%). However, in the United States, these explanations were ruled out by the vast majority of the population. They were held by 18%, 11% and 13% of Americans, respectively (with a margin of error of 3.5 and a 95% confidence interval).

The combination of overestimating the hostility of others and underestimating the threat perceived by others can lead to a spiral of misunderstanding and mistrust (Jervis 1976; Larson 1997). A political leader who fears for his state’s security can react by increasing its military capacities. Foreign governments will interpret this as a threat, and in turn, they will react by increasing their military capabilities. This is the famous security dilemma in which defensive measures fuel insecurity rather than increase

security. The First World War is the most obvious example. While most protagonists were not seeking territorial gain, they were all under the impression that they had to prepare an offensive operation to preempt an enemy attack. The devastating outcome is well known (Wohlforth 1987; Walt 1996; Williamson 2011).

Several factors generate this mutual distrust. On an organizational level, it can be exacerbated by the ultra-careful attitude of certain advisors or bureaucratic organizations that feel duty-bound to imagine the worst-case scenario and prepare for the consequences. On a more socio-psychological level, individuals from all cultures generally appear to define their enemies as a reflection of themselves—in other words, as a diametrically opposed projection of themselves. According to this theory, if an individual considers himself to be balanced and humble, he will generally judge his enemies to be nervous and arrogant. As individuals generally have a positive self-image, they tend to demonize their rivals. This bias prevents them from empathizing with their rivals and has a negative influence on their perception (Eckhardt and White 1967; White 1968; Garthoff 1978). In sum, misperception reduces the rationality and the objectivity of the decision-making process and thus depletes that process.

Attribution Bias

Mutual distrust can also be fed by a different but equally common perception bias—namely, attributing intrinsic motivations strictly to the unfriendly actions of others. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, several of President Kennedy's advisors immediately interpreted the dispatch of Soviet missiles to Cuba as the demonstration that Moscow had suddenly decided to adopt a hostile and aggressive policy. Kennedy's advisors overlooked the possibility that the Kremlin was merely reacting to American actions, namely, the installation of missiles in Turkey (Jervis 1976; Hermann 1985).

Attribution bias can even lead decision-makers to draw conclusions, which have tremendous consequences, from events that have not even occurred. In Errol Morris' documentary *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara* (2003), the former secretary of defense recounts the incident that led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution in 1964, which authorized President Johnson to use all necessary conventional military means in Southeast Asia, and to escalate the war in Vietnam. In August 1964, the destroyer USS *Maddox* reported

to the Pentagon that it had been attacked twice in 48 hours in international waters by North Vietnamese boats. President Johnson retaliated by ordering bombing in North Vietnam and by getting Congress to pass the Tonkin resolution. In retrospect, McNamara acknowledged the fact that there was tremendous confusion back then on whether or not the USS *Maddox* had really been attacked. He even confessed that events afterward showed that their judgment was partly wrong as the *Maddox* had not been attacked the second time:

President Johnson authorized the attack on the assumption that [the second North Vietnamese attack] had occurred. [...] [On the assumption] that it was a conscious decision on the part of the North Vietnamese political and military leaders to escalate the conflict and an indication they would not stop short of winning. We were wrong, but we had it in our minds... in our mindset and it carried such heavy costs. We see incorrectly or we see only half of the story at times” (Morris 2003).

In addition, individuals naturally tend to interpret their enemies’ friendly behavior as the outcome of a constraint. Daniel Heradstveit made this observation after interviewing Egyptian, Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian decision-makers (1979). In the Middle East, everyone considers that the others’ aggressive behavior is the manifestation of their genuine desire. On the other hand, peaceful behavior is considered to be the result of external pressure. Decision-makers have a positive self-image and are aware of their own strategic actions. Therefore, they generally take the credit for their enemies’ acts of goodwill.

On the contrary, when decision-makers adopt aggressive policies, they are quick to justify them as constraints that are beyond their control. They blame public opinion, opposing political parties or pressure from an interest group. However, when they adopt peaceful policies, they gladly point out that the policies reflect their genuine intentions.

In all cases, individuals naturally seek simple causal explanations to justify their own and others’ behavior. Chance, coincidences, impulses, unforeseen consequences and multicausality seem to be as unsatisfactory on an intellectual level for decision-makers as they are for experts who analyze them. The mind is naturally drawn to simple and direct causal mechanisms, which give the comforting illusion that everything can be understood and explained. Conspiracy theories always generate more followers than complex explanations, which are partly based on the vagaries of chance (Jervis 1976).

This attribution bias is connected to the perception bias of the decision-making process. Decision-makers are fully aware of the different opposing factions within their own governmental apparatus. Nonetheless, they generally overestimate the degree of centralization and cohesion in other countries. The controversial speech given by Nicolas Sarkozy in Dakar in 2007 on the “misfortunes of Africa” was interpreted by many African observers as a reflection of the state of mind of the entire French political class. Similarly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s strident declarations about the United States and Israel were interpreted in the West as being the opinion of the entire Iranian government (Jervis 1976; Vertzberger 1990; Malici and Buckner 2008).

This overestimation of the cohesion of others is equally valid in terms of international coalitions. During the Cold War, Western countries were fully aware of the tensions within NATO, but overestimated Moscow’s control over the members of the Warsaw Pact. In some cases, overestimating an interlocutor’s cohesion can lead to the failure of deterrence policies. Political leaders who have access to considerable economic resources are sometimes tempted to offer compensation to foreign governments to ward off an attack. If leaders overestimate the foreign governments’ cohesion and their control over different social and political fractions, they run the risk of not offering sufficient compensation to appease the most aggressive groups. From this perspective, overestimating the enemies’ centrality diminishes the probability of the success of deterrence strategies and increases the probabilities of conflicts (Sechser 2010).

Probabilities

Although the cohesion of foreign coalitions is generally overestimated, an enemy’s military capabilities, in particular, are often underestimated. Wars are frequently the result of overoptimism on both sides. Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, France and the United Kingdom seriously underestimated the resilience of the German economy. On the contrary, the allied countries’ capacities were generally overestimated. France and the United Kingdom made exactly the same mistake in the First World War, by seriously overestimating their Russian ally’s capacities (Jervis 1976; Wohlforth 1987).

Overestimating the probabilities of success goes far beyond military dimensions. Diplomats often make the same mistake in negotiations. In 2002, behind the scenes at the UN Security Council, American diplomats

were still convinced that they could persuade France not to veto the authorization of military intervention in Iraq. The French diplomats, in turn, were still convinced that they could persuade the United States that the threats made against Iraq were sufficient and that it was not necessary to circumvent the UN apparatus (Marfleet and Miller 2005).

These forms of bias are by no means unique to military or diplomatic circles. In an uncertain context, it is extremely difficult for human beings to assess the probabilities of success or failure correctly. High probabilities are rapidly assimilated to absolute certainty. Low probabilities are often considered as implausible.

The hypothesis that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction was plausible and, thus, considered to be a certainty among senior officials in George W. Bush's administration. On the contrary, in 1941, the probability of a Japanese aircraft attack on the American naval base in Pearl Harbor was low. Consequently, the American army was ill prepared for it (Wohlstetter 1962).

By combining the different types of perception bias, ranging from the tendency to overestimate enemy hostility to that of overestimating the probabilities of military success, it is understandable that military conflicts are more frequent than the theory of rational choice would suggest (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Kim and Bueno de Mesquita 1995; Van Evera 1999). As Robert Jervis commented, "although war can occur in the absence of misperception, in fact misperception almost always accompanies it" (1988: 699).

Yet, foreign policy does not always depend on a leader's personality, cognitive bias and perception—far from there. Decision-makers must rely on their state's bureaucracy if they want to carry out their foreign policy. However, as the next chapter shows, bureaucracies direct and constrain leaders in their decision-making processes.

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What Is the Influence of the Bureaucracy?

In modern democracies, the civil service is officially subordinate to the elected representatives. The bureaucracy is supposed to remain politically neutral and ensure that government decisions are implemented. In reality, the relationships between bureaucrats and political leaders are not always clear-cut. While Eisenhower was preparing to move into the White House, the outgoing President Truman whispered to his advisors: “He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating” (Neustadt 1960: 9).

The bureaucracy is not very malleable. There are some foreign ministries that have budgets worth hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of employees. It is nigh on impossible to implement organizational or doctrinal reforms swiftly in such circumstances.

Time also plays in favor of the civil service. Unlike the elected representatives, it is not constantly under threat of being ejected from power at the next elections. It was in place before the leaders arrived and will remain so when they leave. If a decision does not meet with the bureaucracy’s approval, it can implement the decision slowly and partially and, thus, compromise its effectiveness or even its efficiency.

The institutional design of the bureaucracy can also greatly affect foreign policy. The more agencies are institutionally independent from a government’s executive, the more they are likely to pursue their own preferences, to seek greater autonomy and to make executive foreign policy objectives difficult to meet. The US distribution of foreign aid is a case

in point. Research shows that government agencies with aid programs and well-defined objectives are not always responsive to the administration's priorities, while the foreign aid programs of agencies that are more institutionally dependent on the executive will meet the diplomatic objectives of the president (Arel-Bundock et al. 2015).

The bureaucracy's principal resource is no doubt its expertise. It selects the information presented to the leaders and arranges it intelligibly. By presenting the problems or possible actions in a certain way, it structures the leaders' decision-making.

Obviously, elected representatives are not powerless vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. They appoint several senior officials, adopt budgetary appropriations and determine the government's broad policy orientations (Wood and Waterman 1991). Sometimes their decision goes against the bureaucracy's recommendations. The Japanese government, for example, ratified the Kyoto Protocol on climate change despite the unfavorable opinion expressed by several influential ministers (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). Similarly, the Clinton administration favored NATO enlargement to East European countries despite the opposition expressed by the US bureaucracy (Goldgeier 1999). This chapter discusses the control of government leaders over the bureaucracy as well as the influence of the civil servants more closely.

MANAGEMENT STYLES

The decision-making process in foreign policy varies as a function of the leaders' management style—in other words, the way they manage information and the people around them. Leaders adopt very different management styles. In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher relied predominantly on the small team from her cabinet, whereas her immediate successor, John Major, relied more on his ministers and the civil service (Kaarbo 1997). In the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev preferred a centralized authoritarian style, whereas Leonid Brezhnev was more interested in reaching a consensus within the politburo (Stewart et al. 1989). These variations do not depend on the political regime or on the type of problem to be resolved, but on the political leaders' preferences and capacities.

Different management styles influence the decision-making process and, ultimately, foreign policy itself (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). For example, if Major had been prime minister instead of Thatcher, he would undoubtedly have lacked the necessary determination to engage in the

Falklands War despite the objections raised by several ministers (Kaarbo 1997). Similarly, if Khrushchev had been secretary general instead of Brezhnev, he may not have shifted his position on military aid for Egypt as a function of the politburo's preferences (Stewart et al. 1989).

Research on foreign policy management styles can be broken down into complementary branches. The first focuses on the different variables, which make it possible to distinguish between the management styles and identify the ideal types. The second, which is more normative than descriptive, aims to identify the most suitable management styles for foreign policy decision-making.

Defining Management Styles

For analytical purposes, a leader's management style can be broken down into four main variables. The first variable concerns the scope of the circle of advisors consulted before making a decision. Some leaders surround themselves with an inner circle made up of faithful allies in whom they have unwavering confidence. The inner circle can act as a filter between the leader and the rest of the governmental apparatus. Other leaders prefer broadening their circle of advisors so they have more direct access to first-hand information and to experts who are in the field (Link and Kegley 1993).

The second variable that determines the management style is the interaction framework between the advisors. A conventional method of classification, developed by Richard Johnson (1974) and Alexander George (1980), differentiates formal, collegial and competitive frameworks. Formal frameworks seek to produce solutions that are as rational and efficient as possible by using clear hierarchical procedural rules. Collegial frameworks are more based on teamwork and guided by flexible and informal rules, which make it easier to reach a consensus. Competitive frameworks encourage clashes between the different advisors seeking to gain the upper hand. In the United States, it is generally acknowledged that Ronald Reagan encouraged a formal framework, Bill Clinton a collegial framework and Franklin Roosevelt a competitive framework (Haney 1997).

The third variable is the degree of centralization of the decision-making process. The head of state can make the final decision alone or delegate to a group, independently of the number of advisors consulted and their interaction framework. For example, a decentralized decision-making method in a competitive framework will leave plenty of room for

bureaucratic rivalries. Foreign policy will reflect the distribution of power between the different players involved. However, if the leader encourages a centralized method within the same competitive framework instead, he will first let his advisors clash. He can then use the confrontation to his advantage to glean a maximum amount of information and ideas. Then he will decide according to his own preferences and views (Rosati 1981; Hermann and Preston 1994; Kaarbo 1997; Hermann et al. 2001a; Beasley et al. 2001; Mitchell 2005; Garrison 2007).

The fourth and last variable that constitutes the management style is the leader's interpersonal skills. If he is eloquent and charismatic, he will succeed in convincing his own advisors and giving impetus to his entire team. He can also resort to different manipulative strategies to modify the group dynamic. For example, he can make new proposals to split the majority, modify the agenda for a meeting so that the first decision provides the strategic framework for the second decision, or associate two subjects to create new coalitions within his administration (Maoz 1990).

The Most Appropriate Management Style

By selecting one or more of these variables, some studies have attempted to identify a management style that would be more suitable for foreign policy decision-making. Most of these studies conclude that extremes are generally best avoided: the decisional group should be neither too narrow nor too broad; the participants should be able to hold different points of view, but share common values; and decision-making should come half-way between centralized authoritarianism and fragmented pluralism. Extremes of any kind are a handicap to one's capacity to analyze, adapt and learn (George 1972; Destler 1977; Kowert 2002).

Excessive informality and excessive formality can lead to similar mistakes. In the United States, for example, President Lyndon B. Johnson adopted a particularly informal style. The Tuesday Lunch Group that he set up to discuss foreign policy did not always include the same advisors. In addition, it lacked a preset agenda and a decision-making framework. This informality may have been problematic when it came to thoroughly appraising all the information. It may also have contributed to President Johnson's mistakes because he was bogged down in the Vietnam War with no real withdrawal plan (Preston and Hart 1999).

President George W. Bush adopted a style at the White House that had the formality of large corporate board meetings. He combined this with a major and fairly uniform delegation from his inner circle. The decision-making

framework was rigid, which prevented a genuine confrontation of ideas and made it difficult to challenge the president's assumptions. This formalism was a factor that contributed to the analytical mistakes made by the Bush administration. It became engaged in Iraq without thinking clearly about the security situation that would arise after Saddam Hussein's downfall. Thus, Johnson's informalism and Bush's formalism have contributed to similar failures, in Vietnam for the former and in Iraq for the latter (David 2004; Burke 2005; Haney 2005; Mitchell 2005; Rudalevige 2005; Mitchell and Massoud 2009; Badie 2010).

However, some management styles can generate specific weaknesses (Hermann et al. 2001a, b). A formal interaction framework, combined with a highly decentralized decision-making process, can encourage governance by standard operating procedures. This decision-making method allows for fast and effective responses to routine questions, but can be disastrous in crisis situations. With a competitive and decentralized framework, there is the risk of encouraging bureaucratic rivalries. Competition can be beneficial for expressing different opinions. However, as a decision-making method, it can lead to incoherent policies. Lastly, a decentralized and collegial framework is particularly vulnerable to the groupthink syndrome identified by Irving Janis, which is discussed in the next section. Therefore, the head of state should resort to different strategies of group management, similar to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in order to avoid falling into the trap of groupthink (Fig. 4.1).

		Decision-making framework	
		Vertical	Horizontal
Head of state	Active	Risk of authoritarian personality	Risk of groupthink
	Passive	Risk of governance by SOPs	Risk of bureaucratic politics

Fig. 4.1 Risks associated with management styles

While some management styles are counter-indicated, not a single style is a panacea for all situations and all leaders. First and foremost, the management style should correspond to the leader's cognitive capacities, his level of experience and knowledge, his endurance to stress and his need for control. Different leaders and different situations require different management styles (Preston and Hart 1999; Preston 1997, 2001; Kowert 2002; Mitchell 2010).

For example, whereas the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was trying to reach a consensus with his advisors, his daughter and successor, Indira Gandhi, adopted a more centralized and authoritarian management style. The different styles suited their respective personalities. The former sought the approval of his entourage, while the latter was more suspicious and viewed the world with antagonism. The style of one would not have suited the other. These differences in personality and style are ultimately reflected in their respective foreign policies. Nehru sought to appease the tensions with China and withdraw from the conflicts of the Cold War, while Gandhi's foreign policy was far more aggressive (Pavri 2002; Steinberg 2005).

GROUP DYNAMICS

Important foreign policy decisions are often discussed in small groups of senior political officials. Some groups are officially institutionalized, such as the Communist Party's Central Committee in the People's Republic of China or the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs in Canada. Other more informal groups exist, like the Tuesday Lunch Group at the White House, which brought together a few trusted advisors around President Johnson to discuss the Vietnam War (Haney 1997; Beasley et al. 2001; Hermann et al. 2001a, b).

Three main reasons can explain why heads of state often rely on group deliberation to reach a decision. First, on the socio-psychological level, it is a way of reducing the stress inherent to the pressure of decision-making, which would otherwise fall on one person's shoulders. Second, on the administrative level, it provides the opportunity to sound out different ideas and consider different opinions. Lastly, on a political level, a group decision is considered more legitimate by the administration responsible for implementing it and by the public in general.

The group decision-making practice has encouraged foreign policy analysts to develop theories that are specifically adapted to group dynamics.

It is common knowledge that a group's dynamics actually modify the behavior of its members. Group members adjust their expectations and rhetoric as a function of the interactions and their perception of the group. Yet, until now, only one foreign policy theory has genuinely risen to the challenge: groupthink. It has been well received way beyond the realm of FPA and appears to have been empirically proven.

Groupthink

The psychologist Irving Janis identified a specific group dynamic that he called "groupthink" (1972). It is a syndrome that occurs when the pressure to reach a consensus supersedes the group's objectives. The members become so obsessed by their own cohesion that they suppress their differences. Their capacities to analyze events and formulate moral judgments are substantially diminished as a result.

Janis observed the phenomenon of groupthink long before he started working on foreign policy. While studying support groups for smokers who wanted to give up, he noted that pressure in favor of cohesion might conflict with the group's objective (Hudson 1997). Janis was then struck by the realization that his observations on groupthink seemed to mirror the historian Arthur Schlesinger's description of the decision-making process that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to send a thousand Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. Kennedy and his team had just taken office in the White House and had not yet established clear decision-making procedures. However, pressure was running high. It was the middle of the Cold War, and some observers were worried that the new president, a young democrat, would lack the firmness and confidence of his predecessor, General Eisenhower. The Bay of Pigs landing was in fact planned under President Eisenhower, which helped reassure the new administration. When the plan was presented to Kennedy, none of the advisors dared express their reservations, not even those who secretly harbored doubts. Yet, the operation was seriously flawed. It was based on a sharp underestimation of the pro-Castro forces and an overestimation of the surprise effect that would be created. The outcome was dismal: not only were the exiles soon captured, but the failed invasion attempt also strengthened the hold of the Castro regime and brought it closer to the Soviet Union (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1976).

Several factors may contribute to the emergence of groupthink. These include a high level of stress, strong socio-cultural uniformity, a weak or dominant leader, a feeling of isolation, an overestimation of the group's capacities, a dubious decision-making method, a high concentration of sources of information and low self-esteem. Several of these factors were clearly present when Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs landing ('t Hart 1990; Schafer and Crichlow 1996).

Groupthink can be recognized by a set of symptoms. The most important are the illusion of unanimity and invulnerability, the repression of divergent opinions, the systematic justification of past mistakes, the conviction of moral superiority and the tendency to stereotype the actors who do not belong to the group. When several of these symptoms are combined, there is the risk that crucial elements of information will be ignored and that the group's decisions will be flawed (Kowert 2002).

Apart from the Bay of Pigs landing, groupthink can also help explain why groups adopt terrorism as the best strategy to reach their political objectives (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass 2014), why France and Britain approved Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland (Walker and Watson 1989; Ahlstrom and Wang 2009) or the decision made by George W. Bush's administration to invade Iraq in 2003 (Haney 2005; Badie 2010). In general, groups seem to advocate more extreme foreign policies than would be the case if an average was determined after questioning participants individually (Hermann and Hermann 1989).

The pathological approach adopted by Irving Janis and his successors naturally led them to compile a series of prescriptions to reduce the risks of groupthink. These include the leader's abstention with regard to expressing his opinions at the outset, a structured presentation of the different possible interpretations of data and the nomination of a devil's advocate whose role is to criticize the other members' ideas (George 1972; George and Stern 2002).

President Kennedy apparently drew similar conclusions from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the following year, Kennedy insisted that individuals with different points of view chair the ExComm; he delayed expressing his own view and appointed his brother Robert to supervise the identification of all the possible options. The Cuban Missile Crisis is generally presented as being a situation where the risk of groupthink was high but skillfully avoided (Herek et al. 1987, 1989; Haney 1994).

Defining the Phenomenon

Criticisms of the groupthink theory are primarily of methodological nature. In several studies, the link of causality between group dynamics and the foreign policy outcome is a matter of conjecture that has yet to be proven. Apart from Kennedy, who recorded the ExComm's deliberations unbeknown to its members, most group deliberations remain secret. There are neither recordings nor minutes, and archives are not freely available to researchers. The problem of data access makes it difficult to retrace the causal processes in detail. Thus, case studies are particularly vulnerable to multiple interpretations. For example, some challenge Janis' interpretations and maintain that the process leading to the Bay of Pigs landing was not a matter of groupthink (Stern 1997) or, on the contrary, that the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a case of groupthink (Welch 1989). Moreover, studies on groupthink are accused of selection bias: the researcher identify a failure in foreign policy first and then try to find symptoms of groupthink.

Several methodological strategies provide a partial response to these criticisms. In the absence of primary sources of data from group deliberations, some researchers use content analysis to dissect the decision-makers' public declarations systematically and assess their perception of the group to which they belong (Tetlock 1979). Others prefer a controlled laboratory environment to verify whether homogeneous groups are better at resolving complex problems than heterogeneous groups (Flowers 1977).

Another methodological strategy is the comparative analysis of several cases that have been cross-checked by at least two different encoders (Herek et al. 1989). This method involves asking several encoders to examine a series of historic cases using diverse written sources and precise indicators. For each case, they determine whether symptoms of groupthink are apparent and if they consider that the decision adopted was judicious. Researchers then focus on the historic cases for which the different encoders reached the same conclusions. After using this method for 31 historic cases, Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow suggest that it is not the high level of stress that leads directly to inadequate foreign policy decisions, but groupthink as defined by Janis (Schafer and Crichlow 2002).

Therefore, the government leader's management style seems to play a fundamental role in foreign policy (Schafer 1999). Groupthink occurs not so much because of unexpected situations, such as crises or lack of

information, but because of the instructions that government leaders give to their advisors, the atmosphere they succeed in creating and the way they organize the decision-making process.

ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

Graham Allison developed an organizational model for foreign policy when he was still a PhD student at Harvard University. He was doing research to explain the American and Soviet behavior during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In the process, he developed three explanatory models with the help of a research group on bureaucracy. In 1969, he presented the models for the first time in an article published in the *American Political Science Review*. Later, in 1971, he provided details of all three models in his dissertation, published under the title *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. The book soon became a classic of FPA and of political science, more generally. Allison published a revised version in 1999 with the help of Philip Zelikow, in the light of archives that were divulged by the American and Russian governments after the Cold War. The revised edition sparked theoretical discussions on Allison's three explanatory models, including the organizational model.

Organizational Strategies

Graham Allison's organizational model is directly inspired by Herbert Simon's research on limited rationality and by James March's research on organizations. It rejects the idea that foreign policy is the outcome of rational calculations made by a central authority. Instead, foreign policy is presented as the product of an organizational mechanism.

More specifically, the organizational model suggests that bureaucracies adopt two strategies to fulfill their mandate and manage the complex situations that they have to deal with. The first of these strategies is decentralization. The bureaucracy is actually a conglomerate made up of multiple organizational units that are quite independent from each other. When a problem occurs, it is automatically broken down into small tasks that can be carried out by these organizational units.

For example, if a new lethal virus triggers an epidemic abroad, the government would mobilize several ministries according to their respective expertise. Each one then would divide the tasks that need to be accomplished and allocate them to different units. Within the foreign ministry, a

first unit would be responsible for providing technical assistance to foreign governments, a second unit would check the information that was transmitted, a third would put pressure on the World Health Organization, a fourth would provide consular assistance for travelers, a fifth would impose restrictions on migratory flows, a sixth would encourage international scientific cooperation and a seventh would manage trade in pharmaceutical products. All the other ministries, ranging from health to public security, would also divide the tasks that they have to accomplish and allocate them to smaller organizational units. Hence, the response to a problem, such as an epidemic, is too complex for it to be coordinated entirely by a central authority.

The organizational model suggests that the bureaucracy's second strategy for managing complexity is to adopt standard operating procedures (SOPs). SOPs are rules that set out the conduct that an organizational unit should follow in the event of a given situation. They cover all aspects of government action, ranging from drafting official speeches (Neumann 2007) to the response to terrorist attacks (Kuperaman 2001). Following President Kennedy's decision to implement a naval blockade against Cuba in October 1962, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara became quite suspicious of the Navy's SOPs and wondered how the navy would intercept the first Soviet ship,

Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the navy's inner sanctum, the navy flag plot, McNamara put his questions harshly. Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. Picking up the Manual of Navy Regulations, the navy man waved it in McNamara's face and shouted, "It's all in there." (Allison 1969: 707)

As this example illustrates, when a bureaucratic unit has to accomplish a novel task, this task is often assimilated to a situation already covered in the SOP directory and the prescribed response is automatically implemented. Every situation is interpreted and treated as if it were an event that the bureaucratic unit had actually anticipated. This *modus operandi* reduces the response time and means that some aspects of coordination can be planned ahead.

On the other hand, SOPs make bureaucracies more rigid and more resistant to change. Over and above times of crisis, which can cause major disruptions, inertia is prevalent and learning processes are slow. Even in

organizations that are capable of critical self-assessment and that strive to evolve, SOPs impose such severe restrictions on practices that change is hard to implement. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt commented despondently on the resilience of the American bureaucracy:

The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . . But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the na-a-vy ... To change anything in the na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching. (Roosevelt, quoted in Allison 1969: 701–702)

It is not surprising that Roosevelt considered the navy to be particularly resilient. Although foreign ministries' practices may also be extremely codified, the army corps is even more heavily dependent on SOPs. Military forces are hierarchical and disciplined organizations that are constantly in training so they can respond to certain situations. Operation manuals set out precise details of the actions that should be carried out according to a series of indicators and different levels of risk. Pre-established scenarios set the number of units to be deployed, how the mission should be run and the exit strategy. Quantifiable and observable benchmarks, such as the number of dead in combat or the destruction of a given target, are used to grade responses and evaluate a mission's success. As far as the armed forces are concerned, SOPs are tools that are indispensable for the efficacy of their operations.

Effects of SOPs

The persistence of SOPs can have dramatic consequences. Strategies proven in a specific context can be ineffective in a different context. The American military tactics developed during the Korean War proved to be unsuitable against the Vietnamese guerrilla force (Khong 1992). Similarly, the intelligence procedures set up during the Cold War failed to help the American government prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks (Parker and Stern 2002; Zegart 2007). Of course, organizations respond to their

failures by developing their SOP portfolio. However, as the context is constantly changing, SOPs can rapidly be out of touch with the reality.

In some circumstances, SOPs can even help trigger armed conflicts. According to Barbara Tuchman (1962), SOPs played a key role in the outbreak of the First World War. The Austrian ultimatum led to the Russian mobilization, which in turn led to the German ultimatum against Belgium, which led to the French and British declarations of war. This chain reaction was virtually unstoppable because of the SOPs. The Austrian army rejected the idea of a simple siege of Belgrade, the Russian army rejected partial mobilization and the German army rejected a war limited to the Eastern Front. This was due to the fact that none of the armies had actually envisaged these scenarios and they were ill-prepared for them. Each one considered that a rapid offensive would bring a major strategic advantage, and the SOPs were developed accordingly. As Barbara Tuchman notes:

Once the mobilization button was pushed, the whole vast machinery for calling up, equipping, and transporting two million men began turning automatically. Reservists went to their designated depots, were issued uniforms, equipment, and arms, formed into companies and companies into battalions, were joined by cavalry, cyclists, artillery, medical units, cook wagons, blacksmith wagons, even postal wagons, moved according to prepared railway timetables to concentration points near the frontier where they would be formed into divisions, divisions into corps, and corps into armies ready to advance and fight. [...] From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times according to a schedule precise down to the number of train axles that would pass over a given bridge within a given time. (Tuchman 1962: 74–75)

Obviously, SOPs do not necessarily lead to outcomes as dramatic as the First World War. On the contrary, in different circumstances, they can help diffuse conflicts. As they are regular and stable, they send clear signals to other states and increase the credibility of threats. SOPs themselves were not the cause of the First World War. Rather, governments were part of a system in which they allowed themselves to be governed by SOPs (Levy 1986).

When government leaders are fully aware of the power of SOPs, they can force the bureaucracy to deviate from the scenarios forecast and encourage their advisors to devise more creative solutions. John and Robert Kennedy did just that during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To prevent

the situation from escalating into a nuclear war, they made sure that the navy would maintain the naval blockade with unusual flexibility and that the air force would refrain from retaliating when one of their planes was shot down (Allison and Zelikow 1999).

Decision-makers who consider that the problems they face require new SOPs can also set up new organizations rather than attempt to reform existing ones. This is partly what motivated the Bush administration to create the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 in the wake of the 9/11, 2001, attacks, which exposed the weaknesses of the existing intelligence organizations (Johnson 2005). The Bush administration also set up the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 because Bush mistrusted the US Agency for International Development (Hook 2008).

In short, SOPs only represent a danger to political leaders who are unaware of the mechanisms that govern the bureaucracy or when it comes to questions of little importance that escape their attention. Therefore, the scope of Allison's organizational model is limited. It is certainly pertinent when applied to the study of how fairly technical decisions are implemented. However, it is less relevant when it comes to understanding the decision-making processes that concern crucial foreign policy issues. That is no doubt why it is rarely used in FPA, even though it is often mentioned. Allison also developed a bureaucratic model that inspired far more research.

BUREAUCRATIC MODEL

Graham Allison developed the bureaucratic model, much like the organizational model, in order to explain American and Soviet behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969, 1971). Allison drew from the research on bureaucracy and foreign policy conducted by Richard Neustadt, Samuel Huntington, Warner Schilling and Roger Hilsman. In turn, his model inspired several researchers (Allison and Halperin 1972; Halperin et al. 2006; Marsh 2014; Keane and Diesen 2015; Keane 2016; Blomdahl 2016).

One Game, Several Players

The bureaucratic model conceptualizes the governmental apparatus as a decentralized and pluralist framework within which several "players" interact. The different players are not organized according to a clear and functional division of work. Instead, their policy domains partly overlap. As a result of these overlaps, players must defend their viewpoint and their

own interests against other players. They must negotiate with each other to make sure that the government's actions reflect their vision and serve their own interests.

Graham Allison's original model clearly specifies that the players are flesh and blood human beings (1969). This ontological approach meant that analysts could integrate aspects of social psychology into the bureaucratic model (t Hart and Rosenthal 1998; Ripley 1995; Kaarbo and Gruenfeld 1998; Kaarbo 2008). Nonetheless, Allison stresses the fact that individuals' ideas and interests generally correspond to the bureaucratic unit to which they belong. An organizational culture promotes the uniformity of ideas within a bureaucratic unit. The career prospects offered by the growth of an organization are conducive to convergence of interests. Thus, Allison famously adopted the adage "*Where you stand depends on where you sit*". In other words, an individual's position (on an issue) depends on where he is located (on a chart). Hence, players are often equated to bureaucratic units that are in competition (Mitchell 1999).

The different ministries involved may have radically different points of view on a given foreign policy issue. For example, tensions ran high within the Bush administration when the United States envisaged phasing out the agricultural credits offered to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The National Security Advisor saw it as an opportunity to impose sanctions on Saddam Hussein, the Department of State was concerned that it would undermine attempts at constructive dialogue, the Department of the Treasury feared that Iraq would refuse to repay its debts and the Department of Agriculture wanted to maintain a program that benefited American farmers (Holland 1999).

The different teams in a bureaucratic game are not necessarily whole departments. They can also be specific groups from the same department. Hierarchical fault lines can set ground-level staff against managers, which Allison refers to as "Indians" and "chiefs". Functional divisions may also occur, setting units on the same hierarchical level against one another. In the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, for example, the Division of Economic Affairs is traditionally more in favor of liberalizing agricultural market than other divisions, which are more concerned about local producers' interests (Seizelet 2001).

In this bureaucratic game, the head of state is considered to be an additional player, first among equals, who defends his own vision and his own interests. He does not have the monopoly of power and generally refrains from concluding a debate arbitrarily. Indeed, when he has resolved to

make a decision alone, he can still be swayed by discussions between the different bureaucratic players (Smith 1980; Rosati 1981; Christensen and Redd 2004).

Interactions Between the Players

The outcome of the bureaucratic game is determined by several factors. One of the factors is the set of procedures that Allison calls “action-channels”. These official or unofficial rules determine which players take part in which decision, when and how. They provide a decision-making framework that constitutes an advantage for some players and a disadvantage for others. Thus, the most marginalized organizations within a decision-making process often afford to adopt firm ideological stances. However, they are generally unable to disseminate their ideas within the governmental apparatus because the action-channels are unfavorable (Drezner 2000).

The outcome of the bureaucratic game also depends on the distribution of resources among the players. The scale of the budget, the level of expertise, the social support and transgovernmental alliances constitute resources that a player can use to exert a significant influence. A player that has a structural disadvantage can also increase his influence on the decision-making process by adopting different approaches. Some studies, inspired by psychosociology or social constructivism, underline that the quality of the line of argument plays an important role in bureaucratic games (Weldes 1998; Honig 2008). Even minor and marginal players can exert a strong influence if they play their cards right (Kaarbo 1998).

Nonetheless, the foreign policy decision that results from a bureaucratic game may not necessarily be the one supported by the actor who dominates the “action-channels”, has the most resources or is particularly strategic. Frequently, the final decision is not actually the preferred choice of any of the players. It could be the smallest common denominator, the median position, the *status quo* or the outcome of haggling between the different players.

The bureaucratic politics model shows, for instance, that the decision-making process leading the Obama administration to order a troop surge in Afghanistan in 2009 was the result of a political compromise. Some players, including Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and General McChrystal, argued for a counter-insurgency strategy, which necessitated an extra 40,000 troops on the ground over several years, while other players, like

Vice president Biden and National Security Advisor James Jones, pressed the president to adopt a counter-terrorist strategy, which implied fewer resources, around 5,000–10,000 troops. Ultimately, President Obama ordered a surge of 30,000 troops but for only 2 years (Marsh 2014).

The result of these bargaining can be sub-optimal for the state. Even if all the players act rationally, the outcome of their interaction may appear irrational (Gelb and Betts 1979; Lebow 1981). For example, Canada decided in 2004 to authorize the export of generic medicines to developing countries without asking the patent holders for authorization. The Canadian Departments of Trade, Health, Industry and Foreign Affairs, in partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency, developed the mechanism jointly. Together, they reached a compromise that all the players considered satisfactory. Yet, the compromise included so many contradictory concerns that it was ineffective. The pharmaceutical companies threatened to reduce their investments in Canada, the country's international standing suffered and access to medicines did not improve (Morin and Gold 2010; Morin 2011).

Position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Foreign policy is no longer the prerogative of ministries of foreign affairs, if indeed it ever was. Until the 1960s, foreign ministries did have a virtual monopoly of the channels of action pertaining to foreign policy, but that is no longer the case.

In most countries, ministries of foreign affairs are now faced with increased competition in their own policy field. Today, all the major governmental agencies in modern states conduct international activities, and they are not necessarily dealing with or being accompanied by the foreign ministry. The ministries designated for defense and external trade have always been associated with foreign policy. However, the ministries in charge of education, finance, health, culture and so on have now also developed their own services for international relations. Some even deploy agents abroad and are directly involved in international negotiations. Foreign ministries may still have a supervisory role when negotiations are institutionalized within the framework of intergovernmental organizations. However, a significant amount of the sectoral ministries' international activity is more informal, involving transgovernmental networks. This makes it even easier to elude the foreign ministries' channels of action (Hopkins 1976).

Competition also comes from the government leaders themselves. Their schedules are now dotted with frequent summit meetings. In addition to the regular meetings with different groups and coalitions, such as the G-20, NATO, the Commonwealth and APEC, there are a growing number of annual bilateral meetings, for example, between Spain and France or Germany and Israel (Dunn 1996; Krotz 2010). It is increasingly common to see government leaders at the multilateral UN summits. While Indira Gandhi was the only head of state at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, a total of 115 government leaders took part in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Rio in 2012. In general, the preparation of these summits is supervised by the direct representatives of the government leaders, known as “Sherpas”, who short-circuit the traditional channels of action of diplomatic hierarchy.

With this increased competition, foreign ministries lack the necessary resources to lead the field. Their budgets are not as high as those allocated to the ministries of defense, their actions are generally less visible than those conducted by the ministries of trade and industry, and they do not benefit from the support of influential social groups, as is sometimes the case for ministries of agriculture.

In the age of instant communication, traditional diplomatic channels are sometimes criticized for their slowness, their cost, their formalism and their lack of technical expertise. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, declared that if the foreign ministries and ambassadors “did not already exist, they surely would not have to be invented” (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 232). While Brzezinski was only joking, a report commissioned by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1976 seriously advised dismantling the foreign service (Wallace 1978). Although the report’s recommendations were never adopted, this radical example illustrates the prejudice that exists in the different branches of the public administration against the ministry of foreign affairs.

Bureaucratic Model and Its Critics

Allison’s bureaucratic model stimulated debate that has been going on for 40 years. There are as many publications that use the bureaucratic model to explain foreign policy as there are studies that criticize the model’s assumptions (Krasner 1971; Art 1973; Perlmutter 1974; Wagner 1974;

Freedman 1976; Caldwell 1977; Steiner 1977; Smith 1980; Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992, 1998; Rhodes 1994).

Three main criticisms have been directed at the bureaucratic model. The first concerns the difficulty to operationalize it. The model is apparently too complex, ambiguous and imprecise for establishing stable causal relationships and predicting behavior. It does not clearly define who the players are, what their preferences are and how the final outcome is reached. It simply lists a series of factors and provides a narrative framework to explain a decision *a posteriori*.

The second criticism concerns the disparity between the model's assumptions and empirical observations. The model is limited to bureaucratic players. Consequently, it ignores the influence of parliaments, the pressure from interest groups and the restrictions imposed by the international system. In addition, it underestimates the rise of the government leader. When it comes to crucial issues and in times of crisis, a government leader can generally impose his preferences and limit bureaucratic bargaining. Therefore, the bureaucratic model is only relevant for a limited number of issues, which are neither sufficiently routine to be governed by SOPs, nor sufficiently important to warrant direct intervention by the head of state. The model is also unsuitable for studying centralized political systems that give priority to the government leader's role. Although the model has been used to study the foreign policy of different countries, including Canada (Michaud 2002), China (Chan 1979) and the USSR (Valenta 1979), we can presume that these countries are generally less prone to bureaucratic rivalries than the United States.

The third criticism, which is supported particularly by Stephen Krasner (1971), is normative. Krasner's concern is that the bureaucratic model discharges elected representatives of their responsibilities. When a mistake is made, a government leader could use the theoretical model's legitimacy to blame the bureaucracy. From this perspective, the bureaucratic model represents a threat to democracy. However, in this respect, groupthink, which is the antithesis of bureaucratic games, is no more reassuring, as seen earlier in this chapter.

The management styles and the bureaucratic games, however, do not operate in a vacuum. They vary as a function of the institutional context within which they operate. Democracies and autocracies do not produce the same administrative dynamics, no more so than presidential and parliamentary regimes. The next chapter looks at the institutional level of analysis.

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To What Extent Is Foreign Policy Shaped by Institutions?

Foreign policy decisions are always made within an institutional framework, which shapes actors' preferences and behavior. This is one of FPA's most firmly established observations. As Thucydides observed 2500 years ago, democracies, aristocracies and monarchies are driven by distinct mechanisms that lead to different foreign policies. To this day, new publications regularly corroborate this observation.

Many researchers focus on the impact that institutional structures have on foreign policy, largely because of resource availability. Not everyone has access to secret government reports and to the personal thoughts of heads of state. However, everyone can distinguish a parliamentary system from a presidential system or proportional representation from a first-past-the-post electoral system. These are stable categories, which correspond to relatively consensual definitions. Databases like the *Polity IV Project* provide information on political regimes in all countries since the turn of the nineteenth century, making it possible to draw comparisons and identify patterns.

Conceptual innovations have also stimulated research. Since the emergence of neo-institutionalism in the 1980s, the very notion of political institution has broadened. It is no longer merely limited to the constitutional rules that determine how decision-makers are elected. It also includes all formal and informal rules and practices, representations and standards that govern social and political life, both within and outside the state (March and Olsen 1984; Evans et al. 1985; Ikenberry 1988; Stone

1992; Hall and Taylor 1996). As a result, institutions are no longer perceived as inert and stable, but as intermediary variables with a degree of autonomy that lie somewhere between social interactions and behaviors. On the one hand, institutions slowly and gradually adapt to changing situations. On the other hand, they are designed to last, which gives them a capacity to structure behaviors.

An array of theoretical approaches, ranging from rationalism to constructivism, can be used to guide research on the impact of institutions on foreign policy. This chapter presents some of the theoretical approaches by focusing on four forms of institutions: parliamentary and electoral system, state organization, political regime and economic regime.

PARLIAMENTARY AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The generic term “democracy” combines a whole range of different institutional configurations. Electoral and parliamentary systems, in particular, vary significantly from one democracy to another. Yet, institutional variations within democracies can help to explain some of the differences in foreign policy (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014; Brommesson and Ekengren 2013).

Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

A fundamental distinction can be made between presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes. In the former, there is a strict separation between legislative and executive power, whereas, in the latter, these two powers are interdependent. In presidential regimes, the management of foreign policy is entrusted to the president, but the president cannot ignore the counter-power exercised by parliament. Inversely, the prime minister at the head of a parliamentary regime is drawn from parliament and generally controls the majority. Therefore, he has greater autonomy when it comes to managing foreign policy.

The American president is undoubtedly the most classic example of a president whose powers are limited by parliament. The American Congress can intervene in foreign policy in several ways. It can adopt laws and resolutions, set fiscal policies and confirm important nominations. Congress has powers that allow it to adjudicate on qualifying the massacre of Armenians as genocide, block IMF loans to countries that systematically violate human rights and put an end to John Bolton’s career as an American ambassador.

The American constitution also grants Congress the power to regulate external trade, to declare war and to ratify treaties. Thus, Woodrow Wilson failed to persuade the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, despite being one of its main architects. Likewise, the Congress blocked the ratification of the Havana Charter and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, despite some support from the White House. As John F. Kennedy commented, the president “is rightly described as a man of extraordinary powers. Yet it is also true that he must wield those powers under extraordinary limitations” (Sørensen 1965: xii).

Congress’s power over American trade policy was particularly striking during the 1929 crisis. In the panic, Congress adopted the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, which has remained infamous in the United States. The act dramatically increased customs tariffs, which exacerbated the effects of the crisis and caused it to spread on an international scale. If the control of American trade policy had been centralized in the White House, the reaction would no doubt have been different. Traditionally, Congress is more receptive to the grievances of the immediate victims of an economic crisis because representatives are elected on a local level and elections are held every 2 years. After the fiasco of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, the Congress could no longer ignore its institutional vulnerability to local interest groups and transferred some of the control of trade policy to the executive branch (Krasner 1977; Frieden 1988; Haggard 1988; Goldstein 1988; Bailey et al. 1997; Hiscox 1999; Ehrlich 2008).

Compared to the American president, the Canadian prime minister enjoys considerable room for maneuver. The Canadian parliamentary system does not require the prime minister to consult his parliament before engaging in an armed conflict or ratifying an international treaty. This characteristic of the Canadian system explains why Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, whereas the Clinton administration, including Vice President Al Gore, did not dare to submit it to the Senate. Canada is no more efficient than the United States in terms of energy consumption; it does not have greater interest in reducing its energy dependence; it is not significantly more vulnerable to climate change; nor is it any closer to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Canadian parliamentary regime allowed Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by ignoring protests from some members of parliament, which the Clinton administration was unable to do (Harrison 2007).

These constitutional rules are not sufficient on their own to clarify the role of parliaments in foreign policy. Different standards and practices can accentuate their influence, even in parliamentary regimes. Member of the Canadian Parliament, for example, frequently help formulate foreign policy by discussing the laws for implementing treaties, publicly adopting a stance on international current affairs, questioning the government on its policies, leading missions abroad, collaborating with parliamentarians from other countries and producing reports on foreign policy research (Nolan 1985; Clark and Nordstrom 2005; Carter and Scott 2009; Dieterich et al. 2015).

Conversely, in presidential systems, the executive generally has considerable flexibility, which far exceeds that suggested by the written constitution. American presidents frequently take advantage of their prestige and their direct access to the media to swing public debates in a given direction and encourage Congress to fall into line (Meernik 1993; Entman 2004). Some presidents have even foiled Congress's powers by assuming their function as commander in chief of the armed forces so they could start conflicts without waiting for authorization from Congress (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997; Fisher 2014). Presidents often sign "executive agreements" as oppose to treaties to avoid having to obtain Senate's approval (Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007). The Reagan administration even sold weapons to Iran secretly to finance insurgent groups in Nicaragua without leaving any official trace in Congress' budgetary accounts (Koh 1988).

The relationships between Congress and the president evolve as a function of the historical context. At the start of the Cold War, the American president had tremendous support from Congress. While he was often faced with major objections on domestic policy issues, members of Congress exercised restraint on matters of foreign policy, for fear of weakening the United States' position with regard to its Soviet rival. Politics was said to stop at the water's edge. This "double presidency", where the president has greater power in foreign policy than domestic policy, gradually crumbled with the growing opposition to the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Subsequently, Congress became more involved in foreign policy and thwarted the White House decisions on a more regular basis. Republicans and democrats expressed their disagreements on foreign policy more openly. It was only in the immediate aftermaths of September 11 attacks in 2001 that the president was able to enjoy a particularly deferential Congress in terms of foreign policy issues, at least until the problems of the Iraq War became evident (Wildavsky 1966; McCormick and Wittkopf

1990, 1992; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Fleisher et al. 2000; Sabbag 2001; Scott and Carter 2002; Kassop 2003; Lindsay 2003; Johnson 2005; Souva and Rohde 2007; Busby and Monten 2008; Meernik and Oldmixon 2008; Carter and Scott 2009; Newman and Lammert 2011).

This said, the foreign policy of presidential regimes cannot always be distinguished from that of parliamentary regimes. In general, the foreign policy of presidential systems can be expected to have greater continuity in the long term. In comparison, foreign policy fluctuates more in parliamentary systems as a function of the government in power. The transition from George W. Bush's administration to Barack Obama's did not involve a major shift in foreign policy. However, important changes occurred following the transition from Silvio Berlusconi's administration to Mario Monti's in Italy or when David Cameron took over from Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom (Andreatta 2008; Beech 2011).

Nonetheless, although formal rules may set presidential and parliamentary regimes apart, there is some convergence in practice. In presidential regimes, presidents do not officially have all the powers to act unilaterally. However, they do have centrifugal political powers at certain times. In parliamentary regimes, prime ministers have greater flexibility. Nonetheless, they are accountable to parliament and cannot ignore parliamentary opinions, especially when they do not hold an absolute majority. This is the reason why several studies on major differences between the foreign policies of both regimes reached ambiguous conclusions (Auerswald 1999; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003).

Parliamentarians and Their Preferences

One variable, which explains the variations in foreign policy more clearly than the political regime, is the ruling party's ideological orientation (Rathbun 2004; Koch 2009; Hofmann 2013). Right-wing and left-wing governments generally favor quite different foreign policies.

Statistical analyses indicate that right-wing governments, whose voters are generally less pacifist, are more likely to be involved in armed conflict. Left-wing governments, on the other hand, are more likely to be attacked by foreign countries, and conflicts in which they are involved are more likely to degenerate.

Counterintuitively, left-wing governments invest more on military expenditure than their right-wing counterparts. It might be because they are aware of their vulnerability to attacks. Military spending, a form of

state economic intervention, can also be considered as part of a redistribution policy (Marra 1985; Prins 2001; Narizny 2003; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006).

In matters of development aid, some studies indicate that governments controlled by a left-wing party usually give to more countries and provide more aid to each one than right-wing governments (Imbeau 1989; Thérien and Noël 2000; Travis 2010).

In addition, left-wing governments' trade policy constitutes a better fit in terms of the predictions of the classic Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. In countries where labor is plentiful, left-wing governments encourage trade liberalization to attract investors and provide employment. In economies with a higher degree of wealth per capita, they encourage protectionism instead to protect jobs from delocalization (Dutt and Mitra 2005).

When parliamentarians are not subject to severe party discipline, the variations in their votes also correspond to the forecasts of the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. Several statistical studies show that American senators and representatives adopt positions on foreign policy issues that match the economic interests of the voters in the district or state that they represent (Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; Conley 1999; Baldwin and Magee 2000; Fordham and McKeown 2003; Broz 2005; Broz and Hawes 2006; Ladewig 2006; Jeong 2009; Milner and Tingley 2011).

Nonetheless, for some foreign policy issues, American representatives seem to be driven by their own beliefs and personal values. That is the case for the question of economic sanctions, the policy toward Israel and the control of antiballistic missiles (Bernstein and Anthony 1974; McCormick and Black 1983; Hill 1993; Rosenson et al. 2009; Milner and Tingley 2011).

Despite numerous analyses, it is not easy to identify what really motivates members of Congress. Their ideological inclination and their electoral interests do not always match. In addition, different coalitions, which are relatively stable and informal, can develop and influence their votes, such as the traditional alliance between the internationalists and the liberals or, more recently, between the evangelists and the supporters of an aggressive foreign policy. Political parties in the United States and elsewhere are only formal coalitions that federate several heterogeneous interests. Even when party discipline is relaxed, parties provide the central framework for haggling between different approaches to foreign policy (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Cronin and Fordham 1999; Rosenson et al. 2009).

Political Cohabitation and Coalitions

In presidential and semi-presidential systems, the election results can give rise to a situation in which the head of state and the parliamentary majority belong to two different political parties. This so-called cohabitation happened several times in France since the 1980s, and it resulted in a situation that restricted both the president and the prime minister (Volgy and Schwarz 1991).

Several studies show that political cohabitation is particularly unfavorable when it comes to implementing an ambitious and risky foreign policy. In general, divided governments are keen to maintain the *status quo*. Statistically, they are less likely to make a firm commitment to trade liberalization or to start armed conflicts (Cowhey 1993; Cohen 1994; Lohmann and O'halloran 1994; Meernik 1995; Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).

Systems based on proportional representation can lead to the formation of a coalition government constituted of several political parties. Coalitions of this kind are generally fragile and require continual negotiations between parties involved. Minority parties, whether they are right-wing or left-wing, nationalist or environmental, can then take advantage of the situation in order to influence foreign policy. However, these parties may not necessarily steer foreign policy in a specific direction. Studies examining the likelihood of coalition governments resorting to armed force have obtained contradictory results. Studies focusing on the effect of proportional representation on trade liberalization are equally contradictory (Rogowski 1987a; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Palmer et al. 2004; Li 2005; Chan and Safran 2006; Clare 2010).

Above all, coalition governments tend to adopt foreign policies that are momentarily more extreme in some way. The fluctuations in Turkey's Europeanist orientation or the shifts in Israel's commitment to peace, for example, can partly be explained by their system of proportional representation and the vicissitudes of their coalitions (Gallhofer et al. 1994; Kaarbo 1996, 2008; Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008).

The instability of coalition governments can also generate fears on the financial markets. In fact, the risks of speculative attacks are statistically more pronounced in countries led by a coalition government than in those led by a majority government. Markets are also wary of governmental cohabitation because these governments generally react less rapidly and

decisively in the event of a crisis. On the other hand, highly centralized governments are no more reassuring given that their demise can lead to radical political shifts. The institutional structures that offer a certain balance between stability and flexibility are the least vulnerable to speculative attacks (Leblang and Bernhard 2000; Leblang and Satyanath 2006).

In general, states have more confidence in foreign regimes that guarantee parliament's active involvement in the decision-making process. These regimes have a more transparent foreign policy because parliamentary debates provide foreign countries with a continual flow of information on the government's intentions and capacities. On the other hand, a government's leader who is directly elected by the population may appear more credible in the eyes of its foreign partners. If an international agreement is violated, a political leader is more likely to face political sanctions if he is accountable to the people and not simply to his own assembly. In the end, semi-presidential regimes, with head of state elected by popular vote and a government leader accountable to parliament, may represent the optimum balance (McGillivray and Smith 2004).

STRONG STATE AND WEAK STATE

One of the most common institutional approaches in FPA involves determining the balance of power between the state and society. In some ways, it overturns neorealist theory by examining the distribution of power, not between states, but at their very core, so that their foreign policy can be explained.

Determining the Relative Power of the State

Three indicators are generally used to assess the internal power of a state: state centralization, social mobilization and political networks (Krasner 1978; Katzenstein 1977; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991; Evangelista 1995; Schweller 2006; Alons 2007).

The first of these indicators, state centralization, indicates the degree to which the government leader controls executive power. This varies as a function of a series of institutional factors. In general, autocracies are more centralized than democracies, unified countries more so than federations, parliamentary regimes more than presidential regimes, majority governments more than coalition governments, unicameral parliaments more than bicameral parliaments and two-party systems more than multiparty systems (Lijphart 1999).

If we bear these criteria in mind, it is easy to draw the conclusion that Belgium and Switzerland are more decentralized than Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. However, most states are in the gray area between the two extremes. Even in an autocracy, political power can be fragmented. The People's Republic of China is not a liberal democracy, but the rivalries between the State Council and the People's Liberation Army, like those between the different clans within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, are very real (Chan 1979; Lampton 2001; Ripley 2002).

As a way of reducing the different political regimes to a common denominator, several analysts use the concept of "veto player" (Tsebelis 2002) to compare the degree of centralization. A veto player is an individual or a collective actor with the effective capacity to block a given decision. In constitutional monarchies, even if the monarch officially has the right to veto certain decisions, he generally does not have the effective capacity to use this power because of prevailing norms and practices. On the contrary, a minister, a parliament, a political party and a federal body can all be veto players in foreign policy, depending on the political context, the institutional structure and the type of decision, even if the constitution does not formally recognize their veto power. The more veto players there are, the more decentralized the decision-making process and the greater the likelihood of maintaining the *status quo* in matters of foreign policy (Kaarbo 1997). The number of veto players in trade policy, for example, is directly correlated to the maintenance of protectionist policies (O'Reilly 2005).

The second indicator for characterizing a country's internal structure is social mobilization. This depends on two main factors: the degree of cohesion and the degree of social organization. The more organized and cohesive a society is, the greater its capacity to have a significant influence on foreign policy.

In France, these two factors are comparatively weak. Even among groups that defend similar interests, such as employers' organizations or left-wing parties, internal dissension is common. The fragmentation of the French society is the very antithesis of the cohesion that characterizes several Asian societies, which value consensus more than public debate. Despite this ideological heterogeneity, or perhaps because of it, social mobilization on foreign policy issues is not very organized in France compared to other Western democracies. France is quite unfamiliar with the multitude of NGOs and think tanks dedicated to foreign policy that

can be seen in the United States, the United Kingdom or Scandinavian countries. In addition, French pacifist movements do not have anything like the scale of influence of their German or Japanese counterparts. Some associations are particularly active on specific topics, like agricultural protectionism, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or humanitarian aid, or, at specific times, such as during the negotiations on the multilateral agreement on investment. However, French social groups are much more active when it comes to questions of domestic policy, thus allowing the French government greater flexibility on foreign policy matters (Cohen 2004; Anheier and Lester 2006).

The third and last indicator of a state's internal power links the two previous indicators. It is the degree of connection between social and governmental forces. Governments, as much as societies, need channels for communication and interaction to ensure that their position on foreign policy issues prevails.

Foreign policy advisory bodies constitute one of the channels linking governments to their society. All things being equal, they are more common in political cultures, which consider lobbying to be a healthy political activity that provides the government with a continuous supply of diverse opinions. They are less common in political cultures, which consider that defending individual interests is detrimental to the general interest (Risse-Kappen 1991).

There are other less institutionalized channels of communication, such as the practice of revolving doors. According to this practice, staff rotate between university, industry, the media and the civil service. Ideas flow more freely between the government and society when the divisions between the different professional worlds are relatively permeable and non-linear career paths are valued. Inversely, when professional careers are more linear and access to senior public service is limited to pools of candidates, the administration is more isolated from social influences (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009).

In some cases, public and private actors are so closely associated that it is difficult to distinguish between them. In Russia, the way that the public, economic and media powers are interwoven constitutes a form of state corporatism. It is now difficult to fathom whether politicians who sit on company boards are there to defend the public interest or whether Russian foreign policy in the Caspian Sea region is serving the oligarchs (D'Anieri 2002; Dawisha 2011).

By combining these three indicators, analysts can determine whether the balance of power favors the state or the society. Peter Katzenstein (1977), Stephen Krasner (1978) and the other pioneers of this approach place France and the United States at opposite extremes of the continuum that contrasts elitist democracies, governed from above, with pluralist democracies, governed from below. The United States is considered to be the archetype of the weak state with its federal system, its powerful Congress, its highly mobilized society, its unstable public services and political networks dominated by private actors. Inversely, France represents a particularly strong state because of its unified and centralized political system, its stable public service, its fragmented social movements and elite networks, which are dominated by the public sector.

Power of the State and Its Foreign Policy

At least three streams of literature use the contrast between weak and strong states to explain foreign policy. The first focuses on the flows of influence, which are descending in strong states and ascending in weak states. It should be easier for states that are powerful in relation to their society to impose their foreign policy preferences. Inversely, weak states are dependent on social forces and public opinion.

Thomas Risse-Kappen (1991), for example, compares how four liberal democracies take into account public opinion with regard to their foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He notes that the policies of the United States and Germany, two states considered weak in relation to their society, were in line with their respective public opinion. However, the foreign policies in France and Japan, two powerful states, were out of kilter with their public opinion.

Other studies focus on how businesses influence trade policy. In times of economic crisis, all governments are under tremendous pressure to encourage protectionist policies. Yet, more powerful states are generally better able to resist pressure and maintain a degree of trade openness than weaker states (Mansfield and Busch 1995; Henisz and Mansfield 2006).

The second literature using the concepts of strong state and weak state is that of the transnational diffusion of norms. Combining constructivism and institutionalism, this literature argues that strong states are generally more impermeable to the emerging ideas promoted by transnational actors and intergovernmental organizations. They can resist longer than

their weaker counterparts. However, once these ideas have been integrated, strong states are more effective at ensuring their dissemination within their society (Checkel 1999; Hook 2008).

In the 1980s, for example, the Soviet state considerably reduced its influence as a result of the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. This encouraged the spread of liberal norms in the Soviet Union, which weakened the state further. Paradoxically, the state gradually lost its capacity to implement these liberal reforms and a powerful Russian state emerged after the dissolution of the USSR (Evangelista 1995).

The third literature concerns the relationships between a state internal and external power. The main hypothesis examined is that a state that is powerful in the international system can be seriously handicapped by its internal weakness. The flows of influence from the society toward the government encourage the defense of parochial interests to the detriment of large collective projects. If the process of converting resources into influence threatens individual interests, the state can be forced to offer compensation. These additional adjustment cost increases the state's vulnerability to external pressures (Krasner 1977, 1978; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Lamborn 1991; Snyder 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Zakaria 1998; Clark et al. 2000; Schweller 2006; Alons 2007; Kirshner 2012).

The French state is strong enough to freely exploit and mobilize its national resources in order to implement an ambitious and interventionist foreign policy. The French state-controlled economic model, which encourages a few large "national champions", is one example. By comparison, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was unable to engage his country militarily in the Second World War before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor because of the American population's isolationist preferences. To some extent, the EU's institutional weakness equally restricts its ambitions in matters of foreign policy. The EU's weight in international relations is rather disproportionately small in relation to its economic production and its population (Hill 1993).

There are two main criticisms of the analyses of a state's institutional capacity to convert its resources into influence. The first criticism is the failure to consider individual dynamics and preferences within the government. When it comes to explaining foreign policy behavior, limiting oneself to a country's institutional structure is an apolitical approach, implying that the identity of political leaders plays no fundamental role (Gourevitch 1978).

The second criticism refers to the analysis of the two-level game, which is presented in Chap. 7 (Putnam 1988). From this perspective, internal constraints are not necessarily transferred to the international level. In the context of a negotiation, these constraints can be converted into opportunities. A decentralized institutional structure and strong social opposition make it easier for a negotiator to impose its preferences on its foreign counterparts. A negotiator can even make reference to its domestic constraints in order to increase his share of power on the international level.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE PROPOSITION

The democratic peace proposition is probably the most convincing empirical demonstration that political institutions can have a major impact on foreign policy. Researchers have found a strong correlation between democracy and peace in the 1980s and 1990s. To quote Jack Levy, it is a phenomenon that “comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (1988: 662). However, the specific mechanisms involved in the phenomenon of democratic peace remain unclear, and researchers are still debating about the causal mechanisms that account for this empirical observation. Is democratic peace really about democracy, or is it about economic interdependence, international organizations or a combination of several factors (Russett and Oneal 2001; Mousseau 2013)?

Observing the Democratic Peace

The term democratic peace refers to the observation that democracies do not generally wage war on each other. Their wars are almost systematically waged against autocracies. This observation has been reproduced and validated many times by statistical analyses. The relationship between democracy and peace remains statistically significant even when other factors that help explain the variations in armed conflicts are controlled, such as the degree of economic interdependence, cultural and ethnic ties, belonging to a common regional organization, stability of the international system, asymmetry of power, geographic proximity and military alliances. The presence of two democracies is almost a sufficient condition to guarantee peaceful relationships between the two states. This correlation has all the appearance of a causality (Chan 1984, 1997; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Ember et al. 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1993, 1994; Ray 1998; Maoz 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Dixon and Senese 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Choi 2011).

The democratic peace is essentially a dyadic phenomenon. Most authors do not consider democracies to be particularly peaceful. Over and above their dyadic relationships with other democracies, they seem just as aggressive as autocracies. A few analysts consider that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies toward all countries, irrespective of their regime. They generally acknowledge that the monadic behavior that they claim to detect is less pronounced than the dyadic phenomenon, which remains firmly established (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Benoit 1996; Rousseau et al. 1996; Rioux 1998; Leeds and Davis 1999; Reiter and Stam 2003; Keller 2005).

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this is not an absolute law, but a probabilistic observation. Democratic peace does not mean that there has never been and never will be a military conflict between two democracies. The war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, for example, is a notable exception to the democratic peace proposition. However, the vast majority of armed conflicts in the last two centuries have involved either a democracy against an autocracy or two autocracies. When evaluated in terms of all the potential conflicts between all the possible pairs of countries, this pattern indicates that the probability of a war between two democracies is very small (Arfi 2009).

Some analysts segment history and note that democratic peace is only statistically significant during a particular period. In Ancient Greece, democratic cities were often in conflict and the democratic peace was not observed. It seems to be a more recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, analysts disagree about the period when it began. Most of them suggest that it emerged at the start of the nineteenth century, but some push the date forward to the Cold War or even the 1970s. Consequently, we could deduce that it might be a temporary phenomenon that is likely to fade as quickly as it appeared (Weede 1984; Farber and Gowa 1995). Some have also argued that as the number of democracies will grow, peace among them is likely to decline, as autocracies will no longer pose a common threat that forced them to stick together (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013).

On the contrary, we could consider that the democratic peace is a phenomenon that is likely to increase. Indeed, the process of democratization, which leads an autocratic regime to democracy, is particularly destabilizing and creates a situation that is conducive to armed conflicts. According to some analysts, the democratic peace is only possible between countries that have fully completed their democratization process. However, the empirical demonstration of this hypothesis is tenuous and

fiercely contested (Walt 1996; Wolf et al. 1996; Maoz 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).

Defining the Variables of the Democratic Peace

Obviously, the probabilistic observation of the democratic peace depends on the definition of variables. The notion of democracy is particularly polysemic. Several statistical studies have adopted the indicators from the *Polity IV* project to define democracy, such as a multiparty system and holding free elections with universal suffrage. But over and above these objective indicators, democracy can have a subjective dimension. Most governments consider themselves to be democratic, including the Unified Socialist Party in the former German *Democratic* Republic and the Stalinist regime in today's *Democratic* People's Republic of Korea. Similarly, the perception of democracy abroad depends as much on cultural proximity and political alliances as on stable objective criteria (Hermann and Kegley 1995; Owen 1997; Geva and Hanson 1999; Widmaier 2005).

The bias in the perception of democracy can help explain some of the anomalies of the democratic peace. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States refused to recognize the Spanish constitutional monarchy as a democracy, despite its multiparty system, its universal suffrage and the freedom of the press. Thus, the fight against Spanish despotism was used to justify the 1898 war, which paradoxically led to the development of American imperialism in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines (Peceny 1997). This situation recurred several years later during the First World War. The United Kingdom, France and the United States did not perceive the German Empire as a democracy, despite the fact that it had some of the characteristics of a democracy (Oren 1995). Nonetheless, it is difficult to determine whether this perception bias is the cause or the consequence of the animosity between the warring parties.

The notion of peace is also ambiguous. Statistical studies on the democratic peace generally define it in negative terms—in other words, by the absence of an interstate war that causes over 1000 deaths in a 12-month period. Although open wars between two democratic states are rare, proxy wars and clandestine operations occur more frequently. During the colonial period, the European democracies were fiercely opposed to the democratic movements in their colonies. Later, during the Cold War, the CIA led armed operations in several democracies to fight socialist or

revolutionary movements (Poznansky 2015; Levin 2016). Statistical studies on the democratic peace fail to take account of most of these operations because they do not correspond to the definition of interstate war (Trumbore and Boyer 2000; Ravlo et al. 2003).

Having said that, statistical studies that analyze peaceful relationships from different angles generally confirm the existence of a democratic peace. In addition, they have fewer disputes in general, are less easily drawn into an escalating conflict and less likely to resort to some sort of armed force against another democracy. They impose economic sanctions on each other less frequently, and when they do, they generally apply sanctions that only target the ruling elite so that the citizens are spared. Democracies are also more inclined to accept negotiation, third-party mediation and recourse to legal means to resolve disputes. The peaceful relationship between democracies can even be seen in different fields, including trade, the management of water resources and the emission of transboundary pollution (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994; Rousseau et al. 1996; Mousseau 1998; Rioux 1998; Dixon and Senese 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2003; Bernauer and Kuhn 2010; Kalbhenn 2011).

In addition, if narrower definitions of the democratic peace are adopted, there is the risk that the number of cases in modern history would be too limited to establish a statistically significant relationship, particularly if several control variables are taken into account. The democratic peace would then be as exact and ridiculous as the observation that countries, whose name starts with the letter K, rarely wage war on each other. Several authors also mention this methodological difficulty to suggest that democratic peace is ultimately a mere fluke. While this is very unlikely, it remains a possibility (Spiro 1994; Thompson 1996).

Peaceful Nature of Democracies

The real Achilles' heel of the democratic peace is the uncertainty about the causal explanation that links democracy to peace. Several hypotheses have been formulated, but there is still no consensus. As Ted Hopf stated, democratic peace "is an empirical regularity in search of a theory" (1998: 191).

The first explanation that comes to mind is probably the least convincing. It suggests that the interest of democratic states is defined on the basis of their citizens' interest and that the latter have a strong aversion to interstate wars (Jakobsen et al. 2016). This hypothesis has been frequently mentioned since Emmanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham.

Generally, individuals are unwilling to run the risk of dying in combat or to see their loved ones take that risk. They may also be afraid that their material conditions would deteriorate because conflict disrupts trade relations or because of the cost of funding military operations. Yet, democratic governments cannot ignore their citizens' aversion to war without taking the risk of being ousted from power.

These individual preferences might suggest that democracies are more inclined to maintain the *status quo* in the international system, whereas their autocratic counterparts may be more easily tempted by expansionist foreign policies. Indeed, autocracies are more likely to intervene in civil wars in order to grab natural resources. By comparison, the lure of profit is a less common determining factor when democracies decide to take military action in internal conflicts. High voter turnout generally makes elected leaders more reluctant to engage in armed conflict. Elected representatives also seem keener to find a peaceful resolution to conflicts. They act as mediators in international conflict more often and are better peacekeepers than dictators (Doyle 1986; Lake 1992; Kydd 2003; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Reiter and Stam 2003; Bélanger et al. 2005; Crescenzi et al. 2011; Horowitz et al. 2011; Koga 2011).

Yet, this explanation of the democratic peace, which focuses on democracies' preference for peace, is not wholly convincing. In several democratic systems, groups defending fighters' interests or aggressive ideas, such as arms manufacturers or nationalist groups, are influential enough to pressure their governments to adopt aggressive policies. In fact, democracies have triggered several wars of aggression, whereas some autocracies, like Spain under Franco or Iran under the Shah, have tried to avoid them. *A priori*, democracies do not seem to be intrinsically more reasonable or peaceful (Kegley and Hermann 1996; Geis et al. 2006).

In fact, when a conflict breaks out, democracies can be particularly threatening. Elected representatives are well aware that a military failure can rapidly turn into an electoral defeat. Therefore, they tend to deploy more resources to increase their chances of obtaining military victory. For similar electoral reasons, they also tend to aim for total victory rather than negotiate ways out of a war. The rallying effect that is generated by the outbreak of war makes any negotiation with the enemy politically risky. As a result, several statistical studies note that democracies wage wars that are more devastating and victorious than those waged by autocracies (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Desch 2002; Merom 2003; Biddle and Long 2004; Choi 2004; Palmer et al. 2004; Lyall 2010; Colaresi 2012).

Moreover, democracies are more likely than autocracies to maintain their wartime commitments to a military coalition and to fight to the finish. The combination of their respect for the institutionalized decision-making process and the effectiveness of veto players, that is, political actors whose agreement is necessary to change the course of actions, explain this behavior (Choi 2012).

This extremism provides the basis for another explanation of the democratic peace. In fact, democracies have a political incentive to minimize risks, and thus, they choose to intervene in wars that have a high probability of success. Democracies are well aware that other democracies are formidable and tenacious enemies. As a result, they undoubtedly prefer attacking autocracies. This calculation could simultaneously explain why democracies wage as many wars as autocracies, but mutually avoid conflict with each other. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues formulated this hypothesis quite logically, although it has not yet been proven empirically (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Lektzian and Souva 2003).

Explaining the Democratic Peace Through Norms

Several empirical studies explain the democratic peace in terms of norms. Detailed case studies (Russett and Antholis 1992; Owen 1997; Friedman 2008), laboratory experiments (Mintz and Geva 1993) and statistical analyses (Maoz and Russett 1993; Raymond 1994; Mousseau 1998) reveal the existence of a social norm that prohibits wars against other democracies. Citizens and, by extension, their governments seem to consider that disputes between democracies should be resolved via negotiation or arbitration. In their view, wars are only legitimate against autocracies, particularly if they aim to free people from their oppressors and spread democracy.

Some analysts even consider that a collective identity exists between democracies, which could prevent armed conflict between them. Democracies already share certain values that encourage the convergence of their foreign policies and reduce the sources of tension (Gartzke 1998, 2000; Bélanger et al. 2005). This affinity has served as a hotbed for the creation of a collective identity, designed to resist autocracies. The experience of the Second World War and the Cold War has, notably, provided a common narrative line. Today, this collective identity changes the way democracies view the world. The same behavior can be interpreted as defensive if it is adopted by another democracy, but as offensive if it is

adopted by an autocracy. When a conflict breaks out, democracies tend to form a group and support each other (Siverson and Emmons 1991; Wendt 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Werner and Lemke 1997; Peceny 1997; Lai and Reiter 2000; Hayes 2009; Vucetic 2011).

Curiously, a similar phenomenon seems to exist between autocracies. If autocracies are divided into three categories, military regimes (like the military junta in Burma), personal regimes (like Gaddafi's Libya) and one-party regimes (like communist China), there does appear to be some sort of community of allegiance between dictators in the same category. Since 1945, there has not been a single war that sets two personal regimes or two military regimes against each other, and conflicts between one-party regimes have been particularly rare. A standard that prohibits war between similar regimes seems to apply as much to democracies as it does to autocracies (Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003).

Explaining democratic peace through norms and collective identities is criticized, nonetheless. Some studies underline that the nature of a foreign country's political regime seldom constitutes a key factor in political discussions. In addition, during the Cold War, several democracies were allied with extremely repressive dictatorial regimes and failed to intervene when another democracy was in danger of becoming authoritarian. There is clearly a Euro-Atlantic community of allegiance. However, if a community federating all democracies does actually exist in people's minds or in political leaders' practices, it still seems fragile (Layne 1994; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Gibler and Wolford 2006).

Exchange of Information and Credibility

Many analysts explain the democratic peace in terms of the capacity of democracies to exchange credible information. Before starting a war, democratic governments have to prepare public opinion, and in some cases, they even have to obtain parliamentary approval. Generally, it is impossible for them to launch a large-scale surprise attack. In fact, even when they do not envisage armed conflict, they are constantly pressed to express their intentions, their objectives, their preferences and their capacities. Democracies are, therefore, much more transparent than autocracies.

In addition, the information transmitted via parliamentary debates or the media is relatively credible. In democracies, decision-makers cannot give false information or deviate from their stated intentions without putting their reputation at risk and paying for the consequences at the next

elections. If they make a threat, they create a rallying effect and put their reputation at stake, which prevents them from backing down. As bluff is not an option for democracies, they send more credible signals to their enemies. Therefore, democracies can use these signals to resolve conflicts before the situation deteriorates (Fearon 1994, 1997; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003; Slantchev 2006; Tomz 2007; Potter and Baum 2010).

Explaining democratic peace in terms of the credibility of the information exchanged by democracies is the subject of some criticism. Some analysts consider that the freedom of the press actually plays a crucial role in the transmission of credible information. However, the freedom of the press does not necessarily correspond to the nature of the political regime. Some democratic leaders have a high control over the press and some autocracies do have a free press. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to talk about the “peace of the freedom of the press” rather than the “democratic peace” (Van Belle 2000).

Other analysts consider that even autocratic regimes can be vulnerable in terms of their reputation and find themselves in a position where they cannot back down without paying a political price. Soviet Premier Khrushchev, for example, was forced to resign in the months that followed his volte-face during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, the information provided by autocracies also seems sufficiently credible to provide the basis for negotiation (Weeks 2008).

On balance, none of the explanations of the democratic peace is as well documented as the democratic peace itself. The aggressive inclination of some democracies, the frequent tensions between them and the numerous cases of cooperation with autocracies make the democratic peace proposition a particularly intriguing phenomenon. In reality, the phenomenon is probably multicausal. It is quite likely that the democratic peace could be explained by several variables simultaneously (Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1997; Starr 1997).

ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

The idea of a free market emerged from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, alongside the ideas of universal law and perpetual peace. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Social Contract* (1762), Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* (1776) and Emmanuel Kant’s *Project for a Perpetual Peace* (1795) are all based on the principle that individual liberty leads to

collective well-being. As a consequence, researchers consider that if a liberal foreign policy is to remain coherent, it should pursue this triple heritage. Liberalism in foreign policy thus implies simultaneously the promotion of free trade, the defense of human rights throughout the world and the maintenance of peaceful relations (Doyle 1986, 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Liberal discourse has fundamentally oriented research to focus on the triangular relationships between peace, trade and human rights, so much so that the other normative and theoretical perspectives are virtually ignored (Neocleous 2013). The new stream of literature on “open economy politics”, which has only recently reexamined the question, is also one of the many derivatives of liberalism (Lake 2009). If the democratic peace is an empirical observation in search of a theory, liberal peace is a theory with an unquenchable thirst for empirical demonstrations. Although liberal peace is already reasonably well supported by research, some gray areas remain.

From Democracy to Free Trade

The first wave of trade liberalization actually started with a debate on individual rights. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the British middle class were clamoring for the repeal of the Corn Laws, a series of protectionist measures concerning the cereal trade, which primarily benefited the landed gentry. This protectionism was denounced as an unfair privilege granted to a wealthy minority. Free trade, on the contrary, was to benefit those who generated wealth by working for it rather than those who inherited land. It was supposed to encourage the imports of raw materials, reduce the price of food commodities and maintain stable and peaceful relations with foreign trade partners. Despite some resistance, the British parliament gave in to pressure in 1846, abolished the Corn Laws and reduced customs tariffs unilaterally. In its wake came the first movement of trade liberalization on a world scale (Kindleberger 1981; Spall 1988; Brawley 2006).

Even now, democracies tend to favor more liberal trade policies than autocracies. In fact, inclusive political systems encourage policies that benefit the greatest number of individuals, even when profits are minimal for the majority and losses are devastating for a minority. The pattern is even more pronounced in electoral systems where constituencies are so spread out that the preferences of the different interest groups are cancelled out

or disappear in the mass of voters. Inversely, autocracies are more inclined to encourage protectionist policies that benefit the ruling minorities. They maintain higher customs tariffs and give more subsidies to industries that support the government (Rogowski 1987a; Brawley 1993; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Li 2006; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008).

This relationship between democracy and trade is particularly pronounced in developing countries. According to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem in the Heckscher–Ohlin model, when the main factor of production is labor rather than capital or land, workers have a collective interest in making sure that their economy is open to foreign investors and export-oriented. The aim is to increase demand for labor and exert pressure to obtain higher wages. In a democratic political system, workers can demand this preference and oppose protectionist resistance. Thus, the wave of democratization that occurred in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s probably contributed to the liberalization of their economies (Rogowski 1987b; Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Kubota 2005; O'Rourke and Taylor 2007; Baccini 2011).

Democracies are also more likely to conclude free-trade agreements than autocracies. For elected representatives, a free-trade agreement is not just a strategy to guarantee the reciprocity of liberalization. It also provides the symbolic opportunity to show their citizens that they are actively addressing their economic problems (Mansfield et al. 2002).

Having said that, do democracies trade more with each other than they do with autocracies? Statistical studies on the subject are contradictory. Some studies conclude that democracies trade more with each other, while others invalidate this hypothesis (Bliss and Russett 1998; Morrow et al. 1998; Verdier 1998; Mansfield et al. 2000; Bartilow and Voss 2006, 2009).

In addition, democratic forces do not seem to strive for complete liberalization or to encourage liberalization in all areas. Western democracies, particularly the United States, European countries and Japan, maintain strong protectionist measures for agriculture in terms of customs tariffs, public subsidies or phytosanitary barriers. These protectionist measures are not simply due to the fact that farmers have a greater capacity for mobilization than consumers. They are also the result of the citizens' preference. In France or Japan, the citizens who could benefit economically from a reduction in agricultural protectionism remain largely in favor of maintaining it, despite being fully aware of the direct repercussions on retail prices and public expenditure. This paradox cannot be explained by classic liberal theories (Naoui and Kume 2011).

From Free Trade to Peace and Vice Versa

The theory of liberal peace suggests that free trade encourages peaceful relationships. In fact, conflicts generally restrict trade between warring parties. The more intense the trade relations, the higher the economic cost of a conflict. Beyond a certain threshold, the potential gains of military victory are outweighed by the losses incurred as a result of the conflict. At least, this is the most likely rationalist explanation for the empirical observation that has been repeated statistically umpteen times, namely, that economic interdependence reduces the risks of conflict (Polachek 1980; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Li and Sacko 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Simmons 2005; McDonald 2004; Bussmann and Schneider 2007; Gartzke 2007; Goldsmith 2007; Xiang et al. 2007; Bohmelt 2010; Bussmann 2010; Dorussen and Ward 2010; Fordham 2011; Hegre et al. 2010; Polachek and Xiang 2010; Soysa and Fjelde 2010; Mousseau 2013).

The positive relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful relationships is so well established that research now focuses on the conditions that cause variations. Three categories of conditions have been identified. The pacifying effect of trade varies primarily as a function of the characteristics specific to the countries involved. Thus, it is more pronounced when the countries involved are democratic, developed or have electoral systems that encourage large exporters (Papayouanou 1996; Hegre 2000; Krastner 2007; Gelpi and Grieco 2008).

Liberal peace also varies as a function of the nature of the products traded. Arms trade, for example, is strongly correlated to peaceful relations: not a single state sells weapons to its enemies! Oil trade, on the other hand, increases the statistical probabilities of conflict between trading partners (Goenner 2010; Li and Reuveny 2011).

Lastly, the nature of interdependence has an influence on its pacifying effects. The value of trade over national output, the degree of institutionalization of trade relations, the symmetry of these relations and perspectives for future growth, all have an impact on the relationship between trade and peace (Copeland 1996; Gartzke and Li 2003; Hegre 2004; McDonald 2004).

All things being equal, given that economic interdependence encourages peaceful relations, it is not surprising that former aggressors turn to trade to end their past disputes once and for all. The European Coal and Steel Community, built among the ruins of the Second World War, is by no means an isolated example. The Brazilian–Argentinean, India–Pakistan

and American–Vietnamese couples have all reached trade agreements to mark their commitment to developing peaceful relations. This practice is so common that past conflicts statistically increase the probabilities of reaching a free-trade agreement (Martin et al. 2010).

In fact, the choice of free-trade partner often depends more on a special security relationship than on commercial logic. The wave of free-trade agreements reached under George W. Bush's administration is a particularly good illustration of this. Several agreements were reached with countries that did not represent an important market for the United States, but supported the war in Iraq, like Australia, El Salvador, South Korea, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. Other agreements were concluded with countries that collaborated closely with the war on terror, such as Morocco and Bahrain. Conversely, the Bush administration showed little enthusiasm for the proposal of a negotiated free-trade agreement with New Zealand because it did not support the war in Iraq and systematically refused to let American nuclear vessels navigate in its territorial waters (Schott 2004; Newham 2008).

Although the United States has not signed a free-trade agreement with Iraq, their commercial exchanges shot up during the war. American exports went from 31 million dollars in 2002 to over 2 billion in 2011. There is nothing exceptional about this situation. Several studies show that military alliances and military occupations, to a greater extent, significantly increase the flow of trade and investment (Pollins 1989; Gowa and Mansfield 1993, 2004; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Long 2003, 2008; Bartilow and Voss 2006; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007).

Critics of the Liberal Peace

The liberal peace argument, which suggests there is a synergy between democracy, trade and peace, is not without its critics. Some critics consider that the endogenous link between trade and peace could lead statistical studies to overestimate the positive relations between the two. The causal mechanisms go both ways, but few studies take that into account when attempting to measure the effects of trade or military alliances (Goenner 2011).

More radical critics underline that trade can encourage armed conflicts. Several hypotheses have been put forward, but they are contradictory and have yet to be confirmed (Martin et al. 2008; Peterson 2011). A preliminary hypothesis suggests that if a country is dependent on access to foreign markets, it becomes vulnerable to economic coercion and different types

of incursion. Therefore, it may be tempted to engage in armed conflict to recover its autonomy. A second hypothesis suggests that multilateral liberalization mitigates bilateral dependency and, thus, encourages conflict. The negotiations held at the WTO could reduce the opportunity cost of bilateral conflicts, thus making them more attractive. A third hypothesis is based on the observation that the intensification of trade relations between two countries can divert trade to the detriment of a third country. The latter could then envisage resorting to armed force to recover its market share.

There is a fourth even more radical hypothesis. It is the one put forward by Lenin in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Lenin 1917). According to Lenin, liberalism encourages the edification of large industrial and bank groups. Once they have acquired a dominant position in their respective market, they clash with each other in order to continue expanding. The First World War is a perfect demonstration of this type of confrontation.

While Lenin's book may have disappeared from the usual bibliographic references and the liberal vision now dominates the literature, the First World War remains an intriguing case. How can we explain that democracies with well-integrated trade relations became involved in such a devastating war? The democracy/autocracy and liberalism/protectionism dichotomies are probably too crude to shed light on this apparent anomaly. To understand the First World War, a fine-grain analysis is required, and special attention should be given to the specific institutions in each country, particularly to their parliamentary system (Tuchman 1962; Kaiser 1983; Papayoanou 1996).

Social constraints are an important factor in the study of foreign policy. This is why the next chapter presents the social level of analysis by looking at the interactions between foreign policy leaders and the multiple social forces that mark the political landscape.

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How Influential Are the Social Actors?

Various social actors influence or seek to influence foreign policy. NGOs, companies, the media, ethnic groups, unions and experts all exert a degree of pressure on the government. They also interact—exchanging information, setting up coalitions and continually adapting to their environment. The government does not simply listen passively to their grievances. It is involved in social dynamics and, in turn, seeks to influence societal actors. The social fabric is made up of a two-way flux of influence, which overlaps to form a complex system.

Awareness of this complexity helps clarify some commonplace ideas. It is often argued that the electorate has little interest in international politics, that a high death toll suffices to reduce public support for a military intervention, that unpopular politicians use international crises to distract attention from domestic problems, that public opinion reacts impulsively to images shown on television, that NGOs are altruistic by nature while private corporations are egocentric and that the influence of experts is limited to technical issues. This chapter examines each of these commonplace assumptions in turn.

PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion is surveyed constantly, but the press only reports a tiny selection of polls. Other poll results are freely accessible, notably via databases, including the Roper Centre, the Program on International Policy

Attitudes, the Pew Research Center or the European Commission's Eurobarometer. Here again, only a fraction of the surveys is covered. Political leaders themselves commission series of opinion polls, but the results are never made public.

According to Pierre Bourdieu, "public opinion does not exist" (1979: 124). With this provocative statement, Bourdieu points out that respondents do not necessarily have a structured opinion *a priori* and that questions may determine the responses. Even if we adopt this viewpoint, the fact remains that public decision-makers are bombarded by poll results that are presented as reflecting public opinion. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask whether the avalanche of surveys that piles up on decision-makers' desks actually does have a significant influence on how they conduct foreign policy.

The Almond-Lippmann Consensus and Its Critics

Research on how public opinion influences foreign policy has evolved significantly in recent decades. In fact, it took a 180° turn. Yet, the nature of public opinion, survey techniques or the decision-making process has not changed radically. Instead, it is new analytical methods and new research questions that have led analysts to draw different conclusions about the nature of public opinion and the influence of opinion polls (Holsti 1992, 1996).

Until the 1970s, most analysts were extremely critical of public opinion. It was perceived as being incoherent, volatile and capricious. Several analysts considered that letting opinion polls guide foreign policy was dangerous. According to the prevailing theories at the time, public opinion was thought to delay government intervention in explosive situations and force governments to get bogged down in conflicts that were doomed to failure. To sum up, it was considered to be "too pacifist in peacetime and too bellicose in wartime" (Lippmann 1955: 20).

Alexis de Tocqueville and a few of his contemporaries already considered that the reins of foreign policy should be entrusted to experts. Foreign policy was thought to be too complex to be left to citizens who were more preoccupied with their own immediate and daily problems. In addition, it requires secret negotiations that cannot be debated in the public realm. This elitist position made its mark on several constitutions, which put foreign policy exclusively in the hands of the head of state, thus limiting the prerogatives of parliamentarians, who are more vulnerable to swings in public opinion.

Classic realists broadly shared this opinion (Foyle 1999; Nincic 1992). Immediately after the Second World War, realists anxiously observed that decision-makers, such as Roosevelt, had an increasing appetite for surveys. They also noticed that charismatic leaders, like Hitler, had a formidable capacity to mobilize crowds. Moreover, they assumed that public opinion was naive. The French public, for example, naively believed it was protected by the Maginot Line. In Hans Morgenthau's view, "[t]he rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational" (Morgenthau 2005 [1948]: 565). George Kennan went even further:

I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat (Kennan 1951: 70).

Since Morgenthau and Kennan, however, most realists exclude public opinion from their conceptualization of international relations. They reject idealism and are keen to depict international relations as they truly appear, but their aversion to public opinion conducted them to ignore it as a variable. The idea that public opinion is potentially a nuisance and that it has no real influence is strangely muddled up in the realist tradition.

Other researchers, who do not belong to the realist school of thought, analyzed public opinion more seriously, by tackling it head-on. Gabriel Almond was one of the first to provide empirical support to the hypothesis that public opinion is volatile. By studying biennial Gallup polls and how Americans rate the most important issues, he observed that public opinion seemed to be incapable of maintaining stable preferences and a constant focus (1950). With his "mood theory", Almond agreed with the conclusions drawn by the journalist Walter Lippmann, who had already noted the public's lack of insight during the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Together, they forged the empirical basis of what we call the "Almond–Lippmann consensus" on the volatility of public opinion.

Public opinion differs from the opinion of the elite, but that does not necessarily mean it is radical or nonsensical. During the Vietnam War, while surveys pointed to the growing opposition to American foreign policy, some studies questioned the Almond–Lippmann consensus. Sidney Verba and his team, in particular, showed that American public opinion demonstrated a degree of complexity, subtlety and moderation by opposing both a unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam and greater engagement, and by favoring negotiation with the Viet Cong (Verba et al. 1967).

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro resolutely put an end to the Almond–Lippmann consensus (1988, 1992). By analyzing thousands of surveys, they identified several hundred questions that were asked more than once to samples of the American population. They observed that, far from being unstable, American public opinion remains relatively constant. Between 1930 and 1990, there was a less than 10% fluctuation for 73% of the responses to questions that were asked at least twice. Not only that, when there was a sudden turnaround in public opinion, it was systematically in response to new information. Thus, Page and Shapiro concluded that public opinion is more rational than incoherent. This view is still held by most analysts (Russett 1990; Holsti 1992; Knopf 1998; Isernia et al. 2002; Colaresi 2007; Ripberger et al. 2011; Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger 2014; McLean and Roblyer 2017).

Although analysts have now basically abandoned the Almond–Lippmann consensus, one fact remains: preferences revealed by opinion polls are distinct from those expressed by the elite. In several Arab countries, public opinion supports more aggressive policies toward Israel than their leaders (Telhami 1993). In Switzerland, public opinion is resolutely more isolationist than political representatives (Marquis and Sciarini 1999). In the United States, until the election of Donald Trump as president, public opinion favored more mercantilist trade policies than the republican elite, which was predominantly pro-trade (Herrmann and Tetlock 2001). The gap between the population’s majority opinion and that expressed by the intellectual, media and economic elite can be as great as 50 percentage points for some fundamental foreign policy issues (Oldendick and Bardes 1982; Cunningham and Moore 1997; Page and Barabas 2000; Dolan 2008; Ripberger et al. 2011).

Structure of Public Opinion

Public opinion is relatively stable because it is structured along lines that are also relatively stable. Some analysts consider that structuring public opinion along a left-right axis, which is common in relation to social and economic policies, could also be relevant for foreign policy (Aguilar et al. 1997; Stevens 2015). However, this is not always the case. In several regions of the world, for example, anti-Americanism is no more of a right-wing than a left-wing prerogative (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).

In general, opinions on foreign policy are more easily broken down along lines that are specific to foreign policy. Eugene Wittkopf proposed two axes: the first sets internationalism against isolationism, and the second sets conciliation against militant action (1990). This two-dimensional structure was successfully and simultaneously tested by Wittkopf, on the basis of surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, on the basis of surveys specifically targeting the elite (1990). Subsequent studies refined the analysis by adding additional axes, such as a third axis opposing unilateralism and multilateralism (Citrin et al. 1994; Chittick et al. 1995; Rosati and Creed 1997; Bjereld and Ekengren 1999; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2004; Reifler et al. 2011). In all cases, public opinion does appear to be structured and articulated around relatively stable axes.

If respondents' position along these axes is stable, we could presume that the variables that influence respondents are equally stable. Several avenues can be explored in relation to this issue. Some studies examine the impact of psychological variables on opinion, such as the degree of confidence in human nature (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002; Binning 2007) or the degree of risk tolerance (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010). These variables are stable for individuals. They are partly determined by genetic factors, which may help explain the stability of public opinion.

Other studies focus instead on cultural variables, like national identity (Schoen 2008), religion (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008; Çiftçi and Tezcur 2016), cultural sensitivity (Hill 1993), the image of other countries (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990) and cultural proximity (Sulfaro and Crislip 1997). Here again, the culture's stability helps stabilize public opinion.

Two theoretical models conceptualize the relations between these psychological and social variables. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) developed a three-level hierarchical model: foreign policy preferences are based on

social norms, which in turn are based on personal values. For example, a position that favors an increase in the development aid budget may result from a norm, which considers that it is a duty to intervene in the case of a humanitarian crisis. In turn, this norm is shared among those who have a high degree of compassion.

Herrmann et al. (1999) propose a cognitive-interactionist model instead. They consider that foreign policy preferences expressed in surveys are the consequence of constant and systematic interactions between respondents' particular dispositions and prevailing social perceptions with regard to the international context. For example, conservative-leaning individuals and the widespread perception of national decline can strengthen each other, generating an opinion that is strongly in favor of greater military spending.

Other studies adopt a more rationalist approach and establish a direct causal relation between respondents' interests and preferences. Most of these studies focus on trade policies because material interests are easier to document. In particular, they highlight the concordance between the level of workers' skill and their support for free trade. The more specialized the workers, the more they stand to gain from liberalization and the more they actually support liberal trade policies. Some studies have even found a statistically significant relationship between the consumption of imported goods and support for free trade. These studies suggest that respondents, as workers and consumers, are surprisingly capable of identifying their economic interest (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Baker 2005; Fordham 2008).

Variations in economic gains that citizens extract from globalization may affect other domains of foreign policy (Trubowitz 1992). The level of education and exposure to the media do not directly lead to greater awareness with regard to international politics. Obviously, it all depends on the type of education and media (Gentzow and Shapiro 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kennedy and Dickenson 2013). Moreover, when individuals derive economic benefits from globalization, they tend to be better informed about the political context in foreign countries and aware of foreign cultures. Thus, in China, the emerging middle class is simultaneously less nationalistic and less hostile toward the West (Johnston 2006).

Information also affects support for military intervention overseas. The number of deaths in combat, in particular, can have a significant impact on public opinion. *Ceteris paribus*, the greater the number of victims, the less

support there is for war. Mueller even identified a logarithmic function according to which a small number of deaths in the first stages of a conflict can trigger a massive decline in public support (Mueller 1973, 1994; Marra et al. 1990; Koch and Gartner 2005; Karol and Miguel 2007; Gartner 2011).

Nonetheless, the relationship between the number of deaths and public support is neither direct nor linear. Public opinion may sometimes tolerate a high number of victims and continue to support a war. Several conditions affect the sensitivity of opinion with regard to the casualties of war, including (1) the probability that conscription is enforced, (2) the mission's multilateral framework, (3) the severity of the enemy threat, (4) the likelihood of military success and (5) elite's cohesion in favor of military intervention. All these conditions suggest that public opinion can take several criteria into account (Jentleson 1992; Downs and Rocke 1994; Larson 1996; Oneal et al. 1996; Powlick and Katz 1998; Kull and Destler 1999; Kull 2002; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Vasquez 2005; Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Gelpi et al. 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010a; Horowitz et al. 2011; Grieco et al. 2011; Perla 2011).

Influence of Public Opinion

One question, nonetheless, remains in the balance: public opinion may well be stable, subtle and coherent, but does it actually influence foreign policy? The answer appears to be affirmative (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). At least in Western democracies, there is generally a concordance between public opinion and foreign policy. In addition, when there is a swing in public opinion, it is usually followed by a change in foreign policy (Monroe 1979, 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983; Hartley and Russett 1992; Foyle 1999; Rottinghaus 2007).

However, the influence is by no means absolute, systematic and immediate. Recent evidence suggests that the public opinion–foreign policy nexus is not as strong in the presence of an external security threat (Davis 2012). Several examples clearly illustrate that public opinion is not always taken into account. Italy and Spain took part in the Iraq War in 2003 despite public opposition (Schuster and Maier 2006; Chan and Safran 2006). However, both countries withdrew from Iraq after the elections when the parties which had made a clear commitment to withdraw came to power.

Most analysts consider that it is precisely the prospect of elections that puts pressure on elected representatives to consider public opinion. Contrary to popular belief, foreign policy can play a significant role in elections when there are major differences between the candidates. A number of voters, even those who do not follow international current affairs closely, have strong opinions on how foreign policy should be conducted. But they are not all interested in the same issues. Some are concerned with immigration, others with terrorism and still others with negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, when voters concerned by these different issues are put together, they can have a significant impact on election results (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006; Meernik 1995; Baum 2002a, b; Anand and Krosnick 2003; Reifler et al. 2011).

Analysts also agree about the type of influence that public opinion exerts on foreign policy. Public opinion rarely leads decision-makers to adopt specific policies. Instead, public opinion sets parameters within which a whole range of policies can be considered acceptable. If public pressure fails to prevent a government from entering a war, it can force the government to strive to create a multilateral coalition or prevent it from deploying weapons of mass destruction from the outset. Public opinion channels available options without imposing a specific one (Russett 1990; Hinckley 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Sobel 2001; Foyle 2004).

As a channeling force, public opinion helps stabilize foreign policy. When a government is in favor of a shift toward greater isolationism and protectionism, public opinion will exert pressure that is pro-interventionist and liberal. However, when the next government advocates interventionism and liberalism, public opinion is likely to bring it back to greater isolationism and protectionism. Public opinion represents a force of opposition rather than proposition (Nincic 1988).

Current research now looks at the conditions that increase or reduce public opinion influence. Three intermediary variables have been identified, though none has yet been firmly established. The first variable is the degree of state's independence. Internal independence, as well as external independence, can have an impact on the influence of public opinion. At the external level, a state is likely to be more sensitive to public pressure if it is economically or militarily independent in relation to the outside world and has little involvement in international bodies. At the internal level, a state that is institutionally decentralized will also be more sensitive to the influence of public opinion (Risse-Kappen 1991; Chan and Safran 2006; Alons 2007; Kreps 2010).

The second intermediary variable is visibility. Certain foreign policy issues attract more public attention than others. Unsurprisingly, public opinion has a greater influence when it comes to ratifying a multilateral treaty or participating in a military conflict than for issues like the management of stocks of tuna in the North Atlantic or the export of dangerous waste (Monroe 1998; Petry and Mendelsohn 2004). The phase of the decision-making process also has a significant effect on the level of visibility. Public opinion is more influential during phases that attract public attention, such as when an issue is put on the agenda, than when decisions are implemented (Knecht and Weatherford 2006).

The third and last intermediary variable is decision-makers' beliefs. Two types of belief are important: normative and strategic. In the first case, a leader may consider that he has the moral duty to take his population's opinion into account. In the second case, a leader may judge that public support is a prerequisite to the success of a foreign policy. The two beliefs can significantly increase the influence of public opinion. They also help explain how public opinion has a degree of influence in autocratic regimes, which are not subject to election pressure (Powlick 1991, 1995; Telhami 1993; Foyle 1999; Keller 2005; Dyson 2007; Foster and Keller 2010).

Nevertheless, political leaders can misinterpret public opinion. American presidents, for example, tend to overestimate the public's sensitivity with regard to the number of soldiers killed in combat and they underestimate its attachment to multilateral norms and procedures. Thus, fearing a public outcry, the United States withdrew from Lebanon in 1984 after an attack killing 241 American soldiers. However, retrospective analysis shows that the fall in public support at the time of the event was by no means inevitable (Burk 1999; Kull and Destler 1999; Kull and Ramsay 2000).

Audience Costs

Developed by James Fearon almost 25 years ago, the audience cost theory has bolstered the argument according to which public opinion influences foreign policy (Fearon 1994). Fearon argues that leaders cannot be certain of their enemies' determination to go to war during a crisis because they can bluff about their true intentions in order to get maximum concessions. He maintains that we can learn more about our enemies' true intentions when they choose to "go public", that is, when they publicly commit

to taking coercive actions such as mobilizing troops or issuing public warnings. Indeed, leaders who choose to commit publicly focus the attention of their domestic audiences, raise their expectations and run the risk of paying a high political cost if they ultimately choose to back down their public threat. Fearon maintains that historical record shows that domestic audiences are tougher with leaders who formulate empty threats than with those who do not escalate at all.

Audience cost theory has been relatively popular because it was used to study the relationship between democracy and war. Some argue that democracies are more likely than autocracies to win wars because their leaders are publicly elected and can be voted out in the next election. As a result, the audience cost matters more to them. As Jack Levy explains, “Audience cost theory suggests that the ability of domestic publics to punish political leaders for failing to implement their earlier threats creates additional incentives for leaders to stand firm during crises” (Levy 2012: 383). As a result, democratic leaders are more likely to avoid inconsistency and to choose to escalate a conflict only when they are determined to go to war (Reiter and Stam 1998). Accountability to the public, the argument goes, is what makes democracies special in international relations. Audience cost theory has also been mobilized to explain the democratic peace proposition, as mutual audience costs refrain democratic leaders from going to war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). The theory has also been applied to the realm of economic sanctions and evidence indicates that leaders will suffer domestic audience costs if they publicly commit to adopting economic sanctions and subsequently back down (Thomson 2016).

This said, there is still no consensus on the merits of this theory, as research has shown contradicting results (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012). Some have also argued that audience cost theory is not significantly supported by empirical evidence (Mercer 2012), and others have raised some methodological problems in testing the theoretical proposition (Gartzke and Lupu 2012).

INFLUENCE OF LEADERS ON PUBLIC OPINION

Research has shown that the influence of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making is not a one-way street. In some cases, leaders do not simply anticipate public opinion: they direct it. At least, they make a considerable effort to do so. Studies suggest that politicians can especially

influence public opinion in times of war (Berinsky 2009). In the American context, for instance, presidential rhetoric increases the public accessibility to the president's view on a war, which significantly influences public opinion to the president's benefit (Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger 2014).

Some diplomats openly admit that they devote as much energy trying to persuade the population in their own country as they do trying to convince representatives in foreign countries. To achieve their purpose, they may use rousing speeches, emphasizing shared principles or generating a climate of fear (Western 2005; Wolfe 2008). They may also set up programs designed to convince the most reticent, such as industrial reconversion or employment insurance programs, to encourage support for free trade (Ruggie 1982; Bates et al. 1991; Rodrik 1998; Hiscox 2002; Hays et al. 2005).

However, we cannot be sure that these efforts bear fruit. Some studies suggest they are futile (Edwards 2003), while others conclude that public opinion is, primarily, guided by political elites (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Witko 2003; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). In fact, most studies that examine the true capacity of decision-makers to influence public opinion focus on a specific hypothesis, namely, the "diversionary war hypothesis", which is based on the "rally around the flag" phenomenon.

Rally Around the Flag

Since John Mueller's pioneering work (1973), it is now well established that dramatic events, which thrust a country onto the international stage, create a temporary effect that rallies the country's population around its government leader. Argentina's attack on the British Falkland Islands, for example, significantly boosted support for Margaret Thatcher. The effect lasted long enough for the Falklands War to constitute a factor that contributed to Thatcher's reelection in 1983 (Lai and Reiter 2005). It is a phenomenon that Mueller called "the rally around the flag".

The most impressive rally around the flag is undoubtedly the one enjoyed by President George W. Bush after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. President Bush's approval rating on the eve of the attacks was 51%. It shot to 86% on September 15, and by September 21, it reached a peak of 90% (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). This dramatic surge contributed to Congress's almost unanimous adoption of two resolutions, which gave the president incredibly extensive powers for his war on terror (Kassop 2003).

Attacks are not the only events capable of generating a rally around the flag. The trigger can be an event that occurs in any field of activity. It can be positive or negative as long as it is clearly identified, has major implications and is sudden. An important scientific advance, hosting an international summit, a sporting victory, a stock market crisis or an important diplomatic visit can all generate a rallying effect (Mueller 1973; Marra et al. 1990).

The nature of the political regime does not seem to be a determining factor. The phenomenon is particularly well documented in the United States, because of the wealth of data available. Since the Second World War, the Gallup polling firm has conducted thousands of surveys on support for the American president. Its questions are always formulated in the same way. Researchers can now use these data to document the slightest fluctuations in public opinion. However, the rally phenomenon can also be observed in parliamentary systems (Lai and Reiter 2005) and even in autocracies (Heldt 1999; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Levy and Vakili 2014).

Nevertheless, other contextual factors can amplify the “rally around the flag”. In the United States, at least, the effect can be magnified if the following situations arise: the president has a low rate of support before the dramatic event occurs, republicans and democrats collaborate, the country is not already at war, there is abundant media coverage of the event, the president appears to take a risk that puts his career at stake and the U.N. Security Council supports the American response to the crisis (Lian and Oneal 1993; Baker and O’Neal 2001; Baum 2002b; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Colaresi 2007; Groeling and Baum 2008).

These contextual variables also have an impact on the scale of the rallying effect, but the reasons for this are not clear. There is still uncertainty about the causal processes that link dramatic events to increased support for the government leader. According to some analysts, it is first and foremost a population’s patriotic reaction. Dramatic events boost the feeling of belonging in terms of national identity, generating not only increased support for the government leader, but also for all national political institutions (Mueller 1973; Parker 1995).

Other analysts consider the rallying phenomenon to be more the result of the news cycle. When a crisis occurs, journalists initially turn to the government leader, who can monopolize media space temporarily. It is only later that criticisms are raised, spread by the media and the rallying effect subsides (Brody 1991; Oneal et al. 1996; Baum and Groeling

2010a, b). However, independently of the causal explanation, if international crises actually increase the rate of support, government leaders could be tempted to generate them deliberately.

Temptation of War as a Rallying Lever

Several analysts have suggested the hypothesis that political leaders are more likely to generate an international crisis when they find themselves in a fragile position on the domestic political stage. A military conflict could be declared with the intention of diverting attention away from economic problems or political scandals. From this perspective, domestic political instability could be one of the primary factors of international instability.

There are numerous historical case studies of diversion strategy. Bismarck's imperialism at the time of the Berlin Conference and the German Emperor William II's offensive strategy during the First World War could be explained by the desire to counter socialist movements in imperial Germany (Kaiser 1983). The very risky mission to rescue the American hostages in Teheran may have been approved by Jimmy Carter in order to increase his standing six months before the presidential elections (Brulé 2005). In addition, the launch of cruise missile strikes against suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan on August 20, 1998, could be interpreted as an attempt by President Clinton to distract attention from the statement he made before the grand jury, three days earlier, concerning his extramarital relations with Monica Lewinsky (Hendrickson 2002; Baum 2003). Diversion theory even made an incursion into popular culture when the film *Wag the Dog* featuring Robert De Niro and Dustin Hoffman came out in late 1997 just before the Lewinsky sex scandal. The movie plot revolved around a strategy of diversion that strangely resembled the events leading President Clinton to order bombings on Afghanistan and Sudan. This prompted the US media to introduce diversion theory to the public and to draw a parallel between the reality of foreign policy and the fictional story of the film.

However, establishing a true link of causality between domestic political problems and aggressive foreign policy is difficult. Military interventions are multicausal, and it is often impossible to assess the relative influence of a specific factor when studying a single case. By analyzing several cases, however, it is easier to isolate variables and compare them. Statistics do not allow us to retrace all the causal processes, but they are useful to identify significant relationships.

Statistical studies on the diversion hypothesis are more mitigated than historical case studies (Levy 1988). Some statistical studies clearly indicate that government leaders resort to military force more often when the rate of unemployment or the rate of inflation is high, or when the rate of economic growth is low. Some studies add that during periods of war or economic hardship, government leaders who are running at the next election intensify the use of force prior to the elections. Other studies reveal that government leaders who seek to boost their domestic support through external action are the ones who lack the resources to use redistribution policies or repression to achieve the same goals (Gaubatz 1999; DeRouen 2000; Prins 2001; Clark and Reed 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Colaresi 2007; Brûlé et al. 2010; Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Williams et al. 2010; Kisangani and Pickering 2011).

One of the most frequently quoted articles in the abundant literature is the one by Ostrom and Job (1986). Their statistical analysis concludes that American presidents resort to military intervention more often to increase their popularity when the level of support is already quite high than when it is low. This surprising result does not fit the original hypothesis of diversion strategy. We would expect diversion to be used as a last resort, when the chances of reelection are slim and low enough to justify a risky strategy. After all, the rally effect can be modest, it is temporary in all cases and the strategy can easily turn against its initiator if the conflict drags on or if defeat seems imminent.

Ostrom and Job do not invalidate the hypothesis of resorting to foreign policy as a diversion strategy. They simply reformulate it. According to them, a government leader who wishes to engage in military conflict to boost his popularity needs to have a minimum amount of support to start with. This cushion is necessary to avoid a disaster in the event of military defeat. The rallying strategy is primarily aimed at members of the government leader's party or those in his coalition. Some studies actually identify a relationship between recourse to military force and the low rate of support for the government leader among his traditional followers (Morgan and Bickers 1992; Nicholls et al. 2010).

Several statistical studies actually go far beyond Ostrom and Job's criticism and directly attack the hypothesis of diversion. They claim that democratic countries are no more likely to engage in conflict during election years, even when their economic situation is difficult. They generally avoid military conflict in the months leading up to an election. These studies

conclude that a tacit norm might exist in several countries, which prohibits the use of military force on the international stage as a way of conducting political battles on the national stage (Meernik 1994, 2000, 2001; Meernick and Waterman 1996; Yoon 1997; Gaubatz 1999; Leeds and Davis 1997; Gowa 1998; Foster and Palmer 2006).

These groups of statistical studies reach diametrically opposed conclusions because they do not use the same data. Some studies define resorting to force dichotomously, while others introduce a sliding scale to take into account the degree of force deployed. Some are limited to the post-Second World War period, and others go back as far as the Franco-German war in 1870. Some focus on support for the government leader, while some take into account the position and preferences of the other actors involved in the decision-making process. Some studies adopt a unilateral model, while others consider the fact that variations in levels of support may also affect the behavior of other governments. Some studies break down the data on a term basis and consider that the opportunity to mobilize foreign policy is constant, while others take each crisis as a unit of analysis that provides government leaders with the chance to intervene. Some studies ignore the nature of the enemy, while others distinguish the enemy according to the nature of their political regime. Methodological controversies always cause disputes, and analysts use statistical models that are increasingly complex. As yet, it is not possible to establish a definitive verdict.

To be sure, some government leaders refrain from using military force even though it could be used to their advantage. This may be because they use substitutes instead. In particular, they can replace military force with a trade dispute. In this way, they can generate a similar rallying effect and join forces with the economic stakeholders that stand to gain from the dispute. Thus, when the unemployment rate rises in the United States, the probability that the American president will provoke a trade dispute increases significantly (DeRouen 1995; Clark 2001; Whang 2011).

Government leaders can also substitute a conflict with the rhetoric of opposition. According to Sophie Meunier (2007), President Jacques Chirac tinted his speeches with anti-Americanism to create a rally around the flag that was inexpensive and involved little risk. Over 40 years ago, Mueller himself insisted that the rally around the flag is not solely generated by military conflicts. Curiously, the literature on foreign policy as a diversion strategy focuses on war and rarely considers other possibilities.

THE MEDIA

The media are in a difficult position, located as they are between the political leaders and the population. They are not messengers that slavishly pass on government's press releases, nor are they mirrors that systematically reflect public opinion. They are actors, with a degree of autonomy that can influence both leaders and public opinion.

The Media's Influence

The media play a very important role in foreign policy (Baum and Groeling 2010a, b; Peksen et al. 2014). Only a minority of journalists have the necessary means to gain access to firsthand sources of information on the scope and effects of foreign policy. Distances, foreign languages and contextual understanding represent significant barriers. Therefore, sources of information are concentrated, which magnifies the influence of the editorial choices made by a few foreign correspondents.

One of the most important editorial choices involves identifying and prioritizing foreign policy news that will be reported, which is called priming. As only limited media space is available, several events compete daily. In this news business, the same topics usually dominate the media space. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the reactions it provokes, for example, make front-page news more often than other bloodier conflicts. This recurrence can be explained by a phenomenon of path dependency: insistent media coverage of a specific problem generates people's interest and provokes responses from decision-makers. This creates the conditions for maintaining it among the top issues in international current affairs. Once a foreign policy issue breaks through the media's editorial filter, it is likely to come back periodically (Wood and Peake 1998; Oppermann and Viehrig 2009).

Another editorial choice has to do with news framing, that is, the angle used by the media to present the news. This involves the selection and layout of the elements of information that provide substance to the news and structure its interpretation. Framing defines the problem, identifies the protagonists, qualifies their interactions and puts the episode into context. The conflict that set Chechnya against Russia, for example, can be presented as a war of independence between a people and an imperial power or as the demonstration of a clash between Muslim and Christian civilizations or even as a wave of terrorism led by a group of extremists (Oates 2006).

Although available frames are virtually unlimited, a coherent and intelligible news item can only be presented in a single framework. The media favor familiar frames that are based on shared social norms or that reproduce the established national identity (Snow et al. 1986; Entman 2004). Despite their interest for news and current affairs, the media that dominate foreign policy coverage generally make conformist decisions when it comes to both the selection of news items and their treatment.

These editorial decisions can have an impact on public opinion. In one of the first books on the influence of the media on foreign policy, Bernard Cohen underlines the fact that the media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (1963: 13). Repetition has a powerful effect of persuasion when it comes to ranking priorities. Even today, foreign policy issues that are regularly covered by the media become the issues that most of the population considers to be the most important (Soroka 2003).

Nonetheless, Cohen seems to have underestimated the influence of framing. Recent research indicates that the way news is reported can also have an influence on public opinion with regard to foreign policy (Jordan and Page 1992). Even articles and reports, which do not convey an explicit opinion, structure thought and steer reflection in a given direction. Articles that adopt a human scale, rather than a systemic scale, induce a certain mistrust of internationalist foreign policies (Baum 2004). Articles that present the anger rather than the sadness of victims of a conflict incite readers to call for action against the culprits (Small et al. 2006). Lastly, those that underline the losses that the country suffers on the international stage, and not the gains, encourage readers to favor riskier foreign policies (Wolfe 2008).

Media framing, in particular, influence individuals who have little interest in and a minimum understanding of foreign policy (Hiscox 2006). It would be a mistake to presume that this section of the population, which is disinterested in foreign policy, is not exposed to the media that covers foreign policy. Matthew Baum’s research clearly shows that even variety shows, tabloids and the gutter press also exert an influence on their audience with regard to foreign policy (Baum 2002a).

Media’s influence goes far beyond a disinterested public and has an impact on government leaders and foreign ministers as well. Underlying causal mechanisms for this influence may involve three channels. First, the media can put pressure on leaders to adopt a position on problems that

they had previously overlooked. Journalists' questions or even anticipating their question can help put a foreign policy issue on the government's agenda. Second, foreign reports and editorials in major newspapers can influence leaders' ideas because they are considered to be a source of information and analyses, which complements the reports produced by the administration. In their memoirs, several heads of state openly acknowledge that they were influenced by pictures broadcast on CNN or reports in *The New York Times*. Donald Trump's acknowledgment that the pictures of chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians pushed him to authorize the launch of Tomahawk cruise missile against the Syrian government in the spring of 2017 is a clear example of this. Third, leaders may believe that specific media coverage influences their electorate and due to this indirect bias, they may adjust their policies for electoral purposes. Sometimes even civil servants favor the policies promoted by the media, believing that they will then satisfy their leaders, who are sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion (O'Heffernan 1991; Powlick 1995; Wood and Peake 1998; Entman 2000; Van Belle et al. 2004).

Some factors can accentuate the media's influence on leaders. A high level of uncertainty and fierce criticism of existing policies are among the most important factors. The media's influence also seems to be more pronounced for the least strategic issues and the most marginal countries. The famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, for example, united all these conditions: the withdrawal of Soviet aid to developing countries created a situation of uncertainty, the media heavily criticized Western countries for their inaction and the region concerned was not particularly strategic. As a consequence, the reports of the famine broadcasted by the BBC helped boost the levels of aid that Western countries gave to Ethiopia (Robinson 2002; Miklian 2008).

How Leaders Influence the Media?

Although the media can have an impact on foreign policy, the flows of influence also go in the opposite direction: political leaders often influence journalists. Several studies demonstrate this by simultaneously encoding the opinions expressed by leaders and those expressed in the media. Their respective evolution is analyzed over time. Other studies confirm this by highlighting the media's complacency toward the policies of allied countries and their negative bias with regard to enemy countries (Herman

and Chomsky 1988; Bennett 1990; Suedfeld 1992; Bennett and Manheim 1993; Wolfsfeld 1997; Zaller and Chiu 2000; Entman 2004; Bennett et al. 2007; Groeling and Baum 2009).

Leaders have several advantages when it comes to influencing journalists: (1) they enjoy an aura of legitimacy and control, which enhances their credibility; (2) they have the capacity to provoke news events by making statements or taking action; (3) they escape the pressure of parliamentarians and lobbyists, most of whom have little interest in foreign policy; (4) they can withhold strategic information or, on the contrary, put up “trial balloons”; (5) they choose the journalists that interview them and accompany them on official trips; and (6) they supply the journalists with official photographs and videos, which they alone can provide.

In fact, the relationships between leaders and the media are more cooperative than conflicting. They fit into a framework of interdependence or “mutual exploitation” (O’Heffernan 1991). On the one hand, leaders want to use the media to reach their audience without disclosing the most sensitive information. On the other hand, journalists want to maintain privileged relationships with those who provide them with information without damaging their image of impartiality.

In this context, leaders’ influence on the media varies, depending on the circumstances. Military conflicts, especially, increase both their desire and their capacity to influence the media. To generate and maintain support for war, it is essential to convey optimistic messages on the probabilities of success and to present the enemy as a direct threat that defies reason and goodwill. Demonizing a foreign head of state in governmental communication strategies is one of the most reliable warnings of an imminent military conflict (Hunt 1987).

During an actual conflict, governments control access to sensitive information, such as the progression of operations and the death toll. They can set the conditions for journalists who accompany military troops and even impose censorship. Leaders have maximum control when wars are short-lived and remote. On the contrary, leaders find it harder to influence the media during periods of relative peace, such as the one that characterized American foreign policy in the 1990s (Berry 1990; Entman 2000; Zaller and Chiu 2000; Tumber and Palmer 2004).

The influence of leaders on media also varies from country to country. In autocratic regimes, the state often has a direct control over the media. In these countries, there is a high congruence between media coverage

and governmental views (Suedfeld 1992; Whitten-Woodring 2009). Even in some democracies, the government directly or indirectly controls several media outlets, which broadly reflect the government's perspective (D'Anieri 2002; Oates 2006; Archetti 2008).

In the United States, foreign policy debates transmitted by traditional media channels remain in the "sphere of legitimate controversy" (Hallin 1986). When an international crisis occurs, the president and the secretary of state are often the first to be interviewed, and their point of view is broadcast first. Subsequently, when the opposition party, recognized experts or even dissidents from the ruling party express criticism, the media communicate it in abundance. Nonetheless, marginal or deviant opinions, which are not shared by one of the groups from the political elite, rarely find an echo in mainstream American media. Controversies pictured in the media mirror debates within the elite political circle (Bennett 1990).

A striking example of this phenomenon of "indexation" is the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Contrary to popular opinion, the media coverage remained largely in favor of the American government's policy. It was in line with the republican and democratic heavyweights for as long as they supported the war. Later, when the media expressed criticism, it only concerned the cost of the war and the probabilities of success. The media barely mentioned the viewpoint of the pacifist movements that disclaimed the very legitimacy of the war (Hallin 1986).

Half a century later, the media coverage of the war in Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the American government launched its war against terrorism as an interstate war. Presidential speeches were widely broadcast by the American media and, by extension, most Americans were convinced that Afghanistan and Iraq represented an immediate threat. Media criticism about the probabilities of success and the financial costs of the war only emerged during the 2004 presidential campaign, and to a greater extent after the 2008 campaign. *The New York Times* even admitted that several articles written by Judith Miller about the Iraqi threat proved to be unfounded and were the consequence of an overly close relationship between the journalist and the Bush administration. However, the very legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan was not seriously called into question by mainstream media during the first term of the Bush administration (Foyle 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Tumber and Palmer 2004; Bennett et al. 2007; Wolfe 2008; Aday 2010; Baum and Groeling 2010a, b).

CNN Effect

The American media's tow-the-line attitude may surprise those who thought that the "CNN effect" had overturned the balance of power between the leaders and the media. The expression "CNN effect" became part of everyday vocabulary during the Gulf War in 1991. At the time, the CNN television network demonstrated its capacity to broadcast a military conflict live all over the world. It represented both a new source of information for governments and an added constraint for military operations, which could offend the public. Some journalists suggested that the emergence of international news channels had tipped the balance of power in favor of the media (Taylor 1992).

However, the so-called CNN effect has not been fully substantiated by research. In fact, its validity depends on its exact definition (Livingston 1997; Gilboa 2005; Bahador 2007; Balabanova 2010; Gilboa et al. 2016). If the CNN effect is understood to mean provoking emotive and spontaneous responses by broadcasting dramatic images on television, the advent of international news channels has not significantly changed the situation. The images of violence in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, failed to mobilize public opinion and incite Western governments to intervene rapidly. Even the American operation *Restore Hope* that set out to bring peace in Somalia does not stand up to scrutiny. The American media were not interested in Somalia until the administration brought the conflict to their attention. The political decision to withdraw from the conflict came before the most dramatic images of the death of American soldiers were broadcast (Livingston and Eachus 1995; Mermin 1997). No matter how dramatic the images broadcast on news channels may be, they are not a sufficient condition or a prerequisite for military intervention. In addition, when images of disasters are broadcast, funds allocated for international development may be diverted to emergency aid instead (Jakobsen 1996, 2000).

However, there does seem to be a "CNN effect" if it is understood to mean a fast response time. With live news broadcast 24 hours a day, political leaders now have to respond to international crises immediately if they want to avoid seeing their opponents monopolize media space and impose the terms for debate. This increased pressure can have major repercussions on managing foreign policy. Government leaders and foreign ministers sometimes have to take a stance before they can check information with their embassies, consult their advisors or attempt secret diplomatic negotiations away from the media gaze. This pressure exerted by news

channels can have perverse effects when it comes to maintaining peaceful relations. Nonetheless, the CNN effect does not tip the balance of power, nor does it increase media influence (Gilboa 2003; Wolfsfeld 2004).

Foreign policy is more likely to be upset by a different phenomenon, which remains vague and sparsely documented, namely, the transnationalization of new media outlets. Until recently, the media, public opinion and governments overlapped on the same territory. The media outlets that were geared toward several countries and the analysts bold enough to talk about a global public opinion were few and far between. Consequently, most theoretical models that conceptualize the triad of the state, the media and public opinion emphasize their mutual influence, but continue to ignore the transnational flows of influence (Entman 2004; Baum and Potter 2008; Sparrow 2008; Nacos et al. 2011).

However, these models are gradually becoming anachronistic with the multiplication of international news channels and the spread of social network platforms on Internet such as Facebook and Tweeter. Using transnational media, governments communicate directly with foreign populations, demonstrators short-circuit their political authorities and address the whole of the international community while heads of state continue to exchange information when diplomatic channels are broken. Although these transnational communications have always been possible on a more modest scale, new media outlets are developing transnational relations to such an extent that traditional actors are changing their behavior (Van Belle 2000; Badie 2005; Seib 2008; Price 2009).

Not everyone benefits from media transnationalization in the same way. As the following sections illustrate, interest groups and expert communities are increasingly transnational. They are among the main beneficiaries of the new information and communications technologies (Aday and Livingston 2008).

INTEREST GROUPS

Interest groups are organizations dedicated to defending particular interests within the state decision-making process. The nature of the specific interests can differ (Berry and Wilcox 2016). Christopher Hill proposes a typology as a function of the nature of the interests that groups defend (2003). The first category brings together groups defending economic interests, including firms, consumer associations and unions. The second is made up of groups defending territorial interests, including indigenous

communities, ethnic minorities and municipalities. The third category concerns groups defending specific ideas, such as feminist NGOs and churches. However, regardless of the category to which they belong, interest groups that are actively involved in foreign policy have similar activities and the study of their influence raises similar methodological challenges.

How Interest Groups Influence Foreign Policy?

Most interest groups have three features in common, which are independent of the type of interests that they defend. First, in their efforts to influence governments, they have to work closely with other groups. Loosely coordinated coalitions are the norm for representing interests. Isolated actions remain the exception. The coalitions' configuration even constitutes one of the main determining factors when it comes to how much influence the interest groups can exert (Morin 2010).

Second, the major coalitions that defend economic, territorial or political interests use similar strategies for action. They develop rhetoric that they hope will be convincing, strive to align themselves with public opinion, communicate their message through different media outlets, conduct research to support their arguments, testify before parliamentary commissions, meet political leaders behind closed doors and offer compensation to those who agree to support them. The daily work of a lobbyist from *Human Rights Watch* is not dissimilar to that of a lobbyist defending Airbus' interests (Sell and Prakash 2004).

Third, interest groups can exert greater influence during the preliminary stages of the decision-making process. In these early stages, they can influence the frame through which an issue will be understood by the decision-makers and ensure that it is actually included on the political agenda. In subsequent stages, when the different options are examined and policies are implemented, interest groups' influence diminishes and is superseded by the bureaucracy and expert communities. It is only at the assessment stage that the interest groups recover their original leverage (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Joachim 2003; Busby 2007; Carpenter 2007; Bernhagen 2008; Morin 2010; Bubela and Morin 2010).

These three characteristics are common to the diverse categories of interest groups and across the different domains of public policy. However, the literature that examines how interest groups influence foreign policy

specifically is less developed. There are surprisingly few publications on the subject, and the general scope of most research findings is limited. Interest groups constitute one of the weak links in FPA.

It is tempting to attribute this deficiency to the fact that interest groups are less active in the field of foreign policy than in other fields of public policy. At first glance, foreign ministers appear to be under less pressure from lobbyists than their other cabinet members. They are not required to interact daily with a designated group in the way that agricultural ministers have to interact with farmers, education ministers with teachers and cultural ministers with artists. Not surprisingly, comparatively few organizations devoted specifically to foreign policy are included on the public registers of lobbyists (Broscheid and Coen 2007).

Nonetheless, this argument is not entirely convincing. Although it may explain that researchers studying interest groups find more fertile ground in domains other than foreign policy, it fails to explain why most foreign policy analysts overlook the influence of interest groups. Interest groups may be more active in other domains of public policy, but that does not rule out the possibility that they can exert a significant influence on foreign policy in certain circumstances.

Methodological Pitfalls

If few foreign policy analysts tackle the subject of interest groups directly, it is probably due to the major methodological constraints. Isolating the influence of one interest group is particularly difficult when several groups interact and not one of them *a priori* has the upper hand.

One of the safest methodological strategy to demonstrate how a specific interest group influences foreign policy is the one suggested by Betsill and Corell (2007). The method has three components: first, the triangulation of different types of data from various sources; second, identifying all the elements in the causal chain that link the interest groups' actions to the policy adopted by the state; and lastly, the counterfactual analysis, which is used to eliminate rival explanations one after the other.

However, this method is harder than it appears. At least four problems may arise. The first is to identify all the strategic actions that are undertaken by the interest groups and that the analysis should take into account. Some actions are difficult to trace because they only target public decision-makers indirectly, through third-party organizations, foreign countries or public opinion (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008). For example, we can presume

that the donations, made by pharmaceutical companies to African countries in the early 2000s, were designed to counter the NGO campaign in Western countries that set out to modify trade regulations for the export of generic medicines. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide conclusive empirical evidence for this hypothesis. If we do not know what the different interest groups' goals are and which actions should be included in the analysis, it is difficult to evaluate the successes and failures of the different actions (Bubela and Morin 2010).

The second methodological difficulty is the instability of the interest groups' preferences. If their preferences were constant over time and homogenous in space, they could be deduced even when they are not explicit. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In the field of liberalization, several American firms and unions switched positions, respectively, during the 1970s. The increase in capital mobility and the reduction in labor mobility led some businesses to abandon their protectionist positions and some unions to express greater mistrust of free trade (Midford 1993; Milner 1987, 1988, 1999; Hiscox 2002). At the same time, in Latin America, business managers with similar interests were defending radically different positions. When Brazilian industrialists were campaigning for import substitution as a trade strategy, their Argentinian counterparts were campaigning against it (Sikkink 1991). Therefore, we cannot deduce, let alone explain, the interests that a particular group defends without carefully examining the specific ideological and material factors.

The third methodological problem is how to interpret the policy adopted by the decision-makers. Maintaining the *status quo* does not necessarily mean that the interest groups' actions have been ineffective. The pressure exerted by one group may simply have offset the pressure from another group. More often, rival interest groups simply exercise influence on different agents within the state apparatus. Incoherent foreign policies often result from the conflicting pressures exerted by interest groups. On some environmental issues, for example, Japan adopts varied positions within different international bodies as a function of the relative influence of the different interest groups involved (Morin and Orsini 2013).

The fourth methodological difficulty is taking into account how the state influences interest groups. The state does not only respond to pressure; it also acts independently and can even have a direct influence on interest groups. A government that takes part in an international negotiation can increase its leverage if it demonstrates that it is under considerable domestic pressure. Consequently, some negotiators can strategically

increase the pressure from interest groups in order to reap the benefits at the international level. For example, General Musharraf may have tolerated extremist Islamic groups in Pakistan because their presence meant that his requests for economic aid could be justified to Westerners (Grove 2007). Conversely, a government can weaken interest groups by using cross-negotiation strategies. By jointly negotiating the liberalization of manufactured goods and the reduction of agricultural subsidies, the European Commission can weaken the agricultural lobby, which is calling for subsidies, by setting it against the industrial lobby, which is calling for reduced customs tariffs (Davis 2004). When these public authority actions and the bidirectional flows of influence are taken into account, the analyses of the interest groups' influence are much more complicated.

Case Studies and Generalizations

Researchers can overcome certain methodological problems if they choose the group they are going to study carefully. In order to simplify analysis, a number of studies examine the influence of groups that claim to defend the interests of a particular ethnic community (Ahrari 1987; Shain 1994; Smith 2000; Ambrosio 2002; Kirk 2008; Koinova 2013; Haglund 2015).

Ethnic groups are more transparent than private corporations when it comes to their actions and strategies. This is because they are generally based on an entire community. Their preferences and priorities are as stable as the prevailing situation in their country of origin and can remain unchanged for several decades. In addition, most ethnic groups are not directly opposed to specific rivals. By comparison, unions cannot be analyzed without taking into account how companies behave. Lastly, some ethnic groups are more autonomous than groups that are economically or politically dependent on the government, such as farmers or charities.

Studies have shown that ethnic groups can have significantly different degrees of influence over foreign policy. In the United States, groups representing Mexican, Greek, Cuban, Irish, Jewish, Polish, Indian or Armenian communities all had a significant influence on foreign policy. On the contrary, Italian, Arab and Chinese groups do not exert an influence that is proportional to the demographic weight of the communities that they represent. These variations can be explained in part by contextual factors, such as how compatible their demands are with the country's general interest, how the community is integrated within the government and the sympathy expressed by public opinion. Internal factors inherent to

a group can also explain its degree of influence. These include its organizational strength, level of political activity, internal cohesion, representativeness, financial resources and links with a given economic sector (Shain and Barth 2003; Haney and Vanderbush 2005; Rubenzer 2008).

Two American interest groups, which represent ethnic communities, combine several of these conditions and exercise a significant influence on the United States' foreign policy. First, there is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In their book, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt defend the idea that this interest group is so powerful that it encouraged the United States to adopt a foreign policy that was contrary to America's national interest (2007). To prove their point, they suggest that the amount of American military and economic aid given to Israel is disproportionate to the strategic importance that Israel has represented since the end of the Cold War. What is more, America's support for Israel complicates the United States' relations with the entire Muslim world.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to evaluate AIPAC's influence as an interest group. On the one hand, the pro-Israel impulse is driven by diverse interest groups and goes far beyond AIPAC and the Jewish community. On the other hand, AIPAC regularly opposes the powerful oil and arms manufacturing industries when it comes to supporting Arab countries. It is impossible to assess AIPAC's real impact without taking into account the pressure, which is often subtle, exerted by its allies and rivals (Rosenson et al. 2009; Dannreuther 2011).

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) is the other highly influential interest group in matters of American foreign policy. It represents the community of Cubans in exile. CANF was established in 1981 and modeled on AIPAC. It has the same organizational structure, financial strategies and political tactics. It has the additional advantage of being highly concentrated in Florida and New Jersey. Thus, they constitute blocks of voters that are influential at legislative and presidential elections. According to experts, the maintenance of the American embargo on Cuba since the end of the Cold War cannot be explained without taking into account CANF's influence and the one-upmanship that it encouraged between democrats and republicans. But here again, the flows of influence are not as direct and one-way as they may seem.

In reality, the Reagan administration helped set up and develop CANF in the 1980s in the hope of exerting indirect pressure on Congress in line with its conservative ideology. Even after the Cold War, CANF continued to receive substantial public funding and to implement projects

designed by the government. From this angle, CANF's influence partially reflects the influence of American executive power (LeoGrande 1998; Brenner et al. 2002; Haney and Vanderbush 2005; Eckstein 2009; Rubenzer 2011).

This close interweaving between interest groups and part of the state apparatus is not specific to ethnic communities. The most famous example of the confusion between public and private interests is clearly the military–industrial complex denounced by Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell speech:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. [...] We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. (Eisenhower 1961)

After this famous speech, several research studies actually confirmed the close links that united the defense minister and his private suppliers. These groups joined forces and succeeded in convincing Congress to continually increase its military spending and encourage an aggressive foreign policy based on building military capacity. However, it is an extreme case that is certainly not representative of other interest groups or other countries (Melman 1970; Adams and Sokoloff 1982; Kotz 1988).

One methodological strategy involves the simultaneous analysis of several cases, which makes it possible to draw conclusions that are easier to generalize. Elizabeth DeSombre used this approach to study how interest groups influence the positions that America adopts within the framework of different environmental negotiations (2000). Through her qualitative and quantitative analysis, she was able to observe that the United States could be an international leader for environmental protection when NGOs' interests coincide with American business interests. This was the case during the international negotiations on the protection of endangered species and the protection of the ozone layer, two issues for which NGOs, as much as businesses, wanted American standards to be diffused on a global scale. On the other hand, the United States has never been a leader in the fight against desertification or climate change because there

is little NGO campaigning for the former and a number of businesses are firmly opposed to the latter. This observation does not mean that unanimity between the interest groups is a necessary or a sufficient condition for exerting influence. It quite simply means that when their interests are aligned, a proactive foreign policy can be encouraged.

Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page increased further the number of cases in their study of interest groups (2005). To assess the relative influence that different interest groups exert on foreign policy, they used opinion polls of interest groups and American public decision-makers. Using different statistical methods, they observed that the decision-makers' opinion on several foreign policy issues is more in line with business managers than with union leaders. However, over and above this simple observation, it was impossible for them to establish whether decision-makers' preferences were a direct result of the business managers' actions.

A series of quantitative studies examine how ethnic groups influence international conflicts. These studies conclude that the strong presence of an ethnic minority significantly increases the probabilities that their host countries will intervene in a conflict with their country of origin, especially if it is an autocracy. The relationship between ethnic structures and interstate conflicts is well documented. However, the details and conditions for the causal processes remain unclear. General patterns can be identified, but at the expense of a detailed analysis that retraces full causal processes (Davis and Moore 1997; Henderson 1998; King and Melvin 1999; Bélanger et al. 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; Paquin 2008; Koga 2011).

THE EXPERTS

President Eisenhower's farewell speech, quoted earlier, is famous for his denunciation of the military-industrial complex. However, in the same speech, Eisenhower also denounced the excesses of academics, scientists and other experts who have specialized knowledge and increasingly influence public policies. In Eisenhower's view, the association between experts and politics represents as great a threat to democracy as the association between the industry and the military.

Experts are more driven by their causal beliefs than by their material interests. For example, some experts campaign for the liberalization of foreign investment, arguing that such a policy would encourage economic growth, without necessarily hoping to gain personally from liberalization (Chwieroth 2007).

Experts enjoy symbolic capital thanks to their authoritative knowledge, which they use to promote their ideas among political leaders. However, they do not generally have the necessary political and economic leverage to influence public opinion or, indeed, to influence the electoral calculations made by elected representatives. On the other hand, they are socially recognized as privileged holders of expertise, which gives them a certain intellectual authority. This position allows them not only to supply governments with information, but also to help construct the cognitive frame through which information is filtered and interpreted. Therefore, experts' action is more a matter of persuasion than pressure (Antoniades 2003).

Think Tanks

Some experts work with organizations, which are specifically set up for the purpose of persuading decision-makers about the validity of the causal relationships that these experts advocate. These are reflection groups, commonly known as think tanks (Abelson et al. 2017). Several are particularly active on foreign policy, including the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution, the Council of Foreign Relations, Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Crisis Group and the French Institute of International Relations.

Some think tanks have considerable means at their disposal. The Rand Corporation alone has an annual budget of over 200 million dollars and over 1700 employees. Its analyses on rational dissuasion had a significant influence on American foreign policy during the Cold War (Kaplan 1983; Adler 1992; Parmar 2004; Ahmad 2008).

Although think tanks generally present themselves as being independent and apolitical, several are working closely with political parties. In 1975, for instance, experts working at the Brookings Institution wrote a report on how to address the Arab–Israeli conflict, which stagnated under Gerald Ford. This report had a significant impact on Jimmy Carter and was later adopted under his administration. The report changed the US approach to the conflict, and several of its authors were appointed in the Carter administration (Jensehaugen 2014).

In some cases, public authorities provide the impetus to set up a think tank, as well as most of its funding. In other cases, the close relations between think tanks and the government are fed by a constant staff turnover: public decision-makers become experts when they lose

elections and experts enter government when they win. From this perspective, the idea that think tanks and governments are organizations that are independent from each other is an approximation, which can conceal close involvement.

Epistemic Communities

A number of foreign policy analysts are less interested in experts' organizations than in their networks or so-called epistemic communities. Peter Haas defines an epistemic community more precisely as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (1992a: 3).

An epistemic community is a network that is more restricted than an entire discipline or profession. Its members have to share not only causal beliefs and criteria for validating knowledge, but also normative principles and a common political vision (Haas 2016). However, members of an epistemic community can occupy different functions and be involved in diverse organizations. They may be academics, company employees or even civil servants. They may also be active in more than one country and exert an influence on several governments at the same time. During the Bretton Woods Negotiations, for example, the epistemic community of Keynesian economists significantly influenced the British and American governments, from the inside and the outside (Ikenberry 1992; Blyth 2002).

The network approach corresponds to the experts' *modus operandi*. However, it can be difficult for the analyst to delineate the perimeter of an epistemic community and identify its members. Mapping techniques can be used to analyze social networks. A graphic representation of an epistemic community can be constructed on the basis of the links between experts, such as joint publications or shared bibliographic references. Another method involves conducting a discourse analysis or a content analysis in order to identify the experts who share principles, beliefs and doctrinal prescriptions. However, members of an epistemic community cannot be precisely and confidently identified with either of the two methods. In the first case, the analyst has to presume that the experts with close links also share causal and normative beliefs. In the second case, he must presume that the experts who share beliefs operate in the same network. Each time, the analyst runs the risk of overestimating the magnitude of an epistemic community (Roth and Bourgine 2005).

Delineating an epistemic community is methodologically challenging. So much so, that a number of studies stop at this stage and do not assess the scope of the community's influence (Sebenius 1992). Some case studies have shown that epistemic communities had influenced foreign policy. This was particularly the case during international environmental negotiations, including negotiations relating to the ozone layer, acid rain, the Mediterranean Basin and climate change (Haas 1990, 1992b; Zito 2001). However, over and above this observation, the extent of the epistemic communities' influence remains uncertain. Too few studies manage to consider their endogenous problems (Chwieroth 2007b), separate their influence from their allies' influence (Toke 1999) or compare their influence to their rivals' influence (Jacobs and Page 2005).

Different epistemic communities have varying degrees of influence. In some cases, their influence is significant and in others it is marginal. Although epistemic communities appear to have had a significant influence in the framework of several environmental negotiations, this is not an absolute rule. For example, in the case of whale protection, in addition to pressure from the epistemic community of cetologists, industry groups and environmental NGOs have both exerted a major influence in countries that actively support the international moratorium on whaling, as well as in countries that oppose it (Peterson 1992).

Explaining the conditions for this variation is problematic. The epistemic community's size and the stage of the decision-making process do not appear to be determining factors (Adler and Haas 1992). On the other hand, decision-makers' ideological predisposition, in terms of how receptive they are to the epistemic community's ideas, and the opportunity to promote ideas on an institutional level, appear to be prerequisites (Haas 1990; Checkel 1993; Newman 2008; Eriksson and Norman 2010). A series of additional factors may amplify an epistemic community's influence, including support from an NGO coalition, a high degree of uncertainty, a crisis situation and a weak opposition (Zito 2001).

Experts' Predictions

A group of experts may have a significant influence on a foreign policy, but that is no guarantee that the policy will be wise and judicious. Experts are often not only wrong. Worst, they are often overconfident in the validity of their knowledge.

Philip Tetlock reached this conclusion after conducting a large-scale longitudinal experiment (2005). He began by asking recognized experts to formulate a series of predictions in several domains, including foreign policy, and to evaluate the degree of confidence in the validity of their predictions. Twenty years later, Tetlock observed that experts were no better at making predictions than well-informed citizens. In fact, the more specialized an expert is in a particular field, the more confident he is about his predictions and the more likely they are to be erroneous. Tetlock concluded that knowledge could increase the illusion of certainty, making experts impervious to information that contradicts their assumptions.

When experts' predictions are correct, it is not necessarily because they are based on a detailed rigorous analysis. In some cases, the experts' influence helps generate the events that they predict. They are "self-fulfilling prophecies". For example, if foreign policy experts at Tokyo University or at the French National School of Administration teach students that democracies do not wage war against each other, the Japanese and French elite are likely to integrate this line in their belief system and to perceive the world through this bias. When they become leaders of their country, they will have greater confidence in other democracies and will generally resolve their differences through peaceful means (Risse-Kappen 1995; Houghton 2009).

On the other hand, if experts at Moscow's State Institute of International Relations argue that the scarcity of natural resources encourages military conflicts, shortages will effectively generate mistrust at the Kremlin and some Russian leaders may be tempted to launch preventive attacks (Haas 2002). In addition, if experts consider that in the next few decades one of the main lines of confrontation will set the Western world against Islamic civilization, the governments that are convinced by this prediction actually run the risk of contributing to its fulfillment (Bottici and Challand 2006; Eriksson and Norman 2010).

Thus, foreign policy analysts do not position themselves outside the world that they strive to explain or understand; they are also actors. Their ideas are not simply a reflection of foreign policies; they help shape them. From this perspective, the distinctions between the observer and the observed, like that between reality and ideas, are not as clear as they may seem at first glance or as we would like to believe. This is a mundane observation for anthropologists, but is still novel and disconcerting for a number of foreign policy analysts.

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How Does Rationality Apply to FPA and What Are Its Limitations?

Rationality is a key concept in all fields of social science, and in Western civilization, more generally. The rationalist paradigm provides an illusion of control, which may partly explain why it is so deep-rooted. The claim that actors behave rationally suggests that their behavior follows certain patterns and can be explained by an outside observer or even modeled, predicted and manipulated. On the contrary, the belief that behavior is governed by destiny, chance or impulses is extremely destabilizing. Analysts and political decision-makers alike may feel destabilized when confronted with behavior that is interpreted as being irrational (Mandel 1984).

The rationalist paradigm covers a vast range of theoretical approaches (Kahler 1998; Quackenbush 2004). What is sometimes called “rational choice theory” is not a specific theory, but a set of assumptions, which forms the basis for several theoretical approaches. For example, diversion theory and bureaucratic politics are both based on rational choice theory. This chapter defines the notion of rationality, highlights the potential of modeling rational behavior and proposes several adjustments to counter its most frequent criticisms.

RATIONAL CHOICE

The concept of rationality has several meanings. In the framework of rational choice theory, it is important to avoid interpreting rationality as the pursuit of good, fairness or truth. A foreign policy decision that is qualified

as rational is not necessarily the result of an inclusive process where participants share a common objective and genuinely strive to reach a consensus, nor is it the decision that allows an actor to reach his goals or contribute to the common good.

Instead, rational choice theory suggests that no matter how actors behave, they are expected-utility-maximizing agents. At first glance, this idea of rationality may seem rather modest or even trivial: an actor acts because he thinks he can benefit from his action. However, this definition raises several fundamental methodological, theoretical and political questions.

From Micro-Economics to Foreign Policy

The idea that actors' behavior is guided by the desire to maximize their utility stems from micro-economics. Micro-economics does not actually dictate the procedures that a consumer should follow before buying a good, any more than it claims which is the best possible purchase for consumers overall. It simply suggests that consumers will buy the good that represents the best cost/benefit ratio in their eyes, taking into account the information available.

When applied to FPA, this form of rationality can help explain the position adopted by states during international negotiations. For example, states that are actively calling for the adoption of international environmental standards are often those that have the most to gain; in other words, they are the most vulnerable to environmental degradation and the least affected by abatement costs. In Scandinavian countries, the incidence of skin cancer is particularly high and is likely to increase with the depletion of the ozone layer, which absorbs some of the sun's ultraviolet rays. In addition, their CFC emissions, one of the main ozone-depleting gases, have always been low. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Scandinavian countries initiated the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer. France, however, was a major CFC producer and exporter in the 1980s and initially held up the negotiations on protecting the ozone layer. According to rational choice approach, we can deduce that the Scandinavian countries' enthusiasm to protect the ozone, like France's resistance, was driven by their rationality, rather than by collective values or moral imperatives (Sprinz and Vaahantoranta 1994).

Rational choice theory considers that actors' behavior is based on comparative analyses, which integrate their own criteria, to determine the costs

and benefits associated with the different options. From this point of view, the notion of rationality can be broken down into three distinct assumptions. First, actors are conscious of making choices. They are not bound to routine, which could lead them to follow a given path blindly. Second, the actors systematically classify, by order of preference, the different possible actions, including the option of doing nothing. The order is both complete and transitive; in other words, it includes all the possibilities, and the preferences are mutually coherent. Third, actors act in accordance with the option that maximizes their utility, by considering the information available and the associated risks. They do not suppress their preferences simply to conform to moral values or tradition.

In micro-economics, as in FPA, rational choice theory is based on the paradigm of methodological individualism. Despite its name, this paradigm does not mean that the actors in the system are real individuals. On the contrary, rational choice theory is based on rationality that is separate from any individual cerebral mechanism. The paradigm of methodological individualism means that collective phenomena can be explained by the actors' attributes and interactions. The economic agents' preferences determine the balance between supply and demand in the same way that state preferences determine the possibilities of international cooperation. This is a bottom-up approach from units to the system. In this context, rationality can be attributed to human beings, but also to aggregate bodies, such as businesses, ministries or states, as long as these units are considered to be components of a system.

In addition, rational choice theory does not make any assumptions about actors' preferences. More specific theories add to rationality certain assumptions on subjective utility. In micro-economics, utility can be defined as a function of sale price, delivery schedules, product quality, brand image or any other factor that economic agents consider important. In foreign policy, the concept of utility can be defined as a function of a state's pursuit of security, power, electoral support or wealth, among others.

Most theories based on the notion of rational choice consider that actors share the same utility function, defined by a single criterion and the same risk tolerance. Nonetheless, rational choice theory does not impose any such constraints. We can imagine a theory based on variable utilities with multiple criteria, including intrinsic aspects of motivation, like self-esteem. Behavior based on this form of utility may appear altruistic or self-defeating, but it is no less egotistic and rational.

Substitutability of Foreign Policies

Rational choice theory presumes that actors are confronted with choices. In FPA, the idea of choice is generally expressed via the notion of the substitutability of policies. This means that when decision-makers are faced with a problem, they can respond with different policies. It does not mean that all policies are equivalent on an operational basis or that they lead to the same outcome. The substitutability of policies simply supposes that, depending on the context, a decision-maker can resort to one policy or another to deal with a given problem. For example, in the face of the growing threat from a hostile power, one state will mobilize the army, another state will appeal to its traditional allies, a third may launch a preventive strike, a fourth will finance clandestine target operations, a fifth will impose sanctions and a sixth will not change its policies at all. In this perspective, foreign policy is not so much determined by the problem that arises as by the conditions that influence the availability and relative interest of each policy (Most and Starr 1984; Most and Siverson 1987; Diehl 1994; Palmer and Souchet 1994; Palmer and Bhandari 2000; Regan 2000; Starr 2000; Narizny 2003; Milner and Tingley 2011).

In order to implement a policy, it must first be available. The availability of a policy actually depends on material, human and financial conditions. Some less-developed countries have no permanent representative in Geneva, which means effective socialization is difficult, not to mention sanctions or intervention. Even the most powerful countries, which are already overexposed on the international stage, may no longer have sufficient available resources to resort to certain instruments.

The availability of a policy also depends on opportunities. Thus, declaring war on another country when relations with that country are tense, but stable and constant, requires a pretext or a trigger event to justify the action. Yet, when an interactive dynamic exists, a state can strategically limit the range of policies available to its rival by meeting its rival's demands (Leeds and Davis 1997; Clark and Regan 2003; Clark and Reed 2005; Brûlé et al. 2010; Mitchell and Thyne 2010).

In other cases, social or legal norms restrict the availability of a policy. For example, an American law prohibits the administration from offering economic aid to countries that repeatedly violate human rights. This constraint led the American administration to substitute economic aid with food aid, which was given disproportionately to countries with a poor human rights record (Brûlé 2006; Fariss 2010).

Availability is not enough in itself to explain why a policy is adopted. A policy must have some relative interest. In other words, it should generate profits and minimize losses or reduce risks more than the other available policies. In a rationalist approach, the use of a policy does not depend on its absolute interest, but on its relative interest, which is measured in relation to the other available options. Therefore, rational choice involves not only establishing a cost/benefit ratio for a given policy, but also comparing different cost/benefit ratios associated with different policies. It can even be rational to choose an apparently ineffective policy to reach a particular goal if it is genuinely less risky or less expensive than the other policies available.

This is how David Baldwin explains the fact that Western countries frequently resort to economic sanctions, although it is well known that they rarely change the target country's behavior. In Baldwin's view, "If the menu of choice includes only the options of sinking or swimming, the observation that swimming is a 'notoriously poor' way to get from one place to another is not very helpful" (1999: 84). Economic sanctions may be applied as the last acceptable measure to condemn a country's behavior before a situation spirals out of control. While sanctions are unsatisfactory, they sometimes constitute the best available policy from the point of view of rational choice (Whang 2011).

Policy substitutability is a widespread idea in FPA. For example, it provides the basis for studies that compare the efficacy of diverse instruments used to transfer a policy from one state to another. Some analysts suggest that socialization is more effective than coercion. On the contrary, some suggest that manipulating interests has a greater impact than tampering with ideas. Despite reaching contradictory conclusions, these studies make the same assumption about policy substitution because they imply that decision-makers can choose between coercion and socialization to achieve a given objective (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Elkins et al. 2006; Cao 2009).

In addition, policy substitution can be used to solve certain methodological problems. A researcher who wishes to identify a generalizable causal relationship, using a quantitative analysis, cannot base case selection on the value of the dependent variable. This bias in case selection would constitute a serious methodological flaw. Thus, a project that aims to explain why Brazil resorted to financial sanctions should not be limited to cases where sanctions were actually imposed. It should also take into account cases where financial sanctions were not imposed. However, since

it is difficult to identify non-events, the researcher can include substitutable policies as a basis for comparison in the analysis. If we consider that trade sanctions can be substituted by financial sanctions, examining the context where Brazil resorted to trade sanctions would help reduce the case selection bias and identify specific conditions that led to the application of financial sanctions.

Nonetheless, policies substitutability is merely an assumption. The withdrawal of one policy and the deployment of another can be directly observed by the analyst. However, the actual decision leading to the substitution is rarely observed (Clark and Reed 2005). A small number of inconclusive studies have attempted to demonstrate the substitutability of policies, rather than applying the concept to examine a different phenomenon. At least, an increase in resources allocated to one instrument does not generally lead to a reduction in the resources allocated to other instruments, despite the implication of the idea of policy substitutability. Foreign policies often appear to be more complementary than substitutable (McGinnis 2000; Morgan and Palmer 2000 and 2003; Palmer et al. 2002; Starr 2000; Clark et al. 2008; Arena 2010).

Rational Deterrence

Rational choice theory does not simply provide a static explanation of the behavior of an actor taken out of context. It can also explain strategic interactions between actors. Here, the term “strategy” means that actors’ preferences take into account the expected behavior of other actors, who are also presumed to be rational and strategic (Lake and Powell 1999).

This strategic dimension is at the very heart of rational deterrence theory. The theory suggests that a state can guarantee its security by persuading its adversaries that an attack would lead to severe repercussions at a cost that would clearly offset any potential gains. In this perspective, the unlimited accumulation of nuclear weapons is part of a rational strategic approach to defense (Brodie 1959; Snyder 1961; Russett 1967; Morgan 1977; Jervis 1989a, b; Lebow and Stein 1989; Archen and Snidal 1989; Quackenbush 2010; Zwald 2013).

During the Cold War, American decision-makers drew widely on rational deterrence theory. Many of them were convinced that their Soviet adversaries were acting rationally. On that basis, they thought that a clearly stated and credible deterrence would be effective. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed that “[t]he Russians are great chess players and

their moves in the world situation are... attempted to be calculated as closely and carefully as though they were making moves in a chess game” (Jervis 1976: 320; see also Kaplan 1983; Snyder 1991; Adler 1992; Etheredge 1992).

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons complicated the American strategy. There is no doubt that a nuclear attack from either of the warring parties would have generated a similar riposte, gradually leading to mutual destruction. To avoid this apocalyptic scenario, the United States implemented a strategy drawn from rational deterrence theory: brinkmanship. Peace and security must be guaranteed by an extremely high level of risk and a formidable capacity to retaliate. Thus, the United States proposed signing a treaty with the Soviet Union to restrict antiballistic missiles because this type of defensive weapon makes attacks less dangerous and, therefore, more likely (Kahn 1966).

There is no doubt that the United States was also preparing for a limited nuclear war. From a rationalist perspective, a limited nuclear war was probable because, beyond a certain threshold, one of the warring parties would prefer defeat to annihilation. Nonetheless, openly divulging a preference for a limited war would be irrational because it would diminish the credibility of deterrence.

The key to rational deterrence is precisely to communicate a clear threat and make it as credible as possible. Several strategies can be used to this end. One involves forging official and public alliances with other countries. The public nature of a treaty, like NATO, increases the likelihood that allies will honor their commitments and retaliate when one of their members is attacked. If they renounce their commitments, their reputation will be damaged, both nationally and internationally.

Recent theoretical discussions on rational deterrence focus on reputational costs. Some analysts consider that reputational costs are a prerequisite for effective deterrence, without which threats would be perceived as bluff and not taken seriously. In this way, democracies may gain from their vulnerability to reputational costs. Since an elected representative who yields to an enemy is likely to be sanctioned at the next elections, their threats are more credible and their deterrence more effective than those of a firmly established dictator. Other analysts do not consider reputational costs as a prerequisite for deterrence to prevent enemy attacks. They maintain that simply communicating threats has a psychological impact. It generates aggression in the party making the threats and fear in the party on the receiving end, which makes deterrence effective (Fearon 1994, 1995;

Morrow 2000; Danilovic 2001; Schultz 2001; Powell 2003; Zagare 2004; Tomz 2007; Allen and Fordham 2011; Ramsay 2011; Tingley and Walter 2011; Trager 2011).

One thing is certain—reputational costs are not sufficient, nor is transparency infallible when it comes to a deterrence strategy. An enemy can estimate the reputational cost of defection and offer compensation to the ruling elite so that it renounces its commitments and abandons retaliatory measures. After the Six-Day War, for example, Egypt signed the Khartoum Resolution, which was an affirmation of Arab solidarity in the face of the Israeli enemy. Ten years later, Israel and the United States managed to convince Egyptian President Sadat to repudiate the Khartoum Resolution and engage in a peace process. When Sadat signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and there were strong protests from Egyptian Islamist groups. However, this reputational cost was compensated for by the restitution of Sinai and a massive amount of economic and military aid from the United States (Sechser 2010).

Another strategy to make deterrence more credible is to feign irrationality. In fact, a foreign policy that seems impulsive and erratic may be a rational strategy to make enemies believe that in the event of an attack, retaliation might be disproportionate. This could be North Korea's defense strategy. From the point of view of foreign powers, North Korea is hermetic and unpredictable in equal measure (Lankov 2015).

In the name of deterrence credibility, some analysts have even gone as far as imagining a computerized system of counterattack, which automatically launches nuclear missiles at the slightest offensive and excludes the possibility of any human intervention to prevent the launches—doomsday software that programs the end of the world, which is designed to save humanity from just that (Schelling 1966; Howard 1971; Powell 1990).

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union actually possessed a semi-automatic nuclear retaliation system designed to go off if the Soviet command was wiped out (Hoffman 2009). However, contrary to the logic of rational deterrence, the Soviet Union did not divulge this information to the Americans and, therefore, did not make the most of its power of deterrence. In fact, the Soviet Union quite simply did not appear to subscribe to the logic of rational deterrence established by the United States in terms of how it behaved and how it anticipated its enemies' behavior (Booth 1979).

Soviet behavior during the Cold War is not the only empirical anomaly revealed by the critics of rational deterrence theory. History abounds with examples of clear credible threats that failed to deter enemies. Japanese government's persistent refusal to surrender after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima is doubtless one of the most striking cases. Over and above the simple Japanese case, possessing the atomic weapon does not seem to be a very effective deterrent in most conflicts where nuclear powers are set against countries that only have conventional weapons. More generally, if every war ends with the defeat of at least one of the parties, it follows that the losing party miscalculated when it engaged in the conflict, either by underestimating its enemy's capacity to retaliate or by overestimating its own capacity to retaliate (George and Smoke 1974; Huth and Russett 1984; Geller 1990; Gartzke 1999).

In general, proponents of rational choice theory consider that asymmetric information causes disparities between rational deterrence logic and mistakes in foreign policy. The actors cannot identify and assess all the possible options because only partial information is available regarding their enemies' determination, their capacities, constraints and motivation. Furthermore, actors can be misled by incorrect information, which their enemies may transmit strategically. Therefore, the chess metaphor analogy mentioned by Dulles is not quite true. In chess, each player is fully aware of their adversary's ultimate goal and all their previous moves, which is not the case in foreign policy (Morrow 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Fearon 1995).

Although decision-makers may be able to obtain more information, particularly through intelligence activities, searching for information is generally an expensive, lengthy and dangerous process. It would be irrational to wait until all the relevant information is available before taking action. A rational actor must reason with Bayesian inferences. This means that he has to act solely on the basis of the diverse probabilities established from partial information, which is obtained incrementally. Thus, in 1967, when Nasser's aggressive behavior led to a humiliating defeat and territorial loss for Egypt, it was not because he acted irrationally, but because of the uncertainty surrounding Israel's policies (Mor 1991). Rational deterrence theory does not imply that actors are infallible, and the failure of certain deterrence policies does not make it any less valid.

MODELING RATIONALITY

Despite its shaky assumptions, the main advantage of rational choice theory is that it provides the basis for modeling behavior. Indeed, behavior can be anticipated if it follows an identifiable, predictable and stable logic. Game theory, cybernetic theory and the two-level game set out to achieve just that.

Game Theory

Strictly speaking, game theory is not a theory. It is more of a methodological approach that can be adapted to all rationalist theories. More specifically, game theory is a mode of deductive reasoning based on formal modeling. The starting point for reflection is always a set of premises about actors' attributes, which generally includes rationality. This is introduced into a matrix of interactions. These "rules of the game" allow us to determine the strategic behavior of each actor and the outcome of their interactions. This methodological approach, initially developed in economics, was rapidly integrated into FPA (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Jervis 1978; Stein 1982; Axelrod 1984; Snidal 1985; Martin 1992; Morrow 1994; Wolford 2014).

The matrices below represent simple configurations with just two players that have to choose between two options. Their preferences are expressed numerically from 0 to 4. Here, the players strive to achieve absolute rather than relative gains. In other words, they attempt to get as close to 4 as possible without necessarily surpassing the other player's gains. It is a non-zero-sum game: the sum of the gains of both players does not necessarily add up to zero. However, the players are interdependent. The gains achieved by one player depend not only on their own behavior, but on the other player's behavior as well. Therefore, they must act strategically, by anticipating their opponent's likely behavior.

Harmony is the simplest and least common configuration. In this matrix, both player A and player B will inevitably choose option 1. Irrespective of the other player's behavior, the gains brought by the first option—3 or 4—are greater than the gains from the second option—1 or 2. As the players are rational, they will obviously converge toward the top-left quadrant and will both win 4. This quadrant represents a *Nash equilibrium*: no player can gain from a unilateral change in his or her strategy. This quadrant is also Pareto-optimal, which means that no other

Fig. 7.1 Harmony

		Player A	
		Option 1	Option 2
Player B	Option 1	4 / 4	1 / 3
	Option 2	1 / 3	2 / 2

combination can increase the gains of one player without decreasing the gains of the other. This configuration is qualified as harmonious because the equilibrium is optimal (Fig. 7.1).

The problem known as the “battle of the sexes” represents a more common situation. The name relates to a problem that lovers with different interests are faced with when they have to choose a joint activity. If one would rather go to the opera and the other would rather go to a boxing match, but above all, they would both prefer spending an evening together, how will they decide between the two Nash equilibria? One may impose his preferences, by taking the initiative and buying the tickets. However, they inevitably have to coordinate if they want to avoid ending up on their own at a show that they do not really enjoy.

In FPA, this situation arises in several negotiations relating to the establishment of technical standards, especially in the field of telecommunications and transport. French-speaking countries no doubt want French to be the official language for international civil aviation and Spanish-speaking countries would obviously prefer Spanish. However, above all, everyone wants the pilots and the control towers to share a common language, even if it is not their national language. Once a decision is reached, the Nash equilibrium makes any unilateral change unlikely. The dominant strategy will be maintained even if it does not lead to the most favorable result for a given player (Fig. 7.2).

		Player A	
		Option 1	Option 2
Player B	Option 1	3 4	1 1
	Option 2	0 0	4 3

Fig. 7.2 The Battle of the Sexes

The problem of the “prisoner’s dilemma” is characterized by the presence of an optimum that is not in a stable equilibrium. Unlike the battle of the sexes, the two players here share a common interest, located in the top-left quadrant, as opposed to a common aversion. However, this optimum is unstable because the dominant strategy of both players is option 2, which makes the bottom-right quadrant the point of equilibrium.

This problem arises if two criminals suspected of robbery are interrogated separately. By testifying against their accomplice, they may hope to gain a lighter sentence, unless their accomplice also testifies against them. The optimal outcome is to stand together so that the police authorities have no overwhelming evidence against either of them. Despite this, they are likely to denounce one another because they do not know how the other will respond.

In order to move from a balanced situation to an optimal situation, players caught in this kind of dilemma must work together. A prior agreement on the attitude to adopt does not suffice. When they each make their decision, they will be tempted to betray their commitment in the hope of realizing further gains.

To overcome this problem, both players must establish a relationship of trust. Repeating the interaction several times is one way to achieve this. Iteration is a method of obtaining information about past experiences. It also creates an incentive to cooperate by providing a common outlook.

When iteration is not an option, the players can increase their level of confidence by adding sanction and surveillance mechanisms to the rules of the game to neutralize the incentives for defection. A mafia group, which systematically eliminates a traitor’s entire family, can be confident that its members will not become informers when subject to police interrogation.

The prisoner’s dilemma is a problem typical of free-trade negotiations and arms reduction. The economic theory of comparative advantage states that free-trade is beneficial for all partners. Nonetheless, signatories to a free-trade agreement may be tempted to disregard the reciprocity principle and protect their domestic market, while taking advantage of preferential access to foreign markets. Similarly, if we accept that nuclear powers can contribute to peace by simultaneously reducing their arsenal, they may benefit individually from concealing some of their own weapons, while the other parties disarm. Disarmament and trade regimes often use inspection and arbitration mechanisms, respectively, to counteract the incentives to defect (Fig. 7.3).

		Player A	
		Option 1	Option 2
Player B	Option 1	3 / 3	4 / 0
	Option 2	4 / 0	2 / 2

Fig. 7.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma

The stag hunt represents a similar situation to the prisoner's dilemma. However, the incentive to defect is motivated by a strategy of caution in response to the other player's uncertain behavior, rather than by the prospects of further gains. If a hunter is worried that their hunting partner will open fire when the first hare appears and scare off all the stags in the woods in the process, they will also be tempted to shoot small game. Although of less interest, small game is an easier target.

Creditor countries face this type of dilemma when they decide to allocate a loan to a country with dubious credibility. Creditors can refuse a loan even if all parties stand to gain. This may occur if the creditors are worried that the authorities in the debtor country will adopt short-sighted policies, such as currency devaluation that triggers marked inflation, rather than safeguarding their long-term interests, by reforming their economic structures. In other words, the fear of an inflationist policy can scare off foreign investors, which is as great a loss to the creditors as to the debtors (Fig. 7.4).

The game of chicken combines the features of the previous games. It has two equilibrium points, as in the battle of the sexes, but one unstable optimum, as in the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. It is a game that recalls a famous scene from American cinema: two reckless teenagers

		Player A	
		Option 1	Option 2
Player B	Option 1	2 / 2	1 / 0
	Option 2	1 / 0	1 / 1

Fig. 7.4 The Stag Hunt

		Player A	
		Option 1	Option 2
Player B	Option 1	3 / 3	4 / 2
	Option 2	4 / 2	0 / 0

Fig. 7.5 The Game of Chicken

measure up their courage by driving their cars into each other to see who is the greater coward and who makes the other turn away first. This situation is familiar to negotiators who may find it advantageous to appear more uncompromising than they really are, in the hope that their interlocutors will be the first to give way. However, they run the risk of stalling negotiations (Fig. 7.5).

The game of chicken and the other models presented here are no more than basic configurations. The models developed in FPA are increasingly complex. Some models depict several series of actions over time. Some models recognize that the information available to players is imperfect or incomplete. Some models multiply the number of players, stakes and possible options (Kim and Bueno de Mesquita 1995; Wagner 2000; Reiter 2003).

However, game theory remains controversial as a methodological approach. It has sparked an epistemological debate that focuses, more generally, on the rationalist paradigm overall. There is a minority view that game theory reveals invisible but real causal mechanisms. Even when actors are not necessarily aware of all the rules that may affect their operations, their behavior is governed by these rules. Nonetheless, most

analysts consider that rationalist assumptions, which are central to game theory, are pure fiction. Humans and organizations are not strictly rational actors and do not react to rules as computers would (McDonald 2003).

However, within the majority, which views rationality as a fiction, there is fierce disagreement. One subgroup claims that it is a harmful fiction, which distances FPA research from genuine decision-making processes. This group maintains that the more complex the game theory, the more inept and useless it will be (Green and Shapiro 1994; Walt 1999). However, some analysts consider that the rationalist fiction of game theory could be useful for generating hypotheses and making predictions. Even if international actors are not genuinely rational, they behave as if they were. Therefore, game theory may have some predictive value despite its lack of descriptive value. After all, physics has also evolved by integrating variables that do not exist in the empirical world, such as the perfect vacuum (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1984, 1998; Archen and Snidal 1989; Quackenbush 2004).

However, everyone recognizes that modeling in physics or FPA is of little interest if all the variables in the equations correspond to fictitious ideas (Lebow and Stein 1989). Certain analysts are more flexible about the premise that players are rational, to ensure that game theory complies with real decision-making procedures. Instead, they adopt the assumption of “bounded rationality”, as defined in cybernetic theory (Bendor and Hammond 1992; Bueno de Mesquita 1997).

Cybernetic Theory

In Herbert Simon’s view, the environment is too complex and human capacities too limited for the premise of pure rationality to be realistic (1982). Actors are unable to access all the relevant information, assimilate all the information they receive, identify all the available options for action and assess all the consequences of a possible action. Therefore, it is illusory to believe that their behavior maximizes their utility. Simon considers that actors maneuver through the complexity of the real world by simply choosing the first satisfactory option. He calls this “bounded rationality”, an adjustment of rational choice theory, which earned him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978.

Several theories have been built on the notion of bounded rationality, including the garbage can theory and the organizational model referred to in previous chapters and cybernetic theory presented here. All three

theories can be used to analyze the decision-making process of any type of organization. Cybernetic theory is as pertinent for analyzing the behavior of a company as it is for analyzing the behavior of a state. In matters of foreign policy, the theory was developed by John Steinbruner in his work on nuclear cooperation (1974, 1976).

Cybernetic theory in FPA is composed of three main assumptions. The first suggests that decision-makers consider a policy to be satisfactory if it helps maintain certain basic motivating values. These values are directly linked to the decision-makers' political survival, for example, maintaining popular support above 40%, keeping military primacy in a given region or GDP growth rate above 2%. Decision-makers consider that focusing on a limited number of basic values simplifies their search for information significantly.

The second assumption is that decision-makers maintain policies until one of the values goes beyond acceptable parameters. It is only when this type of negative feedback is perceived that decision-makers realize that their policy is no longer satisfactory and should be changed. Conversely, if feedback remains positive or if no stimulus is perceived, the policy is kept in place even when it is suboptimal in reality. This logic encourages continuity and explains why foreign policy is relatively stable and constant (Volgy and Schwarz 1991; Sylvan and Majeski 2009).

Cybernetic theory's third assumption is that when there is negative feedback and an adjustment is required, decision-makers do not base their decision on a systematic comparison of all the available policies. Instead, they gradually examine the different policies one after another, as they appear. In this sequential process, they choose the first policy that allows them to bring the basic values within the boundaries of tolerance. Therefore, they do not need to calculate the specific return of a given policy or to conduct complex comparative analyses. They merely adapt to guarantee their survival (Lindblom 1959).

One illustration of cybernetic adaptation is the position of a cat in a house. A cat's decision to sleep in one place rather than another depends on a limited number of basic values, including the scope of the field of vision and heat. If the cat sleeps three meters away from a chimney, it will stay there until the fire dies down and the temperature that it feels on its skin drops below its level of tolerance. It will then adapt by walking in different directions until it finds a satisfactory new position, sufficiently close to the fire to be warmed up, but not too close to avoid being burnt. A cat obviously lacks the rationality that rational choice theory attributes to

actors: it does not calculate a fire's optimum radiation radius as a function of its calorific output. Nonetheless, it always manages to adapt and find a satisfactory location.

In a similar way, members of the US Congress do not calculate the optimum amounts of money to allocate to military expenditure every year. Instead, they adjust the military budget gradually on the basis of the previous year's military spending. To determine whether they should increase or reduce spending, they take into account certain fundamental factors, such as the evolution in the arsenal of America's main rivals and the change in tax revenues. If the basic values remain within the framework of acceptable parameters, the budget allocated the previous year will probably be renewed for another year (Ostrom 1977; Marra 1985).

Unlike rational choice theory, cybernetic theory recognizes that decision-makers can choose and maintain policies that do not maximize their utility. On the other hand, reasoning on the basis of satisfaction is not irrational given the complexity of the environment and the actors' limited capacities. Actors orient their behavior as a function of their goals and manage to adapt to their environment fairly quickly and effectively. They do not have to explain the continuity or change in their environment in order to adapt to it. They simply have to focus on specific parameters (Girerzenzer and Goldstein 1996; Jones 1999).

This pattern allows the analyst to decode behavioral rules, by carefully observing variations in governments' reactions (Kuperaman 2001). Once the rules have been identified, they can be integrated in a model designed to predict, more or less successfully, how states will behave. For example, in a well-known article, Charles Ostrom and Brian Job (1986) modeled the American decisions to resort to military force on the basis of only ten parameters: three concerned the international environment, four related to the national context and three were linked to the president's political situation. By combining the ten parameters, they managed to explain 71% of military action and 79% of the non-use of military force. They suggested that anticipating the future would have a similar success rate. Cybernetic modeling is clearly imperfect, but it seems to correspond to empirical realities better than modeling based on pure rationality.

Two-Level Game

Robert Putnam's two-level game (1988) is a rational theory that explains strategic interactions between actors. The two-level game studies the ongoing interactions between the national and international levels during

international negotiations. The theory proposes that each state is represented by a single figure called “the chief negotiator”. To reach an international agreement, the chief negotiator must negotiate on two levels simultaneously. On the one hand, the negotiator must find common ground with his foreign counterparts on the international level. On the other hand, he must make sure that he has the support of the domestic political actors who will ultimately ratify the agreement on the national level. Thus, the chief negotiator is caught in a stranglehold and is under pressure from both sides.

Putnam’s argument, both simple and convincing, is based on the notion of the “win-set”, that is, the set of possibilities for international agreement that would be acceptable by political and social actors at the domestic level. The win-set can be broad or narrow, depending on national preferences. Putnam argues that when the win-sets of different bargaining units overlap, the conclusion of an international agreement becomes possible. However, the narrower the win-set is defined by national stakeholders, the more leverage a negotiator has over its foreign counterparts, but the riskier the negotiations may stumble.

A narrow win-set strengthens the chief negotiator’s position. This phenomenon occurs because national constraints can be transformed into international opportunities. When a chief negotiator’s hands are tied on the domestic front, it gives him some credibility when he informs his international interlocutors that he cannot accept an agreement exceeding the limits set by the national actors (Goldstein 1996). Several governments use this strategy to obtain agreements that are more in line with their interests. For example, when governments negotiate IMF loans, those that face strong political protests generally obtain more advantageous loans than others (Caraway et al. 2012). At the European level, the Danish parliament’s control over the executive makes Denmark one of the countries that wield the most power over the European institutional negotiations (Pahre 1997; Slapin 2006; König and Slapin 2004).

However, several aborted negotiations can be put down to the narrowness of the win-sets. This was the case for the failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations at the WTO and for the continued conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Japan over the Senkaku-Diaoyutai Islands. Protectionists groups in the first case and nationalists in the second put so much pressure on negotiators that their respective win-sets failed to overlap, ruling out any possibility of compromise (Downs and Saunders 1998; He 2007; Chung 2007). The identification of the win-set

thus allows the negotiator to develop a strategy and to calibrate its power relationship in the negotiations that he/she conducts with both foreigners and domestic actors.

Three main variables affect the scope of the win-set. The first is the extent of the institutional constraint. For example, a country's constitution may require approval from parliament, the federal states or even a referendum in order to ratify a treaty. This constraint is likely to reduce the negotiator's flexibility. This is the case in the United States, where the chief negotiator's win-set for climate change, a very sensitive issue, is significantly reduced by the Senate's prerogatives (Milner 1997; Harrison 2007). The diplomatic negotiations led by Secretary of State John Kerry on the Iranian nuclear program were marked by the same constraints (Hurst 2016).

The second variable is the degree of cohesion and mobilization of social actors, including companies, NGOs and ethnic minorities. If actors express their preferences forcefully, the chief negotiator cannot ignore them, which reduces his room for maneuver. During the negotiations on the multilateral investment agreement held at the end of the 1990s, almost all French political forces were fiercely opposed to any agreement that failed to include an exception for the cultural industries. This reduced the French government's win-set to virtually nothing (Morin and Gagne 2007).

The third variable that determines the scope of a win-set includes the strategies deployed by the negotiators themselves. Various strategies can reduce the win-set, such as linking two distinct questions, encouraging external transparency, increasing the number of actors involved, exploring alternative solutions and planning a flexible timetable (Mayer 1992). The Indian government initially managed to maintain a relatively narrow win-set, when negotiating an IMF loan in 1980, before the monetary crisis forced it to accept stricter conditions (Dash 1999). The Russian government under Vladimir Putin used the opposite strategy. It deliberately delayed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in order to raise the stakes between the United States and the EU, forcing them to broaden their respective win-sets (Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom 2007).

Most authors who use the two-level game theory are interested in economic negotiations, as illustrated by most examples mentioned so far. However, in the absence of a formal negotiation framework, the theory can be applied to explain security tensions and conflicts. A political leader can promote international security constraints to increase his room for maneuver on the national political stage. Several dictators use this strategy, by stirring

up an external threat to maintain a centralized authoritarian regime. In Egypt, the state of emergency was maintained almost continuously for over 40 years after the Six-Day War. It was used to justify the repression of the Egyptian political opposition (Trumbore and Boyer 2000).

Several authors, who prefer a more empirical approach, have adapted it to different categories of actors, including the transnational networks of non-state actors (Morin 2010) and regional organizations (Patterson 1997; Larsén 2007). These diverse contributions have answered some of the criticisms leveled against Putnam's original theory, including its state-centric nature and its failure to take account of bureaucratic rivalries.

RATIONALITY AND COGNITION

The major shortcomings of rational choice theory have more to do with the intrinsic constraints linked to the actors themselves than with environmental constraints linked to access to information. Organizational weaknesses and cognitive bias often lead to errors of perception and interpretation. These errors, in turn, cause the actors' behavior to deviate from the predictions established by rational choice theory (Green and Shapiro 1994; Mintz and Geva 1997; Geva et al. 2000).

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the best illustrations of this. American agents had access to information indicating that Japan was preparing to launch an offensive. However, this information was not processed and interpreted correctly. The American army had carefully anticipated acts of sabotage, but was ill-prepared for an air strike (Wohlstetter 1962).

Proponents of rational choice theory have been particularly responsive in recent decades. Rather than disregarding cognitivist criticisms, they have continued to design increasingly complex models so they are more in line with empirical realities. Prospect theory and poliheuristic theory result from a cross between rational choice theory and cognitive theories.

Prospect Theories

Behaviorism is the study of direct observable behavior. It is a branch of psychology that has contributed to research in economics and has an increasing influence on FPA (Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Mintz 2007; Elms 2008; Walker et al. 2011).

On a methodological level, behaviorism is generally based on laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with a fictitious scenario where they have to choose between several possible options. For example, they may be asked if they would prefer having a 40% chance of winning 1000 dollars or an 80% chance of winning 200 dollars. Their decisions are then analyzed as a function of diverse variables and theoretical conclusions are drawn (Boettcher 2004).

Prospect theory developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) is one of the main contributions that behaviorist approach has made to FPA (Berejikian and Early 2013). Their research actually demonstrates quite convincingly that most individuals are particularly averse to loss. The psychological pain inflicted by a loss is greater than the pleasure generated by an equivalent gain. Thus, when the subjects of an experiment are put in a situation where they have a 50% chance of winning 20 dollars and a 50% chance of losing 20 dollars, most prefer not to take the risk and not to play the game. In other words, the 20 dollars in their possession that they risk losing is worth more than the 20 dollars that they do not possess but could win. Therefore, the criterion of possession changes the value attributed to an object and surpasses any rational calculation. The simple act of acquiring an object, no matter how trivial, makes it more valuable in the owner's eyes than equivalent objects, which they desire.

Prospect theory also suggests that when individuals are confronted with a loss, most of them are prepared to take more risks to avoid that loss than if they were in a position to gain (Niv-Solomon 2016). They would prefer taking the gamble when there is a 75% probability of losing 100 dollars and a 25% probability of not losing anything than suffer a guaranteed loss of 75 dollars. On the other hand, they would prefer to collect 75 dollars than gamble with a 75% chance of winning 100 dollars and a 25% chance of not winning anything. This variation in risk tolerance has been confirmed by numerous experiments using neurological imaging research with human subjects from different cultures. Experiments have even been conducted on capuchin monkeys.

Prospect theory has major implications for foreign policy. Whether it is a question of international trade, prestige, military force or defining national boundaries, the gains must be worth almost twice as much as the losses incurred to compensate for the losses. Loss aversion explains why most states are more prepared to fight in order to defend their territory than to conquer new territories, why they accept higher costs to maintain an international regime than to create one, why they invest more to slow

down their declining reputation than to boost it and why they do more to counter the formation of hostile coalitions than to strengthen their own alliances. More generally, loss aversion can help explain why great powers tend to be overstretched, overactive and overexposed, which paradoxically undermines their chances of survival (Snyder 1991; Levy 1992a, b, 1997).

A state can strategically develop its foreign policy knowing that other international actors are subject to the same loss aversion. Prospect theory suggests that using deterrence to prevent a foreign state from taking action is a better investment than using coercion to force it to back down. Given this loss aversion, coercion should also be more effective when threats are made than when promises are made (Davis 2000; Schaub 2004; Butler 2007).

These theorems are only valid if the target of foreign policy is located at a neutral point of reference. If, on the other hand, the enemy's position is already located in the domain of losses, deterrence can be ineffective. Deterrence failed to contain French revanchism in 1914 when France had not yet digested the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. Similarly, it did not contain the nostalgia of Italian fascism for the Roman Empire or German Nazism that grew out of the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles.

The reference point for assessing gains and losses is not stable. It is greatly influenced by how the problem is presented. Tversky and Kahneman conducted an experiment with a group of students to demonstrate this phenomenon. The students were presented with a fictitious scenario in which they were the leaders of a country with 600 inhabitants threatened by a new virus. They were asked to choose between two policies: in the first, there is a 100% probability of saving 200 people, but it involves the death of 400 people; in the second, there is a 33% probability of saving 600 infected people and a 66% probability of not saving anybody. When the two possibilities were presented in terms of the number of people saved, 72% of students preferred the first more conservative option. However, when the same options were presented in terms of the number of likely deaths, 78% of respondents preferred the second more risky option. Perceiving a glass as half empty does not generate the same level of risk tolerance as perceiving it as half full, even if objectively the content is the same (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz and Redd 2003; Taylor-Robinson and Redd 2003; Perla 2011).

The point of reference for assessing losses and gains varies as a function of how past events and future aspirations are interpreted. In general, new

gains are rapidly integrated and boost the point of reference, bringing it back to the equilibrium level. Removing the gains would be interpreted as a loss on the basis of the new reference point and not as the suppression of former gains. Inversely, for most individuals, adapting to losses is a slow and painful process. Thus, the point of reference could be based on a distant glorious past or may even be imaginary.

The point of reference varies from one state to another, which may explain fundamental differences in their foreign policy. Prospect theory explains why some states want to change the *status quo* to recover what they perceive as losses, while other equally powerful states want to maintain the *status quo* in order to keep their acquisitions. The former behaves as predicted by offensive realism (Schweller 1994; Mearsheimer 2001a, b, 2009; Layne 2002; Sweeney and Fritz 2004) and the latter follows the ideas put forward by defensive realism (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1987; Grieco 1990; Levy and Thompson 2005; Kirshner 2012).

Aggression, opportunism, balancing and bandwagoning can, therefore, coexist in the same international system. During the Second World War, for example, the great powers were not motivated by the same desires: the United States wanted to maintain the *status quo*, while Germany wanted to overturn it. Similarly, several weak powers, like Hungary, tried taking advantage of the expansion, while others, such as Turkey, simply wanted to save their territory. Reaching a *status quo* is no more the prerogative of the powerful than revisionism is the prerogative of the weak. One of the keys to understanding these variations involves relocating the points of reference to reflect how decision-makers perceive them in order to assess the latter's vision of gains and losses (Jervis 1976, 1994; Snyder 1991; Stein and Pauly 1993; McDermott 1998).

Variations in the reference points can also explain inconsistent or fluctuating foreign policies. For example, Franklin D. Roosevelt resolved to take the political risk of defending the United States' entry into the Second World War as soon as he perceived the conflict as an immediate threat to American interests, rather than as an opportunity to strengthen the United States' strategic position (Farnham 1997). Truman took a greater risk in Europe, by creating a regional alliance centered around NATO under communist pressure, than in the Pacific region, where security was based on more flexible bilateral alliances and was less of a concern (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; He and Feng 2012). During the Gulf War, George H. W. Bush was prepared to launch a military operation to defend American interests in Kuwait, but not to obtain additional gains and

continue the advance on Baghdad (McDermott 2004). When Yugoslavia was dissolved, Slobodan Milosevic was more determined to fight to keep Kosovo, which he considered to be in the domain of potential losses, than was the case during the war in Bosnia, when the aim was to guarantee gains for Serbia (White 2000).

Obviously, it is possible that all warring parties place themselves in the domain of losses and are intent on defending their interests. The more they invest, the greater the losses and the stronger their resolve. Political leaders may pursue a foreign policy that objectively undermines their interests. In this way, researchers have applied prospect theory to explain behavior that defies rationality, such as the American intervention in Vietnam although it was not a threat to the United States' fundamental interests (Taliaferro 2004). Other irrational behaviors include the Soviet Union's rhetorical support for Syria despite Moscow's fear of a war in the Middle East (McInerney 1992); and the trade dispute between Japan and the United States on the export of apples, which lasted for over 30 years, even though the market represents less than 15 million dollars (Elms 2004). Behaviorist economists call "the sunk cost dilemma" this tendency of becoming bogged down with a problem in the vain hope of recovering lost investments (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Carmichael and MacLeod 2003).

To sum up, prospect theory negates the idea of a linear utility function, as it is generally defined by rational choice theory. However, if the utility function is conceived as non-linear, prospect theory can be integrated into the rationalist framework. Prospect theory can even be integrated into the formal game theory model (Berejikian 2002).

Nevertheless, the behavioral approach, which forms the basis of prospect theory, is open to criticism. Several analysts point out that results obtained in the laboratory do not necessarily correspond to the realities of foreign policy. In the complex environment of international relations, options are not presented as clearly as they are in the laboratory. Gains and losses are located on different scales and cannot be reduced to a common denominator. Even if they could be, probabilities of success and failure generally remain rough estimates (Levy 1992b).

Moreover, attributing individual cognitive bias to an entire state may be a form of anthropomorphism or an exaggeration of the leader's prominence. Most foreign policy decisions are made by a group or a whole organization. Prospect theory's response to this criticism is that even if decision-making mechanisms within a state do not correspond to

individual cognitive processes, the results observed are similar (Mercer 2005). In some ways, this is the usual response offered by rational choice theory, which prioritize the validity of predictions over the accuracy of the alleged processes.

Poliheuristic Theory

Alex Mintz and his colleagues developed poliheuristic theory in the early 1990s. It aims to combine a valid account of processes and a reasonable prediction of outcomes. In other words, it subscribes to both the instrumental epistemology of rational choice theory, centered on making predictions, and the realist epistemology of cognitive theories, which focuses on identifying the genuine processes that govern decision-making. Reconciling rational choice theory and scientific realism is a considerable challenge: poliheuristic theory should be simple enough to allow for generalizations and, simultaneously, be sufficiently complex to adapt to particularisms (Mintz 1993; Mintz et al. 1994, 1997; Mintz and Geva 1997; Redd 2002; Beckerman-Boys 2014; Oppermann 2014).

In order to reach this twofold objective, poliheuristic theory suggests that political decision-makers use several (*poly*) cognitive (*heuristic*) shortcuts. Rational choice theory and cybernetic theory suggest that decision-makers respond to a single rule, which involves utility maximization in the former and satisfying fundamental factors in the latter. On the contrary, poliheuristic theory maintains that decision-makers recourse to different processes to reach their decisions.

More specifically, poliheuristic theory's concept of decision-making is divided into two successive phases based on distinct cognitive processes. The first involves the immediate elimination of the options that are politically unacceptable. Here, decision-makers focus on one dimension at a time in order to identify the unacceptable options. For example, they can eliminate all the options that are not supported by the majority of electors and then all those that are favorable to their political adversaries.

The dimensions chosen vary from one decision-maker to another, but they always include those that are directly linked to their political survival. During the Iranian hostage crisis, President Carter took the risky decision of ordering a US hostage rescue mission in Iran while, as the leader of a superpower, he had, in fact, multiple alternatives at his disposal. But, in a first mental and intuitive step, the so-called heuristic phase, Carter quickly

eliminated all the options that would not lead to the rapid release of the American hostages, in the knowledge that their prolonged captivity would be a handicap to his reelection. Hence, negotiation, punitive air strikes, a sea blockade and waiting passively were rapidly excluded, and discussions focused on the scale of the rescue mission. The irony is that the rescue mission was a disaster and contributed to the defeat of President Carter in November 1980.


This first phase of the decision-making process is non-compensatory; that is, the weaknesses of one option in a given dimension cannot be compensated for by the strengths in other dimensions. An option that is politically unfavorable will be eliminated even if it could lead to major economic or military gains. For example, in March 2003, Turkey opposed the deployment of 62,000 American soldiers on its soil in preparation for the attack on Iraq, despite the compensation offered by the United States in the form of economic aid worth over 30 billion dollars and diplomatic support for the EU accession process. Apparently, no economic, military or diplomatic gain could compensate for such a politically unfavorable measure (Mintz 2004a, Mintz 2004b; Christensen and Redd 2004; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010).

Once the number of possible options has been reduced significantly, decision-makers enter the second phase of the decision-making process. This phase corresponds more to the logic of rational choice theory: it is both interdimensional and compensatory. The different dimensions are examined simultaneously, and the strengths of one can compensate for the weaknesses of another. These comparisons clearly require more discussion and information than the first phase, but the exercise is possible because the number of options has already been reduced (Fig. 7.6).


Poliheuristic theory is relatively recent and remains marginal. It is based on the research conducted by a small group of specialists centered on Alex Mintz. Unlike rational choice theory, bounded rationality, game theory and prospect theory, it has not yet been crowned with a Nobel Prize.

Nonetheless, poliheuristic theory seems destined to become widespread. A growing number of case studies, laboratory experiments, statistical analyses and formal modeling appear to confirm the validity of its empirical predictions and assumptions (Keller and Yang 2016). In addition, and unlike several other FPA theories, poliheuristic theory does not seem to be limited to the American context (Vijayalakshmi 2017). Researchers have applied it successfully in order to fathom foreign policy

Rational Choice



Bounded rationality



Poliheuristic




Fig. 7.6 Schematic comparison of decision-making according to rational choice theory, bounded rationality and poliheuristic theory

decisions made by autocratic regimes (Kinne 2005), including Pakistan (Sathasivam 2003), China (James and Zhang 2005; Sandal et al. 2011) and Syria (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2000).

The main appeal of poliheuristic theory is perhaps its capacity to build bridges between different theoretical approaches. It makes it possible to combine the rule of maximizing utility drawn from rational choice theory, the strategic component of rational deterrence theory, game theory’s formal methodological approach, cybernetic theory’s concept of satisfaction and prospect theory’s loss aversion (DeRouen 2000; Stern 2004; Keller

and Yang 2009). The non-compensatory phase of poliheuristic theory can even integrate constructivist approaches, presented in the next chapter, including those that are genuinely far removed from methodological individualism and positivism, which characterize rational choice theory.

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What Part Does Culture Play in FPA?

A number of analysts saw the emergence of the constructivist movement in the 1990s as the return of the cultural dimension to the study of international relations (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). In reality, FPA has always been interested in culture. Several researchers devoted their entire careers to studying the role of identities, discourses, norms and cultural practices in foreign policy. If being constructivist means being interested in culture, FPA was constructivist before its time (Kubalkova 2001; Houghton 2007).

Nevertheless, the emergence of constructivism provoked a fundamental epistemic debate, which still has repercussions for FPA. FPA's traditional epistemic position is to treat culture as an independent variable that can be linked to foreign policies via causal relationships. It constitutes a positivist approach, used by scholars such as Peter Katzenstein, Jeffery Checkel, Martha Finnemore, Katherine Sikkink and Judith Goldstein. According to these authors, culture facilitates research on the subjective utility of rational actors. It also enables mediation in games where there is a situation of multiple equilibria and helps clarify anomalies that rationalist theories cannot explain.

A growing number of analysts prefer a post-positivist approach. David Campbell, Vendulka Kubáľková, Cynthia Weber, Iver Neumann, Jutta Weldes and Roxanne Doty, among others, consider that the goal of FPA research is not to explain foreign policies by identifying their causes, but to gain insight into foreign policies by placing them in the cultural context, which made some policies possible and others inconceivable. They are interested in the "how", not in the "why" of foreign policy.

Post-positivist analysts generally favor interpretative epistemology according to which empirical data should be interpreted before being transformed into results. The researcher is steeped in a culture and, consequently, is unable to analyze the subject of the study with detachment. All discourses, including scientific discourse, are culturally charged, and therefore reproduce power relations. This reflexivist observation sometimes leads to a critical approach according to which, in Robert Cox's words, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (1981: 128.).

The debate between positivists and post-positivists is apparent in all contemporary literature on the role of culture in foreign policy. This chapter reflects the debate, without actually presenting the two sides separately. As Peter Katzenstein pointed out, culture is such an omnipresent and all-encompassing reference that the very concept has a limited heuristic value (1996: 2; Duffield 1999). Focusing on some of its specific components is preferable to tackling it as a whole. Thus, this chapter presents the cultural components that are of most interest to foreign policy analysts, including norms, identities, roles, genders, organizational cultures, strategic cultures and discourses.

NORMS

Norms can be defined as the expectations shared by a community with regard to the behavior that is judged appropriate for a given identity. They define the limit between conformity and deviance (Krasner 1983; Finnemore 1996; Raymond 1997).

For example, an international norm prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers. Child recruitment in the armed forces is considered to be a socially reprehensible act, irrespective of its legal status. On the other hand, compulsory military service for young adults or the stigma attached to children born of war rape is not condemned with the same vehemence and is not the object of firmly established international social norms (Carpenter 2007).

Two main theoretical debates link norms to foreign policy behavior: the first considers states as the target of norms, and the second presents states as the actors that disseminate norms.

Norm Compliance

Several types of social norms challenge states and orient their foreign policy behavior. First, it is important to distinguish between national norms and international norms. In general, international norms have a universal scope,

although their origin and impetus may be limited to a specific cultural era. This is clearly the case for human rights, which are of Western origin, but have universal goals (Risse et al. 1999b; Thomas 2001). In some cases, international norms apply to a specific group of states, such as the norm that requires developed countries to allocate a share of their income to development aid (Lumsdaire 1993; Barnett and Weiss 2008), the norm that urges metropolises to guarantee their colonies the right to self-determination (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Jackson 1993; Crawford 1993, 2002) or the norm that proscribes nuclear powers from using their nuclear weapons (Gaddis 1987; Paul 2009, 2010; Avey 2015).

National norms that belong to a specific culture can also orient foreign policy behavior. For example, Canada's political culture promotes compromise, respect of diversity and equal opportunities. On a national level, these political values are reflected by diverse social and economic programs. They are also manifest at the international level as shown by Canada's major commitment to multilateralism (Stairs 1982; Keating 2012; Smith and Sjolander 2012).

We can also differentiate between substantive norms and procedural norms. Substantive norms guide state behavior in relation to a given issue. Some are so specific that they generate discrepancies in a country's foreign policy. Thus, on the international stage, several states may be actively involved in the protection of marine mammals that are not on the list of endangered species and yet remain aloof when it comes to protecting endangered plants and microorganisms (Nadelmann 1990; Epstein 2008; Blok 2008). Similarly, in wartime, some political leaders seem to consider that it is morally more acceptable to target a greater number of individuals using so-called conventional weapons than to target fewer individuals with chemical weapons or terrorist tactics (Price 1997; Farrell 2001; Tannenwald 2007; Carpenter 2011).

Other norms are of a procedural nature and cut across several domains of foreign policy. Procedural norms include those that encourage multilateralism (Ruggie 1993; Dimitrov 2005), seeking a consensus (Morin and Gold 2010), transparency (Florini 1996) and the inclusion of actors from civil society (Bäckstrand 2006). They help explain why General George Marshall proposed his eponymous aid plan to the USSR in 1947 and why, more than 50 years later, Colin Powell did his utmost to convince the UN Security Council to authorize military intervention against Iraq. The former no doubt anticipated the Soviet refusal and the latter suspected the French veto, but they both had to abide by international procedural norms.

Norms are expressed as a behavioral prescription or proscription, which means they operate like legal regulations. In addition, national and international laws often reflect social norms. However, a norm is not necessarily formalized, or even explicit, and deviant behavior cannot necessarily be legally sanctioned (Nadelmann 1990; Percy 2007).

There are several reasons why states generally abide by social norms, even when they are not enshrined in a rule of law. From a rationalist point of view, states that are socialized to a norm adopt the behavior that is expected of them, without necessarily believing in the norm's virtue. They comply simply to avoid being ostracized, to prevent reputational costs, to cooperate in a situation of multiple equilibria, to maintain their partners' confidence or reduce the pressure exerted by social movements. Therefore, norms are perceived as contextual facts, which states take into account to anticipate the consequences of their behavior and to identify the option that maximizes their utility.

From a constructivist point of view, states comply with norms because they perceive them as fair, natural or legitimate. They internalize the principles underlying the expected behavior, assimilate them into their identity and comply with them, regardless of external pressure and perceptions. In this constructivist scenario, norms restrict the scope of possibilities prior to the decision-making process and help define what states perceive as their interest (Checkel 2001, 2005).

However, it is important not to overestimate the distinction between rational and constructivist compliance. They are not mutually exclusive on a theoretical level. In fact, compliance, which is initially motivated by self-interest, can gradually lead to genuine internalization. A government that strategically adopts policies to reduce energy consumption in the hope of reducing its dependence on gas and petrol exporting countries may ultimately internalize the environmental discourse and become a flagship in the fight against climate change.

In general, ideas are usually consistent with interests. In social psychology, it is well established that when discrepancy occurs as a result of contradictory behavior and beliefs, individuals generally modify their beliefs to fit their behavior, rather than the other way round (Festinger 1957).

On a methodological level, it may be difficult to establish whether an actor has genuinely internalized a norm or merely complies to protect their reputation. An analysis of practices and discourses can confirm that a norm exists. However, it is more difficult to determine whether a norm has been internalized in a belief system.

One approach is to chart the irregularities in norm compliance. A state may invoke a norm when calling for certain behavior, which evidently serves its own interests. However, if it appears to disregard that norm in other circumstances, the analyst can legitimately call into question norm internalization (Howard 2004).

Nonetheless, this methodological strategy comes up against the problem of idiosyncrasy when it comes to norm interpretation (Checkel 1998). States do not interpret norms in the same way, even when they have universal scope and are formally established. In Western countries, for example, there are major differences between France, Sweden and Japan in terms of how human rights are integrated into their foreign policy (Sikkink 1993; Cardenas 2004; Remacle 2008). These variations do not necessarily reveal their strictly rhetorical approach to human rights. They may simply express the different interpretations, which have all been genuinely internalized.

Some studies attempt to explain these variations in the interpretation of international norms. Among the variables that can explain the different interpretations, one can note: the political regime's institutional structure (Checkel 1999), the dynamism of local social actors (Wilkening 1999), the position of national identity in relation to international society (Gurowitz 1999), the personality and preferences of political leaders (Shannon 2000; Bratberg 2011), the government's organizational culture (Legro 1997), the issue's salience in public debates (Foot and Walter 2013) and its concordance with national norms (Cortell and Davis 1996).

The latter is one of the elements that have attracted the most attention. Emerging international norms are not diffused in a normative vacuum. They have to integrate the ecosystem of existing domestic norms before they can be assimilated by a state. It seems, for instance, that the Brazilian diplomatic culture, which revolves around the idea of an autonomy-oriented and nationalistic foreign policy, has prevented the full internalization of international climate norms (Vieira 2013).

However, international norms are rarely precise, which sometimes make it difficult to interpret their compatibility or incompatibility with domestic norms. This question can only be settled using an interactive discursive process. National and international norms are constantly shifting and interacting with actors' discourses and practices (Farrell 2001; Blok 2008; Stevenson 2011; Zahar 2012). For example, Japanese society's norm of non-violence is continually interacting with the government's policy on multilateral military operations. This interaction transforms both the

Japanese national norm and the government's understanding of the international norm. The interpretation of each norm is transformed as a result (Berger 1998; Katzenstein 2003; Dobson 2003; Catalinac 2007; Miyagi 2009; Singh 2010).

Norm Diffusion

Research on norms in foreign policy comes up against two major obstacles. First, on an empirical level, several researchers focus on norms that have effectively led to a shift in foreign policy. This emphasis may have been necessary in the 1990s to establish norms as a legitimate object of FPA research, but now it would be useful to further our understanding of normative processes, as well as identify and investigate case studies where norms clash with foreign policy behavior.

Second, on a theoretical level, studies on norms are soon trapped in a circular logic if they argue that norms are guided by dominant behavior, which in turn defines the prevailing norms. Of course, positive feedback loops make norms relatively stable and long-lasting. Norms are strengthened constantly: discourses are reproduced to underpin them, practices validate them and institutions are dedicated to them. However, norms are not external to interactions. It is because they are produced and reproduced socially that they can be created, modified or overturned by actors (Sandholtz 2008; Wiener 2009; Panke and Petersohn 2012).

One method for overcoming these two obstacles is to examine how normative entrepreneurs promote new international norms. This approach offers the significant benefit of recognizing that actors have a degree of autonomy and it allows more linear causal demonstrations.

Research on normative entrepreneurs is centered on two main types of actors. Most studies focus on transnational NGO networks. These networks have managed to stimulate international norms on many issues including on the environment, human rights, disarmament and human security (Sikkink 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Klotz 1995; Price 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999b; Thomas 2001).

Other studies also underline the decisive role of intergovernmental organizations in catalyzing and disseminating norms. The EU is unquestionably the most frequently cited example. It promotes emerging norms among its member states and candidates for EU accession, as well as when dealing with third countries (Finnemore 1993; Adler 1998; Schimmelfennig 1998;

Manners 2002; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2003; Sjursen 2006; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Telo 2007; Cao 2009; Greenhill 2010; Rumelili 2011).

However, the role of states as normative entrepreneurs is often overlooked. Only a few studies recognize that states can mobilize their foreign policy to promote new international norms, even in the early stages of norm diffusion. In general, most of these studies consider that once norms are well established domestically, foreign policy can contribute to diffuse them internationally. For example, in the 1950s, Sweden was one of the first to encourage other states to share their revenue with developing countries because the norm of economic solidarity was already firmly established in Swedish political culture (Ingebritsen 2006; Bergman 2007). At the same time, the Indian government's active promotion of non-alignment as a norm among developing countries reflected India's norms of non-intervention and non-violence (Acharya 2011).

Over and above this shift from internal to external, a similar shift can be observed between the levels of negotiation. A state that accepts certain norms on a bilateral level is generally more inclined to promote the same norms on a regional or multilateral level. This behavior can partly be explained by material goals, such as the desire to reduce transactional costs, but also by ideational factors. For example, it is not uncommon for states to think twice before adopting certain trade standards in a bilateral free-trade agreement and then to become firm advocates of those standards during multilateral or regional trade negotiations (Mace and Bélanger 2007).

When a normative state entrepreneur has managed to diffuse the norm that it is advocating, its achievement becomes a source of pride and promoting this international norm becomes a distinctive feature of national identity. Swedish development aid and the Indian non-alignment policy have become an integral part of Swedish and Indian national identity. From this point of view, norms do not solely regulate state behavior; they also contribute to their national identity (Katzenstein 1996).

NATIONAL IDENTITIES

National identity is a socially constructed image that a political community uses to portray itself. It is made up of a set of elements, including constitutive norms, comparative categories, collective aspirations and cognitive references (Abdelal et al. 2006).

It is important not to confuse national identity with what some internationalists in the 1950s called "the national character". National identity

is a social construct, which changes over time as it is continually reproduced. The notion of “national character”, however, which is now outmoded, refers to a set of unchanging characteristics, which objectively belong to a nation. Hans Morgenthau relied on this form of outdated essentialism. He attributed mechanical rationality and obsessional formalism to the French, suggesting that this could explain the ups and downs of French foreign policy (2005 [1948]: 141). If we follow this logic of cultural determinism, we might expect the United Kingdom’s foreign policy to be phlegmatic, Italy’s to be flamboyant, and Canada’s to be naive. Obviously, these are just cultural stereotypes tinted with anthropomorphism. As such, they can interfere with cognitive processes, skew perceptions and influence how a foreign policy is formulated when decision-makers are prejudiced against foreign nations. However, these stereotypes do not correspond to the true essence of a nation or to how a nation portrays itself.

Although most contemporary analysts reject this essentialist vision, several debates prevail with regard to how a national identity is formed, its capacity to evolve, the purpose of reproducing it and its relationship to nationalism.

Self and the Other

Most analysts agree with Iver Neumann (1999) that identity is forged by transforming differences into otherness. In other words, the cultural boundary of “self” is defined in relation to how the “other” is represented. The other does not share the characteristics that the “self” attributes to itself. For example, in India under Jawaharlal Nehru, the constitutive otherness of national identity was the British colonial power, whereas for Pakistan under Muhammad Ali Jinnah, it was embodied by Hindu India. These different representations of the “other” help explain why India distanced itself from its former colonial power by playing a key role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, whereas Pakistan used its foreign policy to forge closer links with the West and was unconcerned about losing its identity in the process (Banerjee 1997).

However, constitutive otherness does not necessarily result from a social interaction between the self-defined actor and its counterpart (Hopf 2002; Rumelili 2004). If identity is always relational, then otherness can very well be an imaginary community. The “Anglo-Saxon” world serves as a foil for French identity, although as a strong cultural entity, it no longer shapes American identity (Meunier 2000). Similarly, Israeli identity attributes

anti-Semitism to its neighbors, even those who do not proclaim anti-Semitism (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Stein 2011).

Consequently, even if the image that a community has of itself does not fit the image reflected by the actors that embody otherness, an identity can still be constructed and maintained (Hudson 1999). The United Nations' recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1971 is a striking example of this. To ensure that the event followed in the tradition of China's identity, Beijing has always claimed that the United States felt humiliated after the General Assembly vote. According to the Chinese narrative of the event, the emergence of communist China caused President Nixon to lose face. Yet, the Nixon administration never hid the fact that it wanted to forge closer links with China in order to isolate the USSR. Humiliation was neither felt nor communicated, which did not prevent China from perceiving it or making statements in that sense (Gries 2005).

The otherness that shapes identity can even be represented by an actor that has no genuine personification and zero interaction with the community in the empirical world. Thus, German identity was constructed in response to its own past. Nazi Germany, a warring military power, is the otherness of contemporary Germany, which defines itself as a civil power and as Europe's federating entity (Marcussen et al. 2001; Ashizawa 2008).

However, national identity is not exclusively created by contrasts. Alliances can also contribute to constructing identity. For example, in the nineteenth century, the United States formed a special relationship with its former colonial power, the United Kingdom. The origin of this alliance stems not so much from trade or security rationale, but from a sense of identity or racial logic, where Anglo-Saxon man was a beacon for civilization (Vucetic 2011).

More recently, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States portrayed itself as a fair justice-maker, by forming an alliance with Bosnia's Muslim community. By depicting the Muslim community as a victim and as the last bastion of a multiethnic state, the United States proved to itself that it was at war against all forms of tyranny, even when the oppressor is Christian and the victim is Muslim (Messari 2001).

Similarly, joining an intergovernmental organization is a way of consecrating aspirations of national identity. Since the end of the Cold War, membership of NATO, the EU or the Council of Europe has helped validate the identity of several East European countries (Risse-Kapen 1995), Finland (Arter 1995; Browning 2008), Baltic countries (Berg and Ehin 2009) and Turkey (Rumelili 2011).

Supranational identities are formed gradually, without necessarily replacing national identities. In transatlantic and European cases, these new collective identities have led to the creation of supranational communities. Military conflict within these communities is now as unthinkable as it is within a state (Pouliot 2006). Supranational communities are constructed in contrast to different types of otherness (Bradley 1990; Wendt 1994; Adler and Barnett 1998; Cronin 1999; Mattern 2001).

It is important to recognize that there are multiple overlapping supranational identities. A political community can define itself simultaneously as Arab, clannish, African, agrarian, modern, Mediterranean, Islamic and developing. Samuel Huntington's 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations" was fiercely criticized by political scientists because it conceals the overlap between identities. Huntington only considered a single cultural unit, that of civilization, which he presented as a homogenous block with well-defined fault lines. In reality, identity references do not simply overlap, they may also appear contradictory (Mungiu and Mindruta 2002; Furia and Lucas 2006).

The possibility of combining different supranational identities does not mean that they are quick and easy to construct. Even in Europe, after several decades of European construction, European identity remains fragile, as the Brexit and the rise of Euroscepticism have shown. Yet, it is not for a lack of efforts from the part of political authorities. On several occasions, the European Commission has had to define itself in the face of American otherness because of its environmental and trade policies, particularly on the issues of hormone-treated beef, climate change and genetically modified organisms. Similarly, the European Neighborhood Policy, debates on EU accession and strategic partnership agreements are often used to reinforce European identity in the face of North Africa, Turkey and Russia (Neumann and Welsh 1991; Herrmann et al. 2004; Rumelili 2004, 2011; Jeandesboz 2007; Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008; Rogers 2009; Carta 2012; Morozov and Rumelili 2012).

Therefore, national or supranational identities cannot be declared by simply proclaiming otherness or alliance. If European identity is to mean more than a rallying point for the continent's elite, it must go beyond political statements and be reflected in shared experiences and everyday practices (Wodak et al. 2009). In this context, Christopher Hill states "organizations like Eurovision or UEFA have probably done more to create a sense of shared experience among the peoples of Europe than the rhetoric of a thousand politicians" (2003: 202).

Evolving Identities

Once national identities have been created, they tend to remain stable. They are reproduced daily by political discourses, media culture, education, national holidays, comedies, the development of historic sites and so forth. They are institutionalized and continually reinforced in a dynamic of “path dependency” (Goldstein 1988; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996; Barnett 1999).

Even new identities appear as the inheritors of former identities. This historic foundation is essential if they are to be perceived as legitimate. It facilitates their spread across society and allows them to take hold. New identities have to merge with existing political cultures and institutions. Consequently, they seldom offer more than a reinterpretation of past identities.

American identity was forged with the first puritan colonies. It has evolved by constantly reinterpreting the antagonism between liberty and tyranny, regardless of whether tyranny was incarnated by the Anglican monarchy, European imperialism or communism (Campbell 1992; Peceny 1997). It is not insignificant that in the weeks following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of George W. Bush reinterpreted this duality once again, by presenting terrorists as the enemies of freedom (Ivie and Giner 2007; Sjöstedt 2007; Nabers 2009).

Path dependency explains why identities frequently outlive their original context. German identity, in particular, was remarkably resistant after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Although analysts anticipated a dramatic shift in German foreign policy, it still distinguishes itself with a firm commitment to European integration, an aversion to military offensives and a clear preference for multilateralism. The impact of reunification was tremendous, but not sufficient to destabilize German identity (Berger 1998; Duffield 1999; Banchoff 1999; Rittberger 2001; Harnisch 2001; Marcussen et al. 2001; Weber and Kowert 2007; Malici 2006; Miskimmon 2009).

In some cases, the stability of identity can actually be a handicap and discourses of identity can backfire on their advocates (Schimmelfennig 2001). In 1947, for example, democratic President Truman attempted to persuade Congress, which had a republican majority, to back an American intervention in the Greek Civil War. To achieve this, he rekindled the antagonism between liberty and tyranny, by presenting the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that had to be contained using all possible economic and military means. The Truman doctrine was immediately met with a positive response, which enabled the president to obtain Congress

approval. However, once it took shape and gained recognition, it became a constraint for all Truman's successors. None of them were able to break away from the Truman orthodoxy. Throughout the entire Cold War, American identity was defined as the leader of the free world at war against Soviet imperialism. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, this identity skewed the perception of President Kennedy's advisors. They failed to understand that Castro was only trying to defend himself against a likely attack by the United States. A few years later, this identity led several Americans to take a firm stance against the strategic rapprochement with communist China, which was being orchestrated by Nixon and Kissinger (Weldes 1999; Sjöstedt 2007).

France is also a prisoner of its identity. Since Charles de Gaulle, members of the French political elite have fueled the belief that because of its historical legacy, the "birthplace of human rights" has an almost inalienable right to be seated beside the great powers. The political elite systematically plays down the impact of European integration on the prevailing civilizing and republican dimensions of French identity. Instead, it presents Europe as a springboard that can enhance the French model's prestige and as a bastion against Americanization. Nonetheless, this discourse has lost its power of persuasion, and inconsistencies have gradually appeared. It is getting difficult for the French elite to justify further European integration without upsetting France's traditional identity, which is built on its prominent position in the international community (Cerny 1980; Hoffmann 1991; Gordon 1993; Flynn 1995; Larsen 1997; Risse et al. 1999a, b; Schmidt 2007; Bratberg 2011; Holsti 2011; Krotz and Sperling 2011).

However, national identities are by no means static. Political crises allow new discourses to emerge, as well as new actors and new identities (Marcussen et al. 2001; Mattern 2001; Nabers 2009; Abdelal et al. 2006). Thus, the overthrow of the apartheid regime in 1991 provided the opportunity to rethink South African identity. Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela were actively involved in reconstructing South Africa's identity under the banner "rainbow nation", which promoted diversity and multiculturalism as rallying points. This national reconciliation was reflected in a foreign policy open to all horizons, which involved resuming ties with the West and acting as a mediator in several conflicts (Becker 2010).

Not all crises have such a disruptive impact on identity. The collapse of the USSR provided a major political opportunity, which could have led to a radical shift in Russian identity. However, no credible federating alternative identity emerged in the 1990s. Several points of reference for Russian

identity were ruled out with the end of antagonism with the United States, Ukraine independence, the decline of its great power status and Marxist–Leninist doctrine’s loss of credibility. There was no immediate alternative. Since then, Russia has suffered an identity crisis, which apparently it is trying to overcome by deploying a foreign policy that promotes power and independence (Prizel 1998; D’Anieri 2002; Hopf 2002; Larson and Shevcheko 2003; Light 2004; Mankoff 2009; Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist 2009). Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, its military operations in Eastern Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria’s civil war by supporting Bashar al-Assad are reflections of this revived identity (Zevelev 2016; Tsygankov 2016).

Foreign Policy as Identity Affirmation

From a post-structuralist point of view, foreign policy actually helps define national identity and avoid identity crises. It provides a response to social and state demands for collective identity and helps maintain a degree of social cohesion (Campbell 1992, 1998; Walker 1993; Hansen 2006; Aydin-Düzgit 2013; Hintz 2016).

Post-structuralism goes far beyond Alexander Wendt’s constructivism (1999), which claims that identity provides a stable preexisting foundation for building foreign policy. Post-structuralists suggest that identity is not simply a guide of foreign policy, but also its ultimate goal. Foreign policy constantly reproduces national identity so that it remains in place. Without continual replication, national identity would crumble—along with the state on which it was built.

Foreign policy is far more effective at reproducing identity on a continual basis than any other public policy. Post-structuralists argue that foreign policy constructs security threats beyond the state boundaries. Rather than alleviating insecurity, foreign policy constructs it; instead of building bridges, it erects walls. This is the focal point of the most influential post-structuralist critical theories, including the Aberystwyth school’s on critical security studies, the Paris school, inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault’s research, the Copenhagen school’s on securitization, and the Essex school based on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work (Bradley 1994; Desch 1996; Larsen 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; McSweeney 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; Rasmussen 2001; Zehfuss 2001; Bigo 2006; Balzacq 2011; Weber and Lacy 2011).

For example, after the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakhstan largely built its political identity by rejecting its past along with the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The idea first emerged in civil society and was rapidly endorsed by the state. Kazakhstan's sovereignty involved the construction of a nuclear threat. Its foreign policy constantly reproduces this threat, by promoting a world free of nuclear weapons (Abzhaparova 2011).

The continuous reproduction of identity is necessary because stable national unity is not preexisting to international relations. Nations are "imagined communities", not timeless facts (Anderson 1983). They did not endow themselves with political institutions to guarantee their protection. Instead, states play a key role in nation building by generating a sense of belonging to a community, often through war (Tilly 1985; Ringmar 1996; Fortmann 2009). Therefore, the nation's insecurity provides the basis for state security. Paradoxically, if the state succeeds in cancelling out all threats to its security, it might cease to exist.

Since the Thirty Years' War, states have used military conflict to reproduce national identity and stabilize their hold on power. In recent years, foreign policy has widened its scope of action. Socially constructed frontiers are no longer just geographic: they are also virtual and cultural. In this context, a whole set of actions are used to reproduce national identity, ranging from the expulsion of refugees to subsidies for the cultural industry. They are used, like war, to maintain the frontiers of the political community on which the state is based (Bélanger 1999; Goff 2000).

Post-structuralist theories suggest that the states with the most fragile national identity are the most dynamic when it comes to mobilizing their policies for identity purposes (Posen 1993; van Evera 1994; Lindemann 2011). Several studies on the issue focus on multicultural states. For example, Switzerland seems to maintain cohesion between its cantons by using a distinctive policy of resistance, which is portrayed by its militia army, its policy of neutrality, its restrictive migratory policies and its refusal to join the EU. Canada has succeeded in differentiating itself from the United States and absorbing Quebec nationalism by using its foreign policy to promote multilateralism, universalist principles, peacekeeping and cultural diversity (Chapnick 2000; Thomsen and Hynek 2006; Potter 2008; Gecelovsky 2009).

In FPA, the idea that the state is a fragile construct, which has to be continually reproduced if it is to be maintained, remains marginal. FPA was built on the premise of the state. This assumption has not fundamentally been examined or criticized. When it comes to national identity,

post-structuralist and critical theories are challenged by a theory that is more psychological than sociological and more positivist than post-positivist: social identity theory.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory suggests that there is a direct relationship between the strength of identity and aggressive behavior. The theory claims that the need for esteem and appreciation felt by individuals encourages them to have a negative perception of groups that they do not belong to. It also encourages them to blame those groups for their misfortunes and to discriminate against them. Laboratory experiments have shown that this unfavorable bias is generated as soon as groups are created, even if the criterion to distinguish them is as mundane as eye color or the result of a lottery draw (Tajfel and Turner 1986).

Several analysts use social identity theory to explain foreign policy behavior. For example, it can help explain why states that share a supranational identity seem less likely to engage in military combat with each other. A common religion appears to have a very significant pacifying effect, although some statistical evidence remains relatively weak (Henderson 1998; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Kupchan 2010).

Social identity theory can also help explain Western countries' policy of double standards in the face of violations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Western countries generally express a degree of confidence with regard to liberal democracies and minimize the destabilizing impact of their nuclear weapons programs. However, they firmly denounce autocracies' potential nuclear programs, even before their existence is confirmed. In this case, membership of the group of liberal democracies is the discriminating factor (Chafetz 1995).

In addition, social identity theory proposes that negative bias is more pronounced when group identity is strong. This observation seems equally valid at a national level. Indeed, there is a statistically significant relationship between populist nationalism and the severity of military conflict (Cederman et al. 2011). There also appears to be a relationship between the sense of belonging with regard to European identity and opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. Historically, the French elite has been more attached to the European project than the British elite. This made France a fiercer opponent of European expansion than Britain. French citizens felt

more European, they were more likely to perceive Turkey as the other and they were more averse to its integration (Schafer 1999; Curley 2009).

In a notable article, Jonathan Mercer (1995) used social identity theory to contradict Alexander Wendt's hypothesis (1992), according to which "anarchy is what states make of it". In Wendt's view, states construct friendly, hostile or competitive relations, which lead to Kantian, Hobbesian or Lockean anarchy, respectively. According to Mercer, this idea that agents define the structure ignores cognitive constraints. As social identity theory suggests, if most individuals are wary of those who are outside their group, it is not surprising that hostility dominates interstate relations and that Hobbesian anarchy is the rule, rather than the exception. In other words, although Mercer recognizes that agents socially construct the structure, he uses psychosociology to explain the Hobbesian anarchy (see also Mowle 2003).

Mercer's hypothesis does not have unanimous support among advocates of social identity theory. Some scholars point out that mistrust felt toward outsiders is not necessarily reflected by hatred or aggressive behavior (Brewer 2000; Gries 2005). Different opinion polls reveal that patriotic or nationalist feelings are not associated with animosity toward other states, trade protectionism or support for aggressive foreign policies. Some studies even suggest that there is an inverse relationship (Shulman 2000; Gibson 2006; Foster and Keller 2010).

The key to establishing a relationship between the strength of national identity and foreign policy orientation may be to examine intermediary variables and exogenous variables in more detail. For example, according to some studies, threats against an identity do not provoke a response in terms of identity unless they are combined with immediate material threats, such as economic or security threats (Catalinac 2007; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Woodwell 2007; Coş and Bilgin 2010). However, some analysts place these variables in the ideational world, by underlining that only certain discourses or combinations of norms can transform strong national identity into a catalyst for an antagonistic foreign policy (Furtado 1994; Gries 2005; Woodwell 2007).

One thing is certain—identities are variables, which cannot be isolated from their material and ideational environment. For this reason, the concept of "national role" is presented in the next section to facilitate the study of the relationships between national identity and the international environment.

NATIONAL ROLES

A national role can be defined as a set of shared expectations relating to how a state behaves as a function of its position on the international stage. For example, the roles of leader, mediator and protégé have been part of the traditional dramaturgy of international relations for years. These roles prescribe specific behaviors to those who endorse them, and then, their interactions proceed according to fairly predictable scripts. The concept of role makes it possible to establish a bridge between the actor's specificity and the cultural structure in which he evolves (Walker 2011; Brummer and Thies 2015; Benes and Harnisch 2015; Chelotti 2015; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016).

Kal Holsti introduced the concept of role to FPA in the 1970s, by borrowing from psychosociology (Holsti 1970a). Curiously, constructivist theories developed in the 1990s do not acknowledge this conceptual heritage and rarely use it for inspiration. Yet, there is some resemblance between the notion of role and that of identity and norms. Like identity, roles only exist in interaction with a distinct otherness. Like norms, roles prescribe a behavior rather than describe or represent it. Nonetheless, the concept of role is quite distinct from that of identity and norm.

Role Conception

A national role relates to a specific position on the international stage. This position can be geographic, political or social. It can be situated in space (Dodds 1993), on a scale of power (Holsti 1970a, b) or within a group (Harnisch 2011). Each position corresponds to a limited repertoire of roles. For example, during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had a dominant position in terms of power, which meant that they both played a similar leading character (Wish 1980).

However, the distribution of roles is not determined by objective conditions. The position is a subjective rather than a material fact. For example, France has a military force and a diplomatic service that are disproportionate to its economic weight and security threats. In the eyes of outside observers, there sometimes appears to be a discrepancy between France's presence on the African continent and its resulting strategic and economic benefits. This gap can be explained by subjective conditions. France's military deployment and diplomatic presence reflect the role that France has

shaped for itself and not the role imposed by objective conditions (Gordon 1993; Flynn 1995; Krotz and Sperling 2011; Fordham 2011).

According to Holsti, a national role is primarily conceived on the basis of “[t]he policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (1970a, b: 245–246). In this respect, leaders are the main scriptwriters for their state. They define their role on the basis of their own cultural background. This cultural background can be limited to their close-knit guard, although it is usually shared by the country’s elite or by the population as a whole (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016).

The endogenous aspect of national role formation may impede communication with different actors who do not always share the same cultural references. Thus, China’s role is partly based on a strictly Confucian worldview and on scripts drawn from collective Chinese memory, which only make sense to the Chinese. These cultural roots make Chinese foreign policy difficult for Westerners to grasp. The combination of power and restraint, especially, leaves perplexed observers more familiar with Western powers’ interventionism and proselytizing (Shih 1993, 2012; Feng 2007; Deng 2008).

In this context, modifying a national role often stems from an internal change, rather than external pressure. For example, Japan reassessed its role on the international stage between the first Gulf War and the war in Iraq. Unlike most other states, it manifested greater support for the intervention in 2003 than in 1991. This policy change occurred after Japanese decision-makers reviewed Japan’s role on the world stage and not because the international context was more favorable to Japanese intervention (Lind 2004; Catalinac 2007).

Roles also depend on how political leaders perceive the international environment. Marijke Breuning (1995) and Philippe Le Prestre (1997) each developed a typology of roles based on this perception of the international system. In Breuning’s typology, the roles of “good neighbor” and “activist” can only be taken on by actors who perceive the international system as being more organized than chaotic. In Le Prestre’s typology, the roles of “catalyst” and “stabilizer” are only possible if the system is perceived as restrictive rather than lax.

According to role theory, one of the fundamental states’ objectives is to impose their self-defined role on the public and other actors. During a theater performance, the different actors interact continually and exchange

cues with the audience, which allows them to adapt their play. These cues operate in the same way as feedback, reinforcing the roles that meet expectations and sanctioning those that deviate from the expected script (Walkers 1979, 1987).

For example, the Soviet Union initially defined its role as liberator and promoter of a new order. However, countries in Eastern Europe regularly reflected an image of imperial Russia, which forced the Soviet Union to redefine itself (Hopf 1998). Similarly, the EU cast itself as a normative power with a duty to adjudicate in the international arena. However, this role is not recognized by emerging countries, which perceive the EU as an accessory that France and Germany can hide behind. This negative feedback forced the EU to reconsider its role (Elgström and Smith 2006; Bengtsson and Elgström 2012; Morozov and Rumelili 2012).

The public can also influence the scripts by expressing preferences and reacting to the actors' performances. The public in the United States is particularly influential when it comes to local conflicts, such as the one in Northern Ireland (Grove and Carter 1999) or South Ossetia (Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist 2009). The United States was not directly involved in these conflicts, but the actors involved were fully aware that they were being watched closely. Even when the public is passive, simply being in the public eye is generally sufficient to guarantee a degree of coherence and continuity when it comes to role conception.

In this strategic, interactional and social logic, an actor wishing to redefine its role sometimes has to modify the whole scenario, including the other actors' roles. One of the strategies to achieve this is to interact with the other actors as if they were already playing their new roles. In this way, Gorbachev attempted to switch the role of the United States from a rival to aid donor, by behaving as if Washington suddenly no longer represented a threat and by unilaterally reducing the Soviet arsenal. Gorbachev's policies ultimately put an end to the Cold War, giving all the actors the chance to redefine their roles (Wendt 1992: 421).

Nonetheless, sudden shifts in scripts are rare. Generally, the feedback and the adjustments that take place lead to a gradual convergence between the role, as conceived by the actor, and expectations that the audience and other actors have with regard to that role. There is a convergence toward a common intersubjective reality (Chafetz et al. 1996; Harnisch 2012). The survey conducted by Valerie Hudson (1999) in Russia, Japan and the United States reveals that the expectations with regard to a particular state's behavior are shared by the nationals of that state, as well as by foreigners.

Roles as Foreign Policy Guides

Some researchers are more interested in the impact of national roles on foreign policy than in how they are conceived. Most studies on the subject confirm that states generally behave in accordance with their role description. For example, Stephen Walker (1979) used Holsti's discourse analysis to illustrate role conception for 71 states. He observed a strong similarity with behaviors encoded in the WEIS database. Naomi Bailin Wish (1980) also observed a similarity between the roles expressed by 29 political leaders from 17 different states and behaviors transcribed in the CREON database. These results support Kal Holsti's conclusion that "the pattern of role conceptions for any state is a fair indicator and possible predictor of diplomatic involvement" (1970a, b: 288).

Occasionally, an actor deviates from the script, but this is usually only temporary. This occurred in Ukraine at the end of the Cold War. After a period of hesitation, Ukraine finally resolved to abandon the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union because it lacked the necessary stature for taking on the role of nuclear power (Chafetz et al. 1996).

However, role theory is neither mechanical nor deterministic. Roles are played in an irregular way. The actor always has some scope to interpret its role (Hollis and Smith 1986). The same role played by two different actors will be interpreted differently. For example, the role of higher-up official is quite different in France and Japan, irrespective of whether it relates to authority, responsibility or empathy. These different approaches are manifest in France and Japan's foreign policy, even when they both assign themselves similar roles (Sampson and Walker 1987). Similarly, the cultural image that the French and Germans have of a leader differs on several counts. This divergence is reflected in their behavior on the European scene (Aggestam 2004). The cultural differences between France and the United States are also manifest in the way they both play messianic roles as liberator and beacon for human rights in developing countries (Holsti 2011).

The question of how states behave when they have assumed contradictory roles is more sensitive. States play several roles on several stages simultaneously. Kal Holsti, who developed a typology with 17 different roles, observes that states take on at least 4.6 roles (1970a, b). The more active a country, the more likely it is to have numerous roles. Yet, some roles may be contradictory. If a state plays these roles on different stages, they can coexist without interfering with one another. However, when events cause different stages to overlap, the state has to find a trade-off between its roles or try to merge them to create a new one.

Saudi Arabia was forced to take a stand when there was a military action against Iraq. Riyadh was torn between its roles of US ally, pillar of Arabism and jealous sovereign state (Barnett 1993). In times of economic crises, the United States is split between its hegemonic role, which must guarantee the international system's stability, and that of unipolar power, which can unilaterally adopt protectionist measures (Cronin 2001). Similarly, during the Falklands War, the United Kingdom had to choose between its role as colonial power or guarantor of stability (McCourt 2011). At the end of the Cold War, Germany was plunged into a dilemma between its leading role in greater European integration and that of a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe (Tewes 1998).

Potential conflicts between different roles significantly reduce roles' predictive capacity. In fact, future research on roles in FPA will have to identify conditions that determine why one role takes precedence over another. Clearly, factors such as the historical context of a specific position, other actors' signals and public demands all influence the trade-offs between different roles.

GENDER

Gender constitutes both an identity and a social role. For example, a feminine identity can be broken down into different social roles depending on whether the interlocutor is an aggressor, a child, a victim, a lover or a father. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the concept of gender has followed the concepts of identity and role and that it has been transposed from a level of interpersonal relationships to one of interstate relations. Authors who transpose the concept of gender in this way to shed new light on foreign policy are usually qualified as "feminists"—although some of them reject this label.

Women, Femininity and Feminism

Feminist theory in international relations is extremely rich and diverse. It includes liberal, Marxist, psychoanalytical, post-structuralist, environmentalist and post-colonialist branches. Not all feminists focus their research on the notion of gender. However, those who do, systematically underline the distinction between the notions of gender and sex (Shepherd 2010).

While sex determines the categories of "man" and "woman" on the basis of biological characteristics, the notion of gender offsets masculinity

and femininity on the basis of socially constructed intersubjective realities. Sex is innate, whereas gender is presumed to be acquired and cultural. Feminists working on gender, such as Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe and Jean Elshtain, firmly reject the essentialist idea that sex determines social behavior.

Although femininity and masculinity are not determined by nature, women and men do not move between genders with total freedom. On the contrary, in the feminists' view, genders are social categories that are so omnipresent and so deeply rooted that their structural impact is concealed by what appears to be a natural order. Feminine and masculine categories are rarely acknowledged or called into question. In the absence of critical thought on gender in the discursive landscape, the tendency is to reproduce inequalities and maintain the dominant patriarchal structures.

On the other hand, feminists consider that emancipation from dominant structures is possible. Genders do not inevitably represent a social category. Indeed, they vary according to cultures, in both time and space. For example, the 1980s were marked by the triumph of masculinity, as much in popular culture as in foreign policy, before it declined somewhat in the 1990s (Jeffords 1993). The United States tends to value masculinity and favor a masculine identity in foreign policy more than North European countries (Richey 2001).

Several critical feminists defend the social ideal of gender reconciliation. In general, greater gender equality is associated with a foreign policy that strikes a better balance between behaviors that are socially considered masculine, like confrontation and trade, and behaviors attributed to femininity, such as aid and cooperation (Goldstein 2002; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Neocleous 2013).

Nonetheless, several feminists consider that integrating more women in the foreign policy decision-making process is not sufficient to achieve this goal. Men still represent the majority in official decision-making circles, such as military staff, ministerial cabinets or parliamentary bodies. Until recently, women mainly played roles that were influential, but ignored, minimized or ridiculed, like that of ambassador's spouse, minister's secretary, peaceful activist or prostitute for military expatriates (Enloe 1989, 1993; Moon 1997). However, this asymmetric status between roles attributed to men and women is not the cause, but the symptom of the cultural problem that interests feminists.

In fact, presuming that a woman who is foreign minister would naturally favor a less aggressive foreign policy than a man does not undermine

the gender structure—it actually reproduces it (Tickner 2002). It conveys the traditional discourse, which associates women with peace and places them politically on an inferior level compared to men.

This discourse does not really correspond to empirical reality either. Opinion polls clearly indicate that women are generally less in favor of military spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012) and less favorable to the use of military force than men (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Eichenberg 2016). Nonetheless, several women heads of state, such as Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher and Golda Meir, proved to be just as aggressive as men and played rather masculine roles when conducting their foreign policy (Cohn 1993). Even the mothers, daughters and spouses that remain in the shadow of foreign policy sometimes adopt behavior and discourses that are more aggressive than is generally expected of them (Elshtain 1995; Tessler et al. 1999).

Nation and State in the Feminist Grammar

Feminists claim that the most important prerequisite to emancipation from gender structural constraints is actually recognizing that they exist. To achieve this, gender should be considered like a grammar whose rules split the world of possibilities into dichotomies. A number of opposites can be added to the masculine/feminine pair, such as strong/weak, active/passive, rational/emotional, violence/compassion, objective/subjective, Western/Eastern, war/peace, modernity/tradition, extravert/introvert, internal/external, culture/nature, mature/immature, autonomy/dependence, high politics/low politics, soiled/pure, having/being, cold/hot, civilized/savage, national/international, thoughtful/impulsive, exclusive/inclusive, taking/giving and superior/inferior. Not only is the world described and perceived in terms of these dichotomies, they are all linked through grammatical gender.

Under this lens, foreign policy, especially security policy, appears to be a typically masculine field. It involves cold and rational behavior, as well as a quest for power and independence. In international relations, conflicts are the norm and demonstrations of force are socially expected. In contrast, domestic policies appear to be a feminine prerogative. They require compassion and solidarity, particularly through education, health and social security policies (Grant 1991; Tickner 1992).

Iconography and discourse analysis show that when it comes to social representation, a nation generally assumes feminine characteristics.

Marianne, Athena, Germania, Europa, Italia Turrata, Mother Russia and Britannia are some of the allegorical figures that personify the essence of a nation. They are the guardians of culture, and they guarantee the metaphorical transmission of traditions and collective memory from generation to generation. The “mother country” bequeaths to its children not only a “mother” tongue, but also a collective identity, which calls for “fraternal” behavior between citizens. Despite this apparently edifying representation, feminists clearly point out that the nation is rooted in and confined to a territory. In Western diplomacy’s imagination, the nation only relates to other nations via the intermediary of the state’s authoritative male figure (Peterson 1995).

According to this feminist approach to social representations, when a nation with feminine traits is threatened by foreign powers, the male state has the duty to protect it. Nothing is more effective in the call to arms than the “rape” of a national territory by foreigners. However, security concerns can equally be used to justify subservience. When a state offers security guarantee in return for absolute subordination, it is behaving exactly like a pimp (Peterson 1992; Pettman 1996; Hooper 2001; Wilcox 2009).

Foreign States and Nations

According to the gender reading of foreign policy, a state’s relationship to foreign populations is particularly complex. When at war, a state generally tries to ensure that its strikes are limited to the enemy’s male personae. Foreign state apparatus and *a fortiori* the military are the first targets. On the other hand, civilians, whether men or women, are traditionally represented as feminine. They are perceived as weak and passive or unaware of their own interests because they are the victims of their own state’s manipulation. Consequently, they should benefit from immunity, unlike military men and women. This distinction between the military and civilians is unwittingly reflected in the discrimination between men and women and is even institutionalized in international law (Kinsella 2005; Carpenter 2006).

Some conflicts are so violent and passionate that civilian immunity is ignored. According to feminists, attacking civilians is tantamount to emasculating the enemy. Systematic rape, as practiced by soldiers during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not only a reproduction of the subordination of women on an interpersonal level, but also an attempt to feminize the masculine enemy by demonstrating its incapacity to protect its own population. To some extent, the forced feminization of Bosnia Herzegovina seems

to have persisted after the war. Bosnia Herzegovina still appears to be weak and incapable of guaranteeing its own destiny without the protection of a High Representative appointed by the UN (Hansen 2006; Helms 2008).

When acts of violence target civilians, the response of third states may vary as a function of the conflict's nature. During civil conflict, non-intervention is the traditional practice of third parties. International violence calls for coordinated third-party intervention, whereas violence that involves a state against its own population is condemned in the discourses, but often ignored in practice. From the feminists' point of view, the duty to intervene in civil conflicts, like the repression of domestic violence, is a relatively recent idea that remains fragile. Irrespective of the level of analysis, the taboo surrounding private violence persists and public authorities often choose to ignore it (Tickner 1992).

On the other hand, if a conflict has an international dimension, an attack on civilians can help justify military intervention. For example, the Taliban regime's oppression of women helped to justify NATO intervention in Afghanistan. The war on terrorism was gradually amalgamated with the fight for women's dignity, both in political discourse and the media. Images promoted by NATO forces and diffused in the media often contrast armed and bearded Taliban men with Afghan schoolgirls, smiling under the protection of NATO soldiers. According to several feminists, this paternalistic stance helped justify NATO's security policy and enabled the United States to reconstruct its masculinity, which had been shattered by the castrating collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 (Cloud 2004; Stabile and Kumar 2005).

Paradoxically, attempts to value the role of Afghan women only served to reproduce gender patterns. Even development aid policies that target women, such as establishing micro-credit systems, aid for family planning or nutritional education, are based on assistance. They presuppose that Westerners are the sole bearers of expert knowledge and that foreign women are dependent, passive and ignorant. Feminists consider that this form of development aid largely reproduces traditional structures. Rather than encouraging gender equality, it reinforces the gender identity of aid donors (Richey 2001; Brenner 2009; Naylor 2011).

In a controversial book, Cynthia Weber argues that the goal of American foreign policy with regard to Cuba is specifically to strengthen the United States' male identity (1999). Until the 1959 revolution, Cuba had a female identity in American minds. It was a pleasure island, associated with casinos, music, rum, sex and cigars. The United States could

justifiably consider it as a conquest, because Battista's regime was in their grip and benefited from Washington's largesse. Yet, this symbol of exoticism and eroticism was brutally distorted when Fidel Castro came to power with his shaggy beard, military uniform, passionate speeches and Soviet missiles, which were pointing at Washington. The United States' prostitute suddenly disclosed its hyper-masculinity. The mere presence of this transgender island just a few kilometers away from the Florida Peninsula was a threat to America's sexual identity. According to Weber, Castro did no less than castrate the United States' masculinity. Consequently, throughout the Cold War, Washington's reaction was homophobic. It sought to bring Cuba back to its traditional femininity through clandestine operations and embargoes, but it carefully avoided a direct confrontation with this "unidentified sexual object" for fear of being soiled. In Weber's view, this feminist narrative of American foreign policy, which is unusual and surprising, is emancipating because it reveals both the omnipresence and the superficiality of gender relations.

Not everyone shares Weber's opinion. Some analysts criticize the interpretative approach used by Weber and other feminists. Robert Keohane made a serious attempt to integrate feminism in the dominant epistemic school of thought. He pointed out that feminism could help redefine the concept of power, not in terms of relative control over other actors, but as the potential for collective gain and fulfillment (1989). However, several feminists fiercely rejected Keohane's invitation to join the ranks of positivism. Tickner claimed that traditional theorists "simply don't understand" the feminist project (1997) and that they "may not ever understand" (2010). Weber went even further by denouncing Keohane for infantilizing feminists with his paternalistic attitude, sermons and encouragement (1994).

In fact, most feminists consider that the discipline of international relations is profoundly patriarchal (Cohn 1987; Tickner 1988, 1992). It is a "hard" discipline, based on actor's rationality, obsessed by quantitative methods that give the illusion of controlling the world. Realism, in particular, conveys a genuine misogynist vision. It rejects moral arguments by insisting on the distinction between national and international policies. It suggests that the international system is anarchic, focuses on state actors and only acknowledges relative gains. Morgenthau's definition of power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (1948: 13), as well as Waltz's classic book *Man, the State and War* (1959), is particularly revealing with regard to their misogynous bias.

Therefore, relations between feminists and icons of classic international relations theories are extremely antagonistic. Nonetheless, most scholars who are dubious about the empirical proof of some feminist research actually recognize that their questions stimulate fundamental critical reflection on the sociology of international relations (Sorenu 2010).

ORGANIZATIONAL AND STRATEGIC CULTURES

Culture has multiple levels, which overlap. Some of the cultural elements presented in this chapter are shared by an entire political community, or even by an entire civilization. Other elements have a narrower scope limited to one organization.

An organizational culture is an integrated system of social constructs, including causal beliefs, normative principles, rituals and discourses, which are specific to an organization, be it a ministry, an army corps or even an intergovernmental organization. Members of an organization share a specific approach when it comes to interpreting their environment and understanding their role.

Research on organizational culture in FPA has emphasized international security issues, otherwise known as “strategic culture”. Strategic culture, however, is not necessarily bounded by the borders of an organizational culture. Another line of research on organizational culture has centered on economic doctrines. In particular, studies have focused on post-war Keynesian theory (Ruggie 1982; Hall 1997), *dependencia* in Latin American countries (Sikkink 1991), neo-liberalism in the 1980s (Rohrlich 1987; Hall 1993; Golob 2003) and regionalism (McNamara 1998; Hay and Rosamond 2002). Here again, it is important to note that not all studies on economic doctrines are centered on organizational cultures. Whether the focus is on security or the economy, research on organizational culture revolves around three main topics: (1) conditions for change, (2) how different organizations interact (3) and the causal relationship between foreign policy behavior and culture.

Stability of Organizational Cultures

Most studies on organizational cultures point out that they are remarkably stable. For example, for over a century, the United States’ strategic culture has revolved around the idea that spreading democracy is favorable to international stability and, therefore, to national security. This idea definitely

shifted between President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points and the Bush administration's efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan, but a certain ideological continuity is undeniable (Anthony 2008).

On the contrary, some ideas, which may seem momentarily omnipresent, never succeed in becoming firmly rooted in organizational culture over time. These ideas may be propounded by a small number of thinkers or result from a specific context, but they evaporate when the conditions leading to their emergence dissipate. This was the case with the concept of "human security", which was central to Canada's foreign policy for a few years. It was relegated to second place with the departure of the influential foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. The idea of "controlled globalization" suffered the same fate in Europe. It was advocated by Pascal Lamy when he was the European Trade Commissioner, but disappeared from the Commission's discourse when he left (Meunier 2007).

Several processes contribute to the stability of organizational cultures. First, at the recruitment stage, organizations attract and select candidates who already appreciate their mission. The army has little vocational appeal for pacifist activists, and ministries of trade rarely recruit Marxist thinkers. Therefore, civil servants working from the same organization rarely reflect the diversity of the population that they come from.

For example, for many years, the Canadian diplomatic service was largely made up of Anglo-Saxon men with urban backgrounds, who had graduated from foreign universities and were economically well off. In comparison, when the Canadian International Development Agency was founded in 1968, it attracted a number of French speakers with a community background, who were critical of American foreign policy. Thus, before even joining a specific ministry, candidates often share a common subculture (Lyon and Brown 1977; Granatstein 1982).

Subsequently, throughout their career, members of an organization are constantly socialized to their organizational culture. The same discourses and practices are continually reproduced. This constant reinforcement, which is characteristic of any organization, is even more flagrant in the diplomatic service and the military corps. Expatriation or life at a military base isolates diplomats and soldiers from the cultural diversity of their country of origin and encourages a feeling of cohesion in the face of the outside world (Neumann 2007; Lequesne and Heilbronn 2012).

Furthermore, some organizations deliberately encourage this tendency for cultural withdrawal. Cohesion is considered necessary for the coherence of overseas representation and for the efficacy of military operations.

Diplomatic services and the armed forces often insist on their members' assimilation and homogenization. Several have their own training services and are reluctant to let civil servants from other ministries join their ranks.

Even organizations that have established policies to promote a degree of ideological diversity struggle to achieve their goals. Multiplying recruitment methods and establishing procedures to allow civil servants to express their dissent usually fall short of breaking the cohesion of an organizational culture (Gurman 2011).

In this context, it is not surprising that members of the same organization hold the same view, adopt the same discourse and use the same routine gestures. Neutrality can be inconceivable in a culture that values alliances; measures of protection against internal threats can be overlooked if the culture focuses on external threats; and the idea of disarmament can be unthinkable in a culture that promotes offensive action.

As a result of this stability, organizational cultures are often out of synch with their environment. There are numerous examples of this. In Europe, just before the outbreak of the First World War, European military forces were so ingrained with a culture lauding offensive action that they failed to realize that new technologies would lead to trench warfare (Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984). In the Soviet Union, organizational culture was so hermetic to change that it went through decades of economic austerity before the advent of Gorbachev when major reforms were made (Blum 1993; Checkel 1993; Mendelson 1993; Stein 1994; Evangelista 1995). In Canada, peacekeeping is so rooted in organizational culture that the Canadian army's engagement in Afghanistan provoked a genuine crisis of legitimacy when the gap between discourses and practice became virtually untenable. In the United States, the interstate paradigm is so entrenched in the intelligence services that neither the end of the Cold War, nor the terrorist attacks on 9/11 were sufficient to lead to a genuine review of security centered on transnational threats (Parker and Stern 2002; Zegart 2007; Sjöstedt 2007).

Although organizational cultures might be stable, they are by no means eternal. Several studies focus specifically on understanding the conditions for cultural change. Most scholars agree that organizational cultures evolve gradually through action, combined with long periods of gestation in terms of ideas and one-off events, which destabilize the existing institutions. Traumatic shocks, such as wars or economic crises, provide political opportunities. Thus, ideas that are already circulating on the fringes of an organizational culture can be integrated and lead to adjustments. America's trade culture has developed in this way since the Second World War. It has slowly

integrated protectionist and regionalist ideas as successive economic crises have occurred, but without ever denying its multilateral liberal heritage. The result may look like incoherent bricolage, but it can be explained by deep institutional attachments and a series of ideational adjustments. Despite some upheavals, the United States has been attached to a multilateral economic system that it helped to establish (Goldstein 1988; Ruggie 1993; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Busby and Monten 2008).

In the same vein, the process of forming a common strategic culture in Europe has attracted considerable expert attention. A common strategic culture is considered to be a prerequisite for establishing a strong European security policy. It is widely acknowledged that the policy will take shape gradually over time. However, there is still some debate about the state of progress of the cultural convergence and how much resistance is exerted by national organizations (Cornish and Edwards 2001 and 2005; Meyer 2006; Mérand 2008; Rogers 2009; Biava 2011).

Interactions between Organizational Cultures

Apart from the question of change and continuity, a burgeoning line of research focuses on the question of interaction between different organizational cultures. Indeed, a state is a conglomerate of different organizations, each with its own culture. At the heart of America's bureaucratic apparatus, the CIA's organizational culture is not the same as that of the FBI, even though their missions overlap (Hook 2008).

When important decisions are made, such as whether or not to intervene in an armed conflict, different organizational cultures may clash. Conventional wisdom suggests that the armed forces prefer massive and decisive military intervention, which maximizes the chances of victory, whereas diplomatic services prefer incremental intervention, which can be used in the framework of a negotiation. For example, there is frequent tension between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former usually advocates a firm attitude, and the latter a more conciliatory approach (Johnston 1995a; Ripley 2002).

However, it would be too much of a caricature to believe that the military always prefers an offensive or aggressive policy. Several historical examples illustrate that the military is sometimes more reluctant to use armed force than civil authorities. This was the case in France during the

interwar period and in the United States after the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Kier 1997).

In addition, there may be several subgroups and dissension within the same organization. Despite being in the army, submariners and paratroopers do not always share the same strategic culture and may have different attitudes and preferences. In fact, it is quite common for the different army corps to establish contrasting organizational identities (Legro 1997).

An organization can even be sensitive to several different cultural tendencies. In Canada, the ministry of foreign affairs is simultaneously permeated by pro-European, pro-continental and pro-international movements, which generate a polymorphic organizational culture (Paquin 2009; Paquin and Beauregard 2013). Similarly, in Italy, nationalist, Atlanticist and pro-European tendencies cross continually and have done for the last century (Brighi 2006). Statements made by political leaders may give the impression that leaders are driven by one trend at a time. However, beneath the superficial fluctuations, different ideological tendencies evolve in parallel.

In fact, the cultures of two organizations from two distinct states may have more in common than the culture of two organizations from the same state. An agency that provides aid to developing countries is probably culturally closer to an equivalent agency in a foreign state than to the ministry of international trade from the same country (Zimmerman 1973). It can be striking to observe that professionals working in the same field, but for different governments, use the same vocabulary and share common rituals and practices, while these cultural elements are foreign to their colleagues in other bureaucratic units. Transgovernmental communities are sometimes established (Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004), some of which can be qualified as communities of practices (Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008, 2016).

Nonetheless, these similarities can conceal significant differences. One of the first contributions made by research on strategic culture in FPA revealed cultural differences between equivalent American and Soviet organizations. The American army clung to the doctrine of rational dissuasion and focused on the question of capacities, while the Soviet army developed a preference for preventive attack and operational planning. Even now and for relatively technical matters involving small organizations in constant interaction, strategic culture differs significantly from one country to another (Snyder 1977; Booth 1979; Gray 1981; Krause 1999).

Strategic Culture

The approach was pioneered by Snyder (1977) and Gray (1981) and gained fresh impetus after the Cold War with research by Johnston (1995), Legro (1997) and Kier (1997). The concept of strategic culture adapts to different levels of analysis, and some authors include social dynamics, which are not formally organized.

Strategic culture focuses on the impact of collective ideas shared by governments' elites on foreign and defense issues. It is an "attempt to integrate cultural considerations, cumulative historical memory and their influences in the analysis of states' security policies and international relations" (Al-Rodhan 2015). This concept is essentially an analytical tool that helps to identify a state's patterns of behavior in foreign and security policy.

Gaullism in France and Atlanticism in the United Kingdom can be assimilated to core post-Second World War strategic cultures. For decades, these cultures have impregnated their foreign and defense policies. Gaullism was a cornerstone of France's foreign and security policies during and even after the Cold War. It was the combination of the idea of "grandeur", independence and resistance to US hegemony in Europe and in the world (Kolodziej 1974; Treacher 2011). This strategic culture led President Charles de Gaulle to remove French military forces from NATO's integrated command in 1966 and to ask for NATO forces to leave French territory. As for Atlanticism in the United Kingdom, it was the idea of maintaining close relationship with the United States to guarantee US security presence in Europe against the Soviet Union as well as British influence on the world stage in the post-1945 era (Wallace and Oliver 2005; Paquin and Beauregard 2015). This strategic culture remained influential after the Cold War. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for instance, invested energy and political capital to be as close as possible to the Bush administration in the early 2000s even if he did not always share the same political views (Wallace and Oliver 2005). Moreover, Atlanticism often confounds with the notion of "bridging", which aims at keeping a strong connection between American and European counterparts in order to preserve harmonious transatlantic relations (Andrews 2005; Walt 2005).

Jack Snyder came up with the concept of strategic culture in the 1970s while writing an analysis on the Soviet strategic culture commissioned by the Rand Corporation, an influential think tank in the United States. Snyder explained in his analysis that:

Soviet decisionmakers (and American decisionmakers, for that matter) do not characteristically approach issues posed by technological change as though they were culture-free systems analysts and game theoreticians. Preexisting strategic notions can strongly influence doctrinal and organizational adaptation to new technologies. (Snyder 1977: 9)

This quote from Snyder's analysis summarizes the main contribution of the strategic culture literature: it offers a relevant criticism of rational choice analysis, which is the core assumption of strategic studies. Proponents of strategic culture argue that states are not ahistorical and rationalist actors trying to maximize their utility based on available information but rather that cultural determinants present in a state will give meaning to objective and materialist variables (Johnston 1995b: 34). As a result, strategic culture suggests that when placed in similar situations, "elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices" (Johnston 1995: 35).

Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) show, for example, that despite being similar countries with respect to colonial past, institutions, language, level of power and military alliances, Canada and Australia did not always make the same strategic calculations in foreign and defense policies. Contrary to Canada, Australia supported US unilateral interventions in places like Vietnam and Iraq. To paraphrase Snyder, this is because Canadian and Australian foreign policy elites are not culture-free agents or computers with legs. They are guided by their respective cumulative memories, political experiences and geographic realities, which all interfere in the rational calculations of their respective foreign policy elites.

Strategic Cultures and Practices

Despite this progress, there is an ongoing conceptual and methodological debate in research on strategic culture, which may seem archaic in the eyes of anthropologists and sociologists. This debate relates to the relationship between strategic culture and foreign policy behavior. It has crystallized around the 20-year-old debate between Colin Gray and Alastair Iain Johnston, which has yet to be resolved.

In Alastair Iain Johnston's view, differentiating between culture and practices is essential. A strategic culture can be translated into an explanatory model to account for states' preferences. To this end, Johnston opts for a limited definition of strategic culture, which only includes symbols. In his words, it is an integrated:

[s]ystem of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. (Johnston 1995b: 46)

This limited definition enables a closer examination of the relationships of causality with foreign policy behavior. Thus, Johnston identified a correlation between China's realist strategic culture and its increasing tendency to resort to force during territorial disputes (1995a).

This rather positivist view, however, was contested by Colin Gray (1999), who maintains that Johnston made a mistake by separating ideas from behavior for the sake of generating falsifiable theory. By defining strategic culture as an explanatory variable and by inclining toward causality, the concept of strategic culture inevitably leads to circular reasoning. A strategic culture cannot be simultaneously a cause and an effect (i.e. states' behavior produces strategic cultures and strategic cultures explain states' behavior). From this perspective, research on strategic culture can only improve our understanding of the general context of a foreign policy decision, but cannot explain it.

This problem of circularity has pushed some analysts away from studying strategic cultures, while led others to lower their theoretical claims. Gray suggests that a more contextual or interpretative definition of strategic culture is in order. He emphasizes that strategic culture results from a co-constitutional process that runs between political elites and the dominant structure of ideas (Gray 1999). This interpretative vision led Gray to define strategic culture as "socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray 1999: 51–52). What is certain is that strategic culture is a contentious concept, which remains at the center of an epistemological debate between positivists and interpretivists (Haglund 2004). Some entertain the hope to turn this concept into a causal theory, but establishing causal relationships between culture and practices remains risky. Others think that it should simply be understood as a contextual analytical tool. An increasing number of analysts recognize that practices and discourses, far from being contradictory, overlap and interact continually to form a cultural whole (Duffield 1999; Neumann and Heikka 2005; Bloomfield and Nossal 2007).

DISCOURSE

Several studies on culture in foreign policy are based on discourse analysis. Undoubtedly, this is not the only pertinent methodological approach. Other methods, including content analysis, participant observation, opinion polls and laboratory experiments, can also further our understanding of culture in foreign policy (Abdelal et al. 2006; Paquin 2012; Paquin and Beauregard 2015). However, discourse analysis has a central and increasingly important position in FPA. Its popularity is linked to the fact that it is not just a method, but a theoretical rallying point common to several approaches, including constructivism, post-structuralism, discursive institutionalism and neo-Gramscian Marxism.

Discourse as a Field of Interaction

In spite of or because of the growing interest in discourse analysis, there is no consensual definition about what constitutes a discourse. Nevertheless, everyone recognizes that discourses are social practices. They do not refer to objects that exist independently of social relations, but they convey intersubjective interpretations that give meaning to objects.

The meaning of “conventional weapon” and “weapon of mass destruction”, for example, is shared by all weapons experts. Yet, there is nothing natural or obvious about them. A car is not considered to be a conventional weapon and an airplane is not considered to be a weapon of mass destruction. Yet, that is not because their material properties prevent them from being defined as such. It is because these meanings are not attributed to them by the social and cultural contexts (Price 1997; Mutimer 2000).

For discourse analysts, the reality beyond the discourse is not relevant for understanding foreign policy. Like missiles or freight cargoes, the material realities of foreign policy can exist independently of discourse and thought. However, without discourse, the world has no meaning and, therefore, cannot be studied by social sciences. It is the discourse that gives meaning to statements.

Therefore, a discourse is a combination of different meanings, some of which may be implicit. For example, President Bush’s discourse on the “war on terror” is the result of a unique combination of a specific idea of war and a specific idea of terrorism. The social reproduction of this combination initially constructs the discourse on the war on terror and then stabilizes it (Heng 2002; Jackson 2005; Croft 2006; Dryzek 2006; Nabers 2009; Holland 2012).

Several discourses even generate ambiguity, which means that different interpretations can coexist. They are riddled with empty signifiers, such as “governance”, “equity” or “democracy”. These signifiers make it possible to link disparate ideas and engage actors that would otherwise be irreconcilable. The discourses in Beijing and Taipei relating to the Chinese nation and the status of Taiwan generate confusion. Consequently, both can affirm their respective identity and avoid a clash. A similar ambiguity characterizes several discourses on the European security policy, which means it is open to different interpretations in Paris, Berlin and London (Zheng 2001; Howorth 2004; Avruch and Wang 2005; Rogers 2009).

Although discourses are ambiguous, they do provide a framework. Their rules determine what can be thought and stated. By giving meaning to an object and putting that meaning in a broader context, a discourse defines the parameters in terms of the possibilities of thought and action in relation to that object. Even democracies that promote the plurality of opinion are constrained, in reality, by their own discourse on ethical pluralism (Gaskarth 2006).

Thus, different discourses on Iraq and North Korea led the Bush administration to adopt different policies with regard to the two countries. In 2003, Iraq and North Korea alike had equally repressive regimes. They both appeared on the list of states that support terrorism, were suspected of developing a nuclear weapons program and refused inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet, the United States only used military force against Iraq. This inconsistent behavior can be explained in part by the fact that since the early 1990s, the White House systematically challenged Iraq with a confrontational discourse, whereas the discourse on North Korea was one of negotiation. After more than a decade of reproducing these discourses, the actions envisaged for one country were inconceivable for the other (Howard 2004).

Furthermore, discourses are productive. They do not simply impede thought and perception; they directly construct reality, by generating subjects, objects and the relations linking the two. For example, the discourse on the right to asylum developed after the Second World War created the contemporary identities of refugees and the regions that welcomed them. Like many discourses, it was institutionalized in diverse forms, including organizations, law and social norms (Phillips and Hardy 1997).

Several studies on FPA examine the performative dimension of discourses using securitization theory, which was developed by the Copenhagen school of thought around researchers like Ole Wæver (Buzan et al. 1998).

According to the Copenhagen school, political leaders actually construct state security or rather its insecurity, through discourse. Securing an object is a speech act. When an official declares “I pronounce you man and wife”, they are not simply describing a situation, but transforming it. Similarly, when a decision-maker states that immigration or climate change threatens state security, they help create that very threat.

Securing an object does not exclude it from political debate. Discourses are likely to be modified by actors because they combine different ideas and remain ambiguous. Their interactive dimension can be added to their substantive dimension. Discourses favor some actors, but they are also a space where struggles and conflicts arise. Meanings may be disputed or vindicated. As interactions occur, discursive elements are gradually added, removed or reinterpreted. In this perspective, discourses are not a vague reflection of society, but the actual setting for social interaction (Schmidt 2008, 2010).

Political leaders sometimes modify their own discourses to make certain foreign policies conceivable or acceptable. This was the case when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. From the American point of view, the agreement evoked the United States’ paternalistic discourse with regard to Latin America, as well as the liberal discourse on mutually beneficial trade between equal partners. A third component, focusing on liberalization as a vector of stability and democracy, was required to link the two discourses, which meant that the United States could portray itself as a development provider (Skonieczny 2001).

Thus, existing discourses give meaning to new linkages, which in turn produce new discourses. This explains the fact that discourses are more likely to change than to be replaced and that their origin may go back to totally unrelated contexts. The discourse on the war on terror was derived from the discourse on the “just war”, developed as early as the Middle Ages. After being reworded and diffused by the Bush administration, it was modified by other actors who adopted it, including the Serb nationalists who were trying to justify their claims. Consequently, we can trace the origin of the Serb Radical Party’s discourse as far back as Pope Urban II, a thousand years earlier, although they no longer have anything in common (Graham et al. 2004; Erjavec and Volcic 2007).

Some discourses actually generate new conflicting discourses. For example, a discourse on international measures for whale conservation led to the development of two opposing discourses. One advocates an international moratorium on whaling and the other advocates coordinated and

sustainable whaling (Epstein 2008). These disruptions and reversals are relatively frequent. Norms, identities and roles are generally consolidated by positive feedback loops, which guarantee their stability. In comparison, discourses are more dynamic and subject to change (Schmidt 2008).

Methods of Discourse Analysis

On a methodological level, discourse analysis in foreign policy can use different types of material. Discourses can take different forms and their tone may range from technical to popular.

Some researchers limit their study to the analysis of speeches given by heads of state. Among these researchers, some focus on spontaneous declarations, such as responses to journalists' questions or the transcripts of parliamentary committee debates. They see this as a way to avoid the influence of speechwriters and get closer to the political leaders' genuine beliefs.

However, some scholars study discourses that have been carefully articulated by communications experts, such as those found in press releases. These are a better reflection of the rhetorical strategies that the leaders wish to communicate to guide public debates. The choice depends on research objectives, but it should be made carefully. Comparative analyses reveal major differences between spontaneous declarations and the speeches that the same political leaders have read from a written text (Guttieri et al. 1995; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Shannon and Keller 2007).

It is also possible to distinguish political discourses designed to communicate from those designed to coordinate. The former is geared to the public, while the latter is destined for other decision-makers. Here again, analysis indicates that the same political leader significantly adjusts his discourse on a given foreign policy issue according to the audience being addressed (Schmidt 2008).

Several speech analysts do not limit themselves to declarations made by political leaders. As discourses are cultural, they are shared by an entire community. This community may be limited to a ministry or a political party, but it can also be extended to a civilization. Some analysts retrace the discourses relating to foreign policy that are conveyed in popular culture by working on novels, comic books or textbooks, for example (Lipschutz 2001; Hopf 2002; Sjöstedt 2007).

Although it is easier to analyze a discourse if it is written down, it is important to recognize that not all discourses are necessarily expressed in words. Arrangements, practices and rituals are non-verbal means of communicating

and conveying meaning. They shed light on how actors understand each other, their environment and their conduct. Military parades, funerals for soldiers killed in action and the staging of photographs of ministers overseas also constitute discourse that is communicated by the state. Foreign policy research has even analyzed the discourses conveyed by caricatures, video games, press photographs and films from Hollywood. Both *Star Trek* and *Harry Potter* were used successfully to shed light on how a society portrays itself, defines insecurity and conceives foreign policy (Campbell 2003; Weldes 2003; Neumann and Nexon 2006; Der Derian 2009).

These different sources are generally analyzed through their intertextuality. This involves comparing different sources in order to determine the relationship between them, be it one of filiation, antagonism, reversal or envelopment. It also involves picking out any traces of other universe of representations. This approach makes it possible to determine the outline of a discourse and track its development.

Several techniques can be used to analyze intertextuality (Milliken 1999; Mattern 2001; Hardy et al. 2004; Hopf 2004; Laffey and Weldes 2004). Most analysts use an interpretative approach. Rather than analyzing sources with a predetermined grid, as is generally the case in content analysis, they prefer exploring texts. Using an inductive approach, their own contextual knowledge guides them as they chart intertextual references and reconstruct the origins of a discourse. This method makes it possible to take into account the fragile and changing linkages between the elements of a discourse. In addition, it helps detect implicit references, as well as the elements that are overlooked.

A growing number of researchers, inspired by linguistic techniques, also use lexicometric analysis. Different software provide statistical tools, which make it possible to describe or compare lengthy texts on the basis of their vocabulary. These tools can be applied in a hypothetical deductive approach, as well as in an inductive approach. In particular, the software can identify the most frequent and the most specific lexical fields in a text. These data can then guide intertextual and contextual research (Nabers 2009).

For example, a comparative analysis of press releases from NGOs and pharmaceutical companies relating to the export of medicines to developing countries revealed that NGOs use a more technical and legal lexicon with a statistical overrepresentation of terms, such as “amendments”, “implementation” or “regulation”. This preliminary observation subsequently led researchers to examine the origin of the discourse’s technical nature and its impact on trade policy (Bubela and Morin 2010; Morin 2010).

Another approach to speech analysis focuses on metaphors. Metaphors are stylistic devices that facilitate the articulation of different ideas. They can evoke several ideas in just a few words. The “arms race” metaphor simultaneously expresses rivalry between states, the potential breach in stability that would occur if a winner were declared and the fact that no turning back is possible. The metaphor of “rogue” states implies that a set of rules is applicable to the entire international community, that these rules are repeatedly violated by a minority of states, which are only motivated by their material interests, and that these states should be sanctioned before they disrupt the established order (Doty 1993; Shimko 1994; Chilton 1996; Kuusisto 1998; Paris 2002; O’Reilly 2007; Kornprobst et al. 2008; Flanik 2011).

The selection of a metaphor is not insignificant. Each metaphor points to specific behavior, albeit implicitly. During the Cold War, it was judged necessary to intervene in Asia because only an outside force could offset “the domino effect” and counterbalance communist pressure. Inversely, in the early 1990s, it was considered unnecessarily dangerous to intervene in the Balkans because, historically, the conflicts in this “powder keg” are determined by intrinsic factors (Kuusisto 1998).

Metaphors structure thought with such force that they can generate realities that their authors simply want to evoke. The term “war on drugs” coined by President Nixon came before, not after, the military interventions that sought to reduce the supply of narcotics from Latin American countries. The Obama administration abandoned the expression in order to mark its determination to deal with the issue through the prism of public health. This illustrates how, like all discourses, metaphors are not merely words that reflect reality; they actually produce reality (Whitford and Yates 2009).

In summary, using discourse analysis to gain insight into foreign policy is not a new approach. It has been used by advocates of the cognitive approach since the 1960s. The real novelty is acknowledging that discourses, and culture overall, construct reality. More than 25 years after the emergence of constructivism in international relations, this concept is still challenging and continues to generate epistemic and methodological controversies.

The next chapter presents the systemic level of analysis and asks whether the structure of the international system helps to explain foreign policy.

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Does the International Structure Explain Foreign Policy?

Kenneth Waltz argues that states' foreign policy decisions "are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them". He claims that, as a result, "[i]t is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states" (Waltz 1979: 65). This statement is in sharp contrast with the assumptions of the microscopic level of analysis, which was the main focus of the previous chapters as well as the cornerstone of FPA as a field of study (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961).

Following Waltz's assertion, theories focusing exclusively on the macroscopic scale of analysis emerged in the 1970s. These theories assign a dominant role to the structure of the international system, which is viewed as an autonomous and regulatory body (Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981). They maintain that the state is so entrenched in this international structure and in the organizing principles of international relations that the structure constrains and largely determines the state's behavior, just as the market shapes the behavior of investors, producers and consumers.

The emergence of structural theories intensified the agent–structure debate, which has been at the center of social science discussions since their inception (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992). The debate focuses on the sources of actor behavior. Some argue that the decisions of those who determine foreign policy are conditioned by the structure of the system (such as the distribution of military resources

and prevailing rules and norms), while others maintain that individuals are able to act and make their own choices autonomously and relatively freely from structure (Dessler 1989).

Even if the primary aim of structural theories is to explain the outcome of states' interactions rather than foreign policy *per se*, the structure of the international system is an important component of foreign policy decision-making: it defines the parameters within which foreign policy options are debated; it shapes states' opportunities and constraints and makes certain policy options appealing and others simply unthinkable.

According to Christopher Hill, the international system has three reinforcing logics: "the logic of economics (including structures of trade, production and investment); the logic of politics (which is the competition over how the world is to be organized and resources are to be allocated); and the logic of knowledge", which refers to the world of ideas (2003: 165). The 1968 Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was made possible by the bipolar structure of the system, which conferred spheres of influence on the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers. Back then, the three logics of the system defined by Hill were well understood by state actors. This ultimately explains why the United States and its allies did not flinch when Soviet tanks entered Prague (Lundestad 1975; Mearsheimer 2001b). A similar action taken by Moscow today would have a different meaning and trigger a different response as the international system has a different structure.

Since the structure of the international system matters to decision-makers, it must matter equally to foreign policy experts. Excluding it from the equation would deprive researchers of an important tool for understanding foreign policymaking. Yet, for years, foreign policy experts have tended to focus on the domestic structures of societies, as we have seen in the previous chapters, while leaving the study of the international system to international relations theorists (Hudson 1997b).

This chapter has for main objective to bring together the microscopic and the macroscopic levels of analysis by looking at how consideration of international structure can contribute to FPA. It looks at the shift toward structural theory of international relations by introducing some of the dominant macroscopic theories and approaches. The chapter then addresses the limits and criticisms of this level of analysis, and presents theoretical propositions that try to reconcile different interpretations of agent and structure role.

STRUCTURAL THEORIES

Until the late 1970s, most theories of international relations viewed the international system as the product of states' behavior, without recognizing the dominant role of this structure as an autonomous and regulatory body (Kaplan 1966). But things changed as new theories that focused exclusively on the macroscopic scale were developed in order to emphasize the basic sources of international dynamics. Some of these theories, such as Kenneth Waltz's neorealism and Immanuel Wallenstein's world-system theory, went as far as assuming that structure determines states' behavior, while others, such as constructivism or international society theory, went only as far as suggesting that structure constrains actors' decisions (Wendt 1987). This evolution in the field of international relations led to a clear division between FPA and structural theories.

Structural Shift in International Relations

Initially developed by Waltz (1959, 1979), neorealism (or structural realism) has long been viewed as the dominant structural paradigm in international relations (Gilpin 1981; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001a, b). This paradigm centers on the material structure of the system, that is, on the distribution of military resources between sovereign states. Neorealists assert that it is the level of a state's material resources, relative to the other states, that fixes its position in the structure as well as its international behavior, regardless of its domestic characteristics. According to Waltz's theory, states are homogeneous units of the system that are functionally equivalent and fully conditioned by the international structure.

This paradigm is built on five main theoretical assumptions, which are closely related to one another and endorsed, to varying degrees, by all its supporters. First, the state is the basic unit of international relations. Second, states systematically try to maximize their own utility in a rational and egoistic manner. Third, the utility of states is defined in terms of survival. Whether states cooperate or wage war, their ultimate interest is to maximize their chances of survival. Fourth, in this quest for survival, states evolve in a self-help environment as they cannot rely on the assistance of a supranational hierarchical authority. Thus, the international system is fundamentally anarchic, even when it appears to be stable and ordered. Fifth, since states can only count on themselves, they are in constant competition for the accumulation of material resources in a zero-sum game: what one wins, the other loses.

Balance of power (or balancing) is the cornerstone theory of the neo-realist paradigm. Although there are different variants of balance of power, the basic idea is that the state naturally tends to balance against a rising power, often by joining military alliances, in order to secure itself in an anarchic world (Waltz 1979; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Parent and Rosato 2015; Oskanian 2016).

Bandwagoning, another central theory of neorealism, is the opposite of balancing. It describes the inclination of a weak state to side with a hegemonic or threatening power to maximize its material gains and to ensure its own survival. A weak state bandwagons when it estimates that the costs of opposing or balancing a hegemonic power exceed the anticipated benefits of supporting it (Walt 1988; Schweller 1994, 1996; Mearsheimer 2001a, b; Grigorescu 2008; Ratti 2012).

Neorealists, however, faced a significant challenge in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990). The United States remained as the sole superpower and no state, or group of states, could seriously pretend to militarily counterbalance the American hegemon (Pape 2005; Massie 2014). As Brooks and Wohlforth explain, “counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively costly for the other major powers. Because no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international system” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008: 23; Wohlforth 1999; Layne 2004).

As a result, some neorealists refined the balance of power argument and argued that “soft-balancing” was the natural way for states to behave under unipolarity (Paul 2005; He and Feng 2008; Saltzman 2012). Soft-balancing focuses on non-military strategies that combine diplomatic, economic and institutional means to resist, constrain or, to use Stephen Walt’s expression, “tame” US hegemony (Walt 2005; Cantir and Kennedy 2015; Friedman and Long 2015).

Aside from neorealism, world-system theory is another example of a macroscopic and deterministic argument that had a major impact in the field of international relations (Wallerstein 1974; Frank and Gills 1993; Hopkins et al. 1996; Komlosy et al. 2016). This neo-Marxist approach emphasizes the world division of labor between capitalist states as the structural foundation of the capitalist world-economy. The anarchic international system depicted by neorealists is replaced here by the global capitalist economy as the main explanation of international interactions.

For Wallerstein (1974), the leading contributor of world-system theory, the world can be understood as a pyramid on top of which lay high-skill capital-intensive production countries. These countries are the core of the system, and the United States is currently at the top of this category. At the bottom of the pyramid is the periphery, where the least developed countries are located. These states are exploited by the core for their labor and raw resources and include today's poorest developing countries. Finally, the semi-periphery is the intermediate category between the top and the bottom where states are either trying to elevate themselves to, or are falling down from, the core of the world-system. Semi-peripheral states are, simultaneously, being exploited by the core and exploiting the periphery. India and China are current examples of states in the semi-periphery. They give an illusion of fluidity and possible catching-up, providing some political stability to the capitalist system.

In this system, states pursue their own political and economic interests and often adopt policies, such as economic protectionism, that go against the logic and interests of the world capitalist system. Only a global hegemonic power can resolve this contradiction between national interests and global capitalist interests. The hegemon can "exert its will on the other states within the system. It uses that power to ensure the free flow of goods and capital and to undermine economic nationalism" (Hurst 2005: 111).

Thus, according to world-system theory, the world capitalist system was made possible by a strong hegemonic state that established the rules of the world capitalist system through military force, technology and ideas. This was a condition for capitalism to emerge in the sixteenth century and spread worldwide as successive great powers, such as Spain, Holland, France, Britain and the United States, managed to extract and transfer surplus resources from the periphery to the center.

The international society theory is a third theoretical approach that takes structure seriously. Hedley Bull (1977), a pioneer of international society theory, shares the neorealist assumption that the international system is anarchic, but his notion of the international society, or his "society of states" approach, leads him to make a different and somewhat less deterministic structural argument. Bull argues that under an international society, states' international behavior is governed by a set of normative institutions, by which he means habits, rules, principles and norms that are commonly accepted and shared by sovereign states in the conduct of their relations. These institutions are made possible when there is "a consensus among states that they share some common

interests and conceive themselves as being related to each other” (Griffiths 1999: 147; see also Bull and Watson 1986).

According to Bull, international law, diplomacy, reciprocal recognition, balance of power and war are key agreed-upon institutions through which the international society of states can maintain the international order needed to pursue and maintain peace and security (Bull 1977; Wight 1991; Little 2000). Hence, the international order is generated by all members of the international society and not, as neorealists maintain, simply by great powers. Without such a consensual understanding among states, however, there is no international society but only an international system defined by power politics and anarchy (Buzan 1993). For instance, although an international system of states emerged in Europe in the fifteenth century, it took centuries before a truly international society emerged in Europe in the late nineteenth century (Gong 1984, Buzan 1993). The international system is therefore a necessary condition for an international society to emerge. Bull’s argument suggests that not only do these institutions, taken as a normative framework, constrain states’ behavior, but sovereign states often prioritize the well-being of these institutions at the expense of their own interests.

Like for neorealism or world-system theory, international society theory does not attempt to predict specific state behavior (Little 2000). Some have also criticized it for its lack of theoretical clarity (Waever 1992; Buzan 1993; Finnemore 2001). Nevertheless, this theoretical proposition implies that normative structural considerations, much more so than domestic rational calculation, shape states’ international behavior.

Like international society theory, constructivists understand the international society as a social construction that gives meaning to states’ actions. In the 1990s, constructivists such as Friedrich Kratochwil (1991), Alexander Wendt (1992) and Nicholas Onuf (2012) drew attention on the intersubjective ideational structures that give meaning to international relations. Unlike material structures shaped by the distribution of resources among states, ideational structures are socially constructed, which means that they are not exogenously defined but rather the product of constant interactions between agents. The main distinction between international society theory and constructivism is that international society theory suggests that that norms and principles matter only when an international society of states has developed, while constructivists always see international politics as a social construction.

Constructivists argue that the international structure is made up of norms and rules that define the “reality” of international relations as well as

the identity and interests of state actors. As Wendt explains, “It is through reciprocal interaction, in other words, that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests” (1992: 406). Once constituted, the social norms that make up the ideational structures, such as sovereignty or anarchy, become social facts that reinforce certain state behaviors and marginalize others (Wendt 1995, 1996, 1999; Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1998).

Of course, constructivists do not deny the materiality of facts, whether an intergovernmental conference, the dropping of a bomb or the signing of a treaty. However, they consider that it is the social meaning of these facts that matter above all. For instance, are these facts a manifestation of friendly or adversarial relations? As Wendt points out, “A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, relation” (1996: 50).

Limits and Criticism

During the Cold War, the stability of the international structure made systemic theories quite appealing. Western experts did not know much about what was happening inside the Chinese or the Soviet states and they did not have enough information to explain these great powers’ preferences. Structural theories therefore provided a convenient way to explain and predict states’ interactions because they conceived of the state as a unitary and rational actor (Hudson 2010). This led Alexander Wendt to criticize neorealism and world-system theory for being inadequate to explain state action because they fail to recognize the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures (Wendt 1987).

By arguing that it is the system as a whole that dictates states’ behavior, structural theories fail to explain change in the international system because the only possible source of change is the system itself (Moravcsik 1997; Hurst 2005). Neorealism failed, for instance, to predict the end of the Cold War and the systemic transformations that came with it (Lebow 1994). A few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kenneth Waltz confidently wrote that “[a]lthough [the Cold War] content and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics and will last as long as that structure endures” (Waltz 1989: 52). This infamous quote is often cited in international relations textbooks as a critique of the systemic determinism of neorealism.

A substantial part of FPA research opposes the primacy of the system's structure to explain foreign policy. The analogy of the state as a billiard ball, originally popularized by Arnold Wolfers (1962), is often used by FPA experts to criticize systemic theories (Fordham and Asal 2007). They argue that states cannot be treated as opaque, monolithic balls that are functionally interchangeable. They reject the idea that states all react in the same way when hit and that only their positions on the board are important in predicting their behavior.

On the contrary, the vast majority of FPA experts recognize that state actors have much more autonomy than what structural theories claim, regardless of the structure in which they operate. They recognize that taking domestic variables into account sometimes makes theoretical explanations more complex, but ignoring them completely in favor of systemic models generates simple and, ultimately, impotent explanations (Ripley 1993; Hagan 2001).

Jordan and Syria are good examples in this regard. Although Syria is more populous than Jordan and more heterogeneous ethnically and religiously, their geographical location and the type of resources they control are relatively similar. Yet, Jordan and Syria have adopted diametrically opposed behaviors, the former allying itself with Western powers and the latter being hostile to them. This difference in behavior can only be explained by examining their respective histories as well as political and social forces (Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006). Hence, while neorealism argues that systemic pressures explain why very different states behave similarly, it cannot explain why states sharing similar material capabilities behave differently. Therefore, snowflakes are a more appropriate analogy for states than billiard balls because while their trajectories are certainly affected by joint forces such as gravity and wind, they vary according to their internal and multidimensional characteristics (Fordham and Asal 2007).

Tensions between supporters of the structural perspective and those who favor state-specific dynamics have crystallized around the issue of the use of armed forces. Some studies indicate that military interventions have a more significant statistical relationship with the variation of the distribution of military resources in the international system than with the evolution of electoral calendars, public opinion and political parties in power (Meernik 1993; Gowa 1998). Other studies, however, conclude that the use of force varies more with internal policy changes than with changes in the international environment (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991).

The most compelling works are undoubtedly those that recognize that the actions of agents and the constraints of international structure are distinct but complementary. Internal and external factors are involved at different stages of the process leading to an armed conflict (Rose 1998; Dyson 2010; von Hlatky 2013). These more nuanced studies, however, attract less attention than those that defend the most entrenched positions (Gaubatz 1999).

CAN STRUCTURAL THEORIES INFORM FOREIGN POLICY?

For years, scientific orthodoxy had advocated a strict distinction between the national and the international levels of analysis. Syncretism was perceived as a breach of the imperatives of theoretical coherence. Throughout his career, Kenneth Waltz argued for a rigid distinction between the study of international politics and the study of foreign policy. He argued that his structural model can explain and predict systemic orientations, or war and peace, but that neorealism cannot and should not attempt to predict anything about foreign policy because his model is at too high a level of generality and abstraction to explain a particular state behavior. Hence, Waltz categorically refused to reconcile neorealism and FPA.

The question, then, is how can we test structural theories if we cannot link them to states' behavior? According to some, the conceptual division between structural theories and theories of foreign policy is harmful to the advancement of knowledge in international relations (Schweller 2003). Randall Schweller argues that structural theories must specify the connection between systemic causes and states' behavior. Otherwise, this division "creates problems with theory testing and evaluation, because our confidence in an explanation rests on its fit with the actual behavior of states under the conditions specified by the theory" (Schweller 2003: 322).

Schweller is not the only one to believe that the structure can and should inform foreign policy. Some argue that structural realism "does not provide a theory of foreign policy," but by stressing the importance of relative power and security, it does have something to say about foreign policy (Telhami 2002: 170).

Even Waltz himself relied on multiple foreign policy examples to defend his neorealist argument in his seminal theory of international politics. Waltz did not hesitate, for instance, to use "his version of neorealist theory to predict German and Japanese foreign policies in the post-Cold War

world (Elman 1996: 10). This is ironic considering Waltz' explicit stance on the agent–structure debate as well as confusing to the reader who is trying to make sense of his structural argument.

Structural Assumptions and State Units

Whether one agrees with the strict distinction between systemic theories and foreign policy theories, those who choose to apply systemic assumptions at the national level must be creative and vigilant. They must specify the connection between structural assumptions and states' motivations and interests, while making sure to maintain logical consistency in the process.

Over the years, several studies have taken up this challenge by drawing foreign policy implications from structural theories (Grieco 1988, 1990; Paquin 2008, 2010). Despite Waltz's attempt to keep his neorealist argument out of the realm of foreign policy, several authors have used neorealism to inform foreign policy, following Colin Elman's statement according to which "neorealist theories are suitable for making statements about individual state's foreign policies" (Elman 1996: 48).

Joseph Nye (2005), for instance, relies on balancing to explain why Syria allied with Iran during the Iran–Iraq war at the start of the 1980s despite its linguistic and ideological connections to Iraq. By allying with Iran, which appeared weaker than Iraq, Syria wanted to prevent Saddam Hussein's regime from becoming a preponderant power in the region (Nye 2005: 64). The theory of bandwagoning was also used to explain specific foreign policy. The decision made by the Czech government in 1938 to peacefully agree to the Munich agreement, which allowed Germany to annex the German-speaking portion of its territory, obeyed that logic (Labs 1992). Opposing or balancing Nazi Germany would have probably precipitated war with Hitler and threatened Czechoslovakia's survival since its geographical proximity made it "a prime and early target for conquest" (Labs 1992: 393).

Robert Pape (2005) uses soft-balancing to explain US allies' foreign policy in the weeks leading up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Allies used political and institutional means to oppose the warmonger administration of George W. Bush. As Pape explains, "France, Sweden, and other European states used institutional rules and procedures in the UN to delay, if not head off completely, U.S. preventive war against Iraq" (Pape 2005: 38–39).

For his part, David Skidmore (2005) explains that American unilateralism under George W. Bush was not simply rooted in the neoconservative

ideas upheld by his administration but must be understood more broadly in terms of the unipolar structure of the international system. Skidmore maintains that unilateralism was not a unique feature of the Bush administration but rather a constant structural dynamic that encompassed every administration since the end of the Cold War when the United States became the sole remaining superpower. He argues that:

with the removal of the Soviet threat, American presidents have gained greater scope to act independently of international opinion abroad combined with less freedom to resist the influence of parochial, antimultilateralist interest groups at home. This analysis suggests that the structural sources of unilateralism in American foreign policy have deeper roots than the ideological complexion of the Bush administration. (Skidmore 2005: 208)

Similarly, Robert Kagan explains that the difference between Europe and the United States as far as their foreign policy is concerned is not rooted in their different values and national character but rather in their relative material power. He argues that the structural distribution of power explains the changing role and interests of the United States and Europe since the Second World War. Kagan maintains that Europe's current commitment to multilateralism and international law is due to the relative decline of its power and its inability to reach its ends through other means (Kagan 2002). Europe is relatively weak, the argument goes, so it is natural that it has developed an aversion to the use of power. It is also natural that Europe has greater tolerance for threat, such as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, because it lacks the means to address the problem. In conclusion, the asymmetry in the respective levels of material power of the United States and Europe has led them to perceive the world differently and to adopt different discourses, justifications and strategies.

Others have adapted Hedley Bull's international society argument to foreign policy. Despite its medium-sized material capabilities, India behaved as a great power from 1947 to 1962, notably by fighting US and Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia. This behavior is puzzling because of the lack of correspondence between India's relative power and its geostrategic ambitions. By relying on the international society argument, we can gain a broader understanding of India's preferences (Roy 2011).

As a member of international society, India subscribed to its core institutions and cherished the international order that resulted from them. The international society argument would suggest that, when faced with

the great power rivalry between the United States and China in Asia, India felt insecure and feared that this rivalry could compromise the international order. Nehru's concern for the protection of normative institutions, including the principle of sovereignty, coupled with the state's feeling of insecurity, would therefore account for India's puzzling post-1945 behavior (Roy 2011).

Foreign policy experts have also built on Wallerstein's world-system theory to provide foreign policy explanations. Harry Truman's policy toward Western Europe following the Second World War is a case in point (McCormick 1995). Back then, the world capitalist system was in crisis because Western European economies were struggling to rebuild. This structural crisis put pressure on the Truman administration to adopt the Marshall Plan to prevent Western Europe from reverting to economic nationalism, and to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The ultimate objective of this economic stimulus package was to guarantee the flow of goods and capital in a world capitalist economy that benefited, above all, the American hegemonic power (McCormick 1995; Hurst 2005).

Constructivism also makes it possible to establish synergies between FPA and the structure of the system. Since ideational structures are socially constructed by agents, constructivists do not see agents as solely dominated by structure, but also as producers of their own structure. Most constructivists argue that agents and structures co-constitute and co-determine each other. The international structure therefore defines the playing field in which foreign policy agents operate, and agents, through their discourses and practices, reproduce and transform the structure (Börzel 2002).

A telling example of the importance of ideational structures for states' foreign policy is the radical transformation of the US Congress and the shift in President Reagan's position on the apartheid regime in South Africa (Klotz 1995) from conciliatory to hostile. This change of policy is both surprising and counterintuitive since the segregationist South African regime was an important US ally against communism and a reliable economic partner of the United States. In the 1980s, an anti-apartheid transnational community strengthened the social norm on racial equality by denouncing the segregationist regime of South Africa. This community associated the pro-apartheid position of the Reagan administration with a racist position, which propelled the issue to a national debate and led congressional Democrats to speak against the apartheid regime. With the help of moderate Republicans, Congress eventually passed tough sanctions against South Africa through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,

with which the Reagan administration was compelled to comply. Hence, constructivism suggests that only a change in the ideational structure of international relations can help us understand this surprising policy shift.

Constructivists subscribing to the idea of co-constitutionality feel compelled, however, to choose between structure and agent as an analytical entry point, to avoid the circular argument that ideas are both the causes and the consequences of actors' behavior. Facing the chicken or the egg dilemma, most constructivists choose to focus on structures to explain agents rather than the reverse. This structural perspective, however, is often criticized. Valerie Hudson, for instance, reminds us that since only human beings have ideas, agents must precede the constitution of the international structure (Hudson 1997a, b). Of course, we could counterargue that humans would not have political and social ideas without them being socialized in an ideational structure.

RECONCILING AGENT AND STRUCTURE

Peter Gourevitch was one of the first theorists to attempt to reconcile the different levels of analysis. As he argued, “[t]he international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them”. Consequently, “international relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes” (Gourevitch 1978: 911).

Robert Putnam has also contributed to this discussion by making a convincing demonstration of the relevance of integrating levels of analysis in the study of international negotiations through his two-level game theory (Putnam 1988). In his opinion, it is useless to try to find which level best explains international relations, because they all play a role. As Putnam argues, “It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’ The most interesting questions are ‘When?’ and ‘How?’” (Putnam 1988: 427).

Far from having achieved a consensus, the agent–structure reconciliation has nevertheless gained considerable momentum over the last decades. Not only individual research initiatives have applied structural assumptions to state units, as we have seen in the last section, but new schools of thought and research programs are trying to bridge the gap by explicitly connecting agent and structure in a constructive way. These approaches tend to fall into two categories: those that start from structure and extend

to agents and those that focus on agents and then connect to structure. The remainder of this chapter presents two theoretical flagships that illustrate these categories, namely, neoclassical realism and behavioral international relations (Behavioral IR).

From Structure to Agent

Starting from the perspective of structure, neoclassical realism, which emerged in the 1990s, opens the analysis explicitly to agents and their perceptual biases (Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1996; Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Schweller 2003; Layne 2006; Dueck 2006; Rathbun 2008; Lobell et al. 2009; Dyson 2010; Juneau 2015; Ripsman et al. 2016). This school of thought was developed by scholars who argued that systemic theories of international politics were ill-equipped to explain, for instance, “how superpowers would define their competitive relationship, let alone the nuances and evolution of their respective grand strategies” (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 2).

Without abandoning the neorealist primacy of the international structure, which they define as the primary independent variable, neoclassical realism reaches out to classical realist authors, such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Henry Kissinger, who integrated ideas and domestic political variables into their analyses of the international system. This explains why Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” to define this emerging school of thought (Rose 1998).

According to neoclassical realism, the impact of structure must be studied at the national level through a series of intervening variables that “filter” structural constraints through leaders’ perceptions, state institutions, societal cohesion, the role of political elites and access to material resources. These intervening variables are very important because they have a direct impact on decision-makers’ ability to make decisions. While neorealism claims that states with similar material resources will behave in a similar way, neoclassical realists explain that they may actually take different, or even opposite, routes if they have different state structures and domestic constraints. As Rose points out, “the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through in intervening variables at the unit level” (Rose 1998: 146).

In the case of US military interventions abroad, neoclassical realist research suggests that the president, whether Truman in Korea, Johnson in Vietnam or Bush in Iraq, has a certain perception of the national interest and of the threats to it. These interests are defined by the position of the United States

in the international structure. But when the president comes to the conclusion that a military intervention is needed to respond to a threat, it is through the constraints of national policies that the presidency defines its strategy and seeks public support. It is through state structures, taken as intervening variables, that the president defines the state's military strategies. These intervening variables are key because they give rise to the policy variations that cannot simply be explained by systemic pressure. As Dueck explains:

[T]he desire to build domestic support for intervention may, for example, encourage the president to oversimplify circumstances in his public rhetoric. The same desire may also lead him to add or subtract elements of intervention that might have been desirable from a purely international, realist perspective. (Dueck 2009: 148)

In the 1960s, Lyndon Johnson misrepresented the situation of the Vietnam War to the American people so that his Great Society project could have the full attention of legislators and the public. This led Johnson to wage an ineffective war that was partly hidden from the American people, eventually leading to a loss of public confidence in the administration and a decline in support for the war. Johnson's perceptions of domestic constraints had a profound impact on the course of the Vietnam War. This point was emphasized by Zakaria (1998), who maintains that the state's role in filtering or interpreting the constraints of the international system cannot be ignored.

Neoclassical realism is seen by some experts as an *ad hoc* effort to compensate for the failure of neorealism to use structural pressure to explain certain phenomena (Vasquez 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999). For example, neorealism can explain the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War but cannot explain why Washington adopted a strategy that mixed liberal internationalism and containment (Taliaferro et al. 2009). It can explain why great powers seek conquest and expansion but cannot account for why great powers rarely sought regional hegemony and expansion in the early twentieth century (Schweller 2006). Because the structural positioning of great powers cannot account for these puzzles, scholars have generated neoclassical realism.

This shift from neorealism to neoclassical realism came with its share of criticisms. Legro and Moravcsik (1999) argue, for instance, that by relying on domestic variables, neoclassical realism looks a lot like liberalism and undermines the neorealist paradigm. As they argue, proponents of neoclassical realism "seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms

that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent, and less distinctive to realism” (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 6). They maintain that this school of thought is a degenerative effort to save neorealism from theoretical impotence. Rathbun (2008) counterargues that neoclassical realism can be defended as having a “coherent logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the way we would expect structural realism to do so” and that it “explains when states cannot properly adapt to systemic constraints and points out the serious consequences that result” (Rathbun 2008: 296).

Neoclassical realism will probably remain a prime target of theoretical purists who claim that the parsimonious nature of neorealism is sacrificed on the altar of FPA. Nonetheless, it remains a constructive addition to the agent–structure debate.

From Agent to Structure

Starting this time from the perspective of agent, new bridges were built toward structural theories through Behavioral IR (Mintz 2007; Walker et al. 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). This social-psychological approach is neither an alternative to structural theories nor even a unified theory. Behavioral IR emerged in the 2000s and joins together a number of existing theories, some of which have been discussed in detail in previous chapters. They include poliheuristic theory, prospect theory, attribution theory, faulty heuristics and/or groupthink (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Khong 1992; Levy 1997; McDermott 1998; Mintz 2004; Brulé 2005; Yarhi-Milo 2014).

While structural theories assume that agents will rationally adapt their strategies as new structural information is communicated, Behavioral IR argues that agents adapt to new information in ways that systematically deviate from rationality. It connects agents to structure by showing that emotions and psychological factors shape leaders’ beliefs about the international system. The unconscious factors that define the psychological “inside system” of the decision-maker are directly connected to “the formation of conscious beliefs about the outside” world (Herrmann 2017: 79). This inside-to-outside process is central to Behavioral IR, allowing it to bridge FPA and international relations (Walker 2011a).

This approach calls into question the basic assumption of rational choice theory according to which actors make rational decisions in order to maximize their expected utility. It argues that human beings are not fully rational and that their decisions are guided by emotions and social

psychology. “Hatred, love, fear, threat, and support all produce not only different choices from opposite emotions, but also variations in the way people arrive at a choice” (Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 100).

Behavioral IR theories all recognize that (1) decision-makers do not always make rational decisions; (2) leaders adopt cognitive shortcuts when making decisions, as they cannot process large amounts of information; and (3) the decision-making process is biased (Mintz 2007).

Behavioral IR is not a new field of study, but its initial development was slowed down by a lack of empirical data (Walker 2011b). Recent progress in laboratory experimental research, however, has brought psychology research back to the forefront of international relations and FPA in what some go so far as to call a behavioral revolution (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017: 2). New behavioral research allows us to better understand the sources of variations in actors’ preferences and beliefs. This contribution is important because while rational choice assumes that actors will have the same preferences under the same environment, Behavioral IR shows that decision-makers operating in the same environment can develop different preferences and beliefs. This approach is therefore valuable because it looks for the causes of the “systematic differences in how actors perceive the situations they face, rather than assuming agreement and taking perceptions for granted” (Kertzer 2017: 110).

Some behavioral studies focus on operational code analysis and assume that foreign policy decisions are conditioned by the combination of two political worlds: (1) the external world of events defined by the power and behavior of other states, and (2) leaders’ internal world of beliefs, which is defined by their emotions and psychological traits (Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2008). By combining these two worlds, operational code analysis connects structure-oriented to agent-based theories (Walker 2011a).

Using this approach, we can provide an explanation as to why the North Korean and the Cuban communist regimes did not adapt to the post-Cold War world system. While structural theories cannot account for the continuity of these regimes after 1991, operational code research suggests that Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro failed to change their belief systems as the Cold War ended. They were unable to adapt and learn by generating new skills and beliefs based on their interpretation of the end of bipolarity (Malici and Malici 2005). While the external world radically changed, the cognitive and emotional experience of these leaders, that is, their internal world of beliefs, remained constant.

Other behavioral research adopts a different perspective and focuses on the so-called two-level model of cognition (Kahneman 2011). According to this model, decision-makers think both fast and slow. Some decisions result from fast intuitive and impulsive thinking (System 1), while others follow a slower and more rational path (System 2). Research has shown that most of the time decision-makers rely on System 1, which is generated by emotions and psychological factors. This system is the source of human motivations and desires. System 2 is used by decision-makers to make more complex computations, and it is actively solicited when “an event is detected that violates the model of the world that System 1 maintains” (Kahneman 2011: 24). Otherwise, System 2 remains in a low-effort mode. As Kahneman summarizes, “most of what you (your System 2) think and do originates in your System 1, but System 2 takes over when things get difficult, and it normally has the last word” (Kahneman 2011: 25; Haidt 2013; Herrmann 2017). Hence, the decision-maker is like “a rational rider on an emotion-driven elephant” (Haidt 2013). This analogy shows how difficult it is for decision-makers to find the perfect balance between emotion and reason.

Studies from this research perspective have shown that the more people’s beliefs are motivated by their national attachments to their country, the more international norms will be inconsistently enforced. During the Iraq War, for instance, Americans who expressed a chauvinistic attachment to the United States tended to underestimate the importance of nationalism as a source of resistance in Iraq and to reject the idea that the United States was an occupying force. Even when controlling for education, knowledge and income, they did not see the US intervention as “violating the norm of self-determination but as nurturing necessary preconditions for independence” (Herrmann 2017: 68). Hence, Americans who were the most emotionally attached to their country tended to buy the Bush administration’s justification for the war and to disregard international norms that went against their beliefs and contradicted their emotions. The same study confirmed the existence of the reverse relationship. This leads Herrmann to argue that:

people can easily believe almost anything that supports their team, and they find ways to disbelieve those things that do not. My theory suggests this may be because they are seeking to avoid painful tradeoffs. They want to act on the inclinations of the emotion and they want to do so while believing they are acting in the morally appropriate fashion. [...], [w]hen reasoning is motivated by strong emotions, beliefs are likely to form in ways that do not follow the logical rules of evidence (Herrmann 2017: 80).

While neoclassical realism is criticized for its lack of theoretical distinctiveness, Behavioral IR is mainly attacked from a methodological standpoint (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). Most behavioral studies rely on laboratory experimental research or surveys using representative samples of people. Few actually deal with foreign policy elite samples when measuring the impact of psychological variables. Moreover, experimental research and surveys cannot replicate the “real life” of decision-makers in their working environment, which is typically characterized by pressure, responsibilities and stress. Some have counterargued, however, that “if a theory is expected to apply to any decision maker, then testing that theory in a convenience sample [...] is appropriate” as long as the research is randomly assigned (Hafner Burton et al. 2017: 22).

These relatively new theoretical approaches are gradually marginalizing the extreme positions that did not allow reconciliation of FPA and structural theories because they espoused different levels of analysis. Most experts, whatever their theoretical inclinations, now recognize that the behavior of actors is not entirely determined by structure and that their choice is not entirely devoid of structural constraints.

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What Are the Current Challenges to FPA?

Books on international relations and foreign policy that came out in the 1960s can be disconcerting. Leafing through the dusty volumes, the young scholar may expect to find a catalogue of generally accepted opinions and commonplace ideas, long since refuted by research. On the contrary, they will find quite the opposite.

Most of the key notions of contemporary FPA actually emerged over half a century ago. In the early 1960s, seemingly irrational foreign policies were explained by bureaucratic rivalries (before Allison's model), social identity (before constructivism), perception bias (before prospect theory) and the interactions between the levels of analysis (before Putnam's two level game). The jargon has changed, the case studies are different and the methods are more sophisticated, but the fundamental conclusions remain much the same.

That does not mean that FPA has stagnated for half a century. On the contrary, after its development in the 1960s and before its regeneration in the 2000s, FPA has become immersed in empirical demonstrations. The ideas that emerged in the 1960s were rigorously tested and double-checked. In this way, FPA has confirmed several of its hypotheses, such as the democratic peace, and disproved others, such as the volatility of public opinion. The validity of some hypotheses has yet to be confirmed, for example, diversion strategy. However, the methods now used to test these hypotheses are more refined. Thanks to this methodological rigor, FPA has managed to prove its worth.

In recent decades, developments in FPA have been more empirical than theoretical. As a result, the vision proposed by Rosenau in the 1960s with regard to FPA's theoretical development is still valid today (1966, 1968). Now that FPA has empirically proven several of its central ideas, it should focus on theoretical regeneration, which can be achieved by addressing four major challenges. These include: (1) establishing the links between different theoretical models; (2) highlighting the comparison between national contexts; (3) extending research to new categories of actors and (4) developing a genuine dialogue with practitioners without losing its identity in the process.

CHALLENGE 1: BEYOND ECLECTICISM

In the 1970s, FPA researchers abandoned the idea of formulating a general theory that could explain all foreign policies. FPA rather produces middle-range theories: they are only valid in clearly defined situations and only partially explain foreign policies. This epistemological humility, typical of FPA, is both a strength and a weakness.

Researching middle-range theories has meant that FPA has been able to avoid dogmatic and sectarian arguments between rival schools of thought. In FPA, there are no dialectically opposed paradigms involving competition and endless debate as in international relations theory. Rather, there is a multitude of complementary research programs that have been generated simultaneously. FPA has explored all possible levels of analysis, as this book demonstrates. Studies on national identity co-exist alongside studies that concern institutional constraints or decision-makers' cognitive processes. Given the complexity and multicausality of social dynamics, FPA's eclecticism represents an undeniable advantage when it comes to understanding the world of politics.

Over time, however, this eclecticism has meant that the different FPA research programs have become somewhat insular. Instead of appearing as a coherent field of study, FPA is sometimes seen as an archipelago of theoretical islands, which communicate little with one another and the outside world. For example, studies on the personality of decision-makers, group-think or national roles only interest a handful of scholars, while most remain indifferent. Each research network pursues its own program, largely unaware of fellow researchers in other networks. This insularity may ultimately lead to intellectual asphyxiation.

Having developed different theoretical models, FPA should now focus on how they are linked. In order to achieve this, some scholars suggest going back to the idea of developing a general theory, which combines all the middle-range theories (Welch 2005). Indeed, this was James Rosenau's original idea (1966). In Rosenau's view, FPA should not simply identify independent variables that influence foreign policy decisions. It should also identify contextual variables, which determine the relative pertinence of one independent variable compared to another. He hoped that the variations between the levels of economic development or between the political systems in different countries would make it possible to identify which theoretical models were relevant for explaining the foreign policy in a specific country.

In some ways, this was also Margaret Hermann's aim (2001). According to Hermann, the characteristics of the decision-making unit should help determine which theoretical model to choose. For example, one decision taken by an authoritative leader, another decision taken by a small group and a third taken by a large coalition will lead to different theoretical models. In this way, Hermann organizes FPA's various theoretical models into a single system. This systematically guides the researcher toward a specific model as a function of the case that they are interested in.

An alternative way to establish links between FPA models involves combining several models to create a new one, rather than examining their scope conditions. Thus, analysts suggest sequencing the decision-making process into different stages, where each stage corresponds to a different model. This is the basis of poliheuristic theory, which comes to life when cognitivist theory meets rational choice theory. Similarly, some researchers use prospect theory or the operational code to determine the actors' preferences and then use an interactionist model, such as game theory or the bureaucratic model, to explain their behavior (Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott 2004; Devlen 2010).

An increasing number of studies go even further and analyze interactions between several simultaneous processes. Public opinion and national identity interact, much like analogies and perspectives or emotions and rationality (Kaarbo 2008; Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). Studying interactions between these processes, which are artificially segmented by research, provides the opportunity to go back to fundamental FPA reference works. It is also one of the best ways to ensure FPA's future development.

CHALLENGE 2: BEYOND THE AMERICAN FRAMEWORK

Adapting FPA beyond the American framework represents a further challenge. FPA, like international relations overall, has developed at American universities. Even today, the United States is FPA's center of gravity (Hoffmann 1977; Waever 1998; Larsen 2009).

Obviously, there are a number of distinguished foreign policy analysts outside the United States. The studies conducted by Walter Carlsnaes (Sweden), Knud Erik Jørgensen (Denmark), Christopher Hill (United Kingdom), Thomas Risse (Germany), Kal Holsti (Canada), Alex Mintz (Israel), Douglas Van Belle (New Zealand) and Iver Neumann (Norway), to name but a few, have influenced FPA far beyond their respective countries. However, most research centers, scientific journals, databases and annual conferences dedicated to FPA are still found in the United States.

This geographic concentration has not prevented FPA from developing remarkably diverse theories. While several American scholars encourage positivist epistemology, the United States is also home to critical, reflexivist and post-structural analysts. After all, John Mearsheimer, Jerrold Post, Cynthia Enloe and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita are all American academics, who have made a significant contribution to FPA, despite their radically different approaches.

FPA's geographic concentration has generated some confusion between FPA, in general, and the analysis of American foreign policy, in particular. Several American scholars developed their theoretical model with American foreign policy in mind and have only tested their hypotheses using the American example. However, it is uncertain whether the theories developed for the United States have a universal scope. Similarly, they may not be the most relevant for understanding foreign policy in other countries. For example, is the structure of public opinion in other countries based on the polarity between isolationism and internationalism? Do ethnic minorities exert the same influence in Europe as they do in the United States?

So far, FPA has no definitive answers to these questions. Despite Rosenau's call in the 1960s to increase comparison between different countries, genuine comparisons—and not simply a juxtaposition of case studies—are still rare (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2004; Larsen 2009; Balabanova 2010).

Nonetheless, in the near future, FPA is likely to broaden its scope and focus more on comparisons. A growing number of American researchers are interested in foreign countries, and theoretical models developed in

the United States are spreading on a global scale. With this twofold evolution, there is every reason to believe—and hope—that FPA’s models will become more established and that its US-centrism will slowly disappear.

CHALLENGE 3: BEYOND THE STATE-CENTRIC PRISM

FPA should not only widen its geographic scope and take an interest in countries that have been neglected until now, it should also broaden the focus of its research and consider new categories of actors. Several decades ago, the overriding concept of Westphalian order justified the fact that analysts gave sovereign states the monopoly of foreign policy and focused their research on this single category of actor. The Westphalian order, based on the principle of state sovereignty, made a fundamental distinction between the international system and national systems. The only transmission belt between the two systems was the state. Consequently, only the sovereign state could have a foreign policy, and the latter was primarily oriented toward other sovereign states. This state-centric approach to international relations has broadly structured the prism through which foreign policy analysts perceive the subject of their research (Krasner 1993; Ruggie 1993; Ringmar 1996; Schmidt 2011).

Since the end of the Cold War, it is clear that the Westphalian order is gradually crumbling. The world is now facing new and broader international issues that are multicausal and do not stop at international borders, such as climate change, cyberterrorism, and migration issues. It appears that the sovereign state is not fully suited to tackle these crosscutting issues and the world is witnessing the multiplication of local, national and international non-governmental actors who try to address these complex problems. Hence, in a world where there is a myriad of dimensions, levels and actors, points of reference are collapsing.

Some scholars consider that by moving away from the Westphalian model, contemporary foreign policy is drawing curiously closer to medieval norms. Today, as in the Middle Ages, several sources of authority overlap, and it is difficult to distinguish public interests from private interests. The search for power, wealth and virtue are intertwined, as they were in medieval times (Hall 1997).

Other scholars argue that there is no question of going back to earlier practices since the Westphalian order was a myth in the first place, which never really existed beyond textbooks. Transnational powers have always

played a key role in international relations, and there is nothing new about the so-called new diplomacy (Sofer 1988; Coolsaet and Vandervelden 2004; Carvalho et al. 2011). However, regardless of whether the Westphalian order has crumbled empirically or conceptually, the outcome is the same: FPA can no longer ignore other categories of international actors (White 1999).

The new international actors that FPA should take into account include towns, regions and federated states, some of which are sufficiently independent to develop and implement their own foreign policy. In fact, their “paradiplomacy” is more active than ever. A number of sub-national entities are signatories to international agreements, are represented overseas by their own delegations, authorize arms sales to foreign countries, have the right to express their opinions in a number of intergovernmental organizations and are engaged in economic sanctions (Coolsaet 2002; Lecours 2002; Blatter et al. 2008; McMillan 2008).

The international relations of cities is another domain that is increasingly studied (Curtis 2014, 2016). Local and regional authorities sometimes hold positions that go against the central government’s policy. This occurred when some American towns and states made a commitment to respect the Kyoto Protocol (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Koehn 2008), or the Paris climate accord following President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement. However, in most cases, the local and regional authorities’ international action does not clash with the central state (Paquin 2004). Indeed, it is increasingly common to see central authorities actively encouraging the development of local and regional international actions.

On a supra-state level, intergovernmental organizations also adopt policies that can be examined in the light of FPA. State decisions are not just implemented slavishly by agents or passive negotiating bodies. Bureaucracies have their own world outlooks and their own interests, and their leaders have their own personalities and management style. Intergovernmental organizations, like states, create coalitions with transnational actors, promote certain ideas and adopt policies (Finnemore 1993; Risse et al. 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chwioroth 2007).

The EU is doubtless the intergovernmental organization that has been studied the most frequently using FPA’s theoretical and methodological tools (White 1999; Carlsnaes 2004; Carta 2012). However, several FPA models have yet to be applied and adapted to the EU. Other intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, represent new fields of research, which FPA has yet to explore.

Several analysts go even further and imagine a “private foreign policy”, belonging not to infra- or supra-state public authorities, but to an NGO or to transnational corporations. Some non-state actors actually mimic state behavior: they create alliances, adopt common standards, organize summits, interact directly with intergovernmental organizations (IGO), have recourse to international courts, threaten actors with economic sanctions if the latter fail to conform to their preferences and claim to be advocates of the common good.

In fact, it is increasingly difficult to identify state prerogatives that are not subject to exceptions, even when it comes to the most symbolic aspects of foreign policy: the British NGO, FIELD, formally represented small island states during the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the rock singer Bono attends press conferences on development aid alongside government leaders and private military companies are involved in military operations. Non-state actors are omnipresent in all the fields of action that concern foreign policy (Betsill and Corell 2007; Cooper 2007). In this context, it is legitimate to believe that FPA models may be able to shed new light on the international action, which involves non-state actors.

CHALLENGE 4: BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER

The fourth challenge facing FPA is to broaden its audience. There is still a sharp division between scientific research and the practice of foreign policy. It is true that some FPA research has significantly influenced the formulation of foreign policy, as in the case of rational dissuasion models during the Cold War and, more recently, the studies on the conditions that determine the success of economic sanctions. However, these are exceptions. A number of scholars show little interest in the practical application of their research, an attitude mirrored by practitioners. Although some think tanks appear to be intermediaries, bridging the gap between academic and diplomatic circles, the divide between the two worlds is still considerable (George 1994; Hill and Beshoff 1994; Lepgold 1998; Walt 2005; Jentleson and Ratner 2011).

Nonetheless, FPA’s theoretical and methodological models are relevant to foreign policy practices. Some have obvious applications, for example, they can be used to improve an instrument’s effectiveness or anticipate how an interlocutor will behave. And FPA’s political value does not stop there. FPA not only helps practitioners find new solutions, it may enable them to think carefully about defining problems on a more fundament

basis. It helps demystify stereotypes, query analogies, recognize perception bias and explain ambiguity and complexity. To sum up, FPA usefully undermines certainty.

Hence, in order to make a contribution to foreign policy practices, FPA researchers do not necessarily have to focus on how their theories take a stance on burning international issues. They can quite simply try to avoid undue jargon and explain their theoretical assumptions and arguments. This is precisely what our book has attempted to do.

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